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Abstract
The thesis argues that the relationship between liberalism and conservatism is closer than is
commonly supposed. Though the 'triumph of liberalism' - whether intellectual <r political- is
a commooplace it in filet rests 00 a conceit: liberalism's claim to be able to provide a publicly
justified morality founded 00 the ideas of rationality, tolerance and autonomy. That is the
root of, to quote MacIntyre, 'the spectre haunting contemporary liberal theorists [which] is
not communitarianism, but their own irrelevance'. 1 I shall argue that this irrelevance is neither
the result of liberal theorists' inadequacies nor a corollary of the exigencies of contemporary
politics. Rather, it is a structural inevitability. For liberalism can justify its values only by
resorting to a conservative axiology. The thesis delineates three strands of liberalism,
classical liberalism, libertarianism and perfectionism. I argue that the problem that all these
liberalisms have in common is that they all need to use a conservative fOODof argument to
justify liberal norms of rationality, autonomy and tolerance.
The origin of this dilemma lies in the nature ofliberalism itself. Since liberalism's emergence
as a self-conscious form of political discourse it has been founded on a particular view of
how people are. Liberal doctrines about the social and political obligations of individuals are
derived from the view of man (sic) as a rational choosing individual. However, such
individuals are historical artefacts and their flomishing depends 00 a precise set of historical
circwnstances. I argue, iherefore, that the various species of liberalism examined in this
thesis all advocate - to a greater or lesser extent - conservative political prescriptions in
defence of the matrix of institutions, laws, manners and mores which allow liberal
individuality to flourish.
1 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'The spedreofcamw.mitarianism', Radical Philosophy, 70,1995, pp 34-7, p35.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Liberal political discourse dominates contemporary political thought. Nonetheless liberals
themselves recognise that much of the discourse is profoundly unsatisfactory. Liberalism is
founded on the notion that individuals are moral persons capable of putting aside personal
valuings and instead acting on norms which can be justified to all. If liberals lose faith in the
existence of such an objective morality then their self-understanding will be undermined.
Western liberal societies would then lose what they hold to be essential - a publicly justified
morality founded on the ideas of rationality, tolerance and autonomy. The attempt, therefore.
to justify liberalism, to whatever extent it can be justified has become central to the liberal
enterprise. This thesis will argue that, in order to justify itself, liberalism draws upon a
conservative epistemology or form of argument which inevitably leads to a substantive
conservative political position.
One of the most comprehensive attempts to justify liberalism is offered by Gerald Gaus's
1990 work Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory': However, in his
later book Justificatory Liberalism? Gaus notes:
I assumed that further work would yield more specific political principles. a
justification of certain political institutions, and, indeed policy prescriptions of various
sorts. This proved mistaken. As I try to show in this book. the public justification of a
public morality has great difficulty advancing beyond abstract principles. Because of
this, the further work that was required was not ... more detailed public justifications -
the arguments for which were manifestly inconclusive - but an analysis of how
political institutions cope with this inconclusiveness.'
2This quotation demonstrates the dilemma at the heart ofliberalism and the dilemma which I
shall explore in this thesis. Despite over a hundred years of effort by liberal philosophers
there is still no publicly justifiable account of morality founded on notions of rationality,
autonomy and tolerance which is acceptable to all liberals. This problem of justification lies
at the core of the current debate between communitarian and deontological liberals.
Deontological liberals such as the earlier Rawls and Nozick try to provide a universal,
objective justification of the liberal order. They attempt to find a basis for human association
which all people can accept irrespective of cultural religious or ethnic background. By
contrast, communitarian liberals such as Sandel, Taylor and Rorty argue that liberalism is
valuable only in the context of the societies which gave it birth: people living in existing
liberal communities have found living autonomous lives valuable and as a result they seek to
widen and deepen the autonomy enjoyed in liberal societies. For them that is justification
enough. Finally, writers such as Joseph Raz, Gerald Gaus and the later Rawls have
attempted to retain ideas of objectivity and rationality whilst at the same time recognising
that liberalism must nonetheless be a localist doctrine.
I shall argue that at the core of the problem lies an intellectuaI crisis caused by the inability
of liberals to establish objective foundations for fundamental liberal values such as freedom,
autonomy and rationality once the metaphysical religious foundations implicitly adopted by
early liberal theorists such as Locke had failed. In its political discourse the intellectual
crisis of liberalism emerges as the dichotomy between communitarian and deontological
strands of liberal thinking. However, what has not been noted is that the other result of this
intellectual crisis is the extent to which both deontological and communitarian liberals have
come to depend on an implicitly conservative form of argument in defence of those values.
This might seem an odd idea. After all conservatism in its traditional sceptical guise is the
3opposite of liberal attitudes to the possibility of rational improvement. It is, however, this
form of conservative argument that I shall argue is currently being used by deontological
and communitarian liberals to shore up liberalism's failure to establish the objective
foundations it needs. It is, of course, important first to establish precisely what is meant by
the claim that contemporary liberals use the form of arguments - at the very least - with
which conservatives have traditionally defended established values and practices. This claim
goes beyond the most obvious similarity between 19th Century liberalism and the
conservatism embodied in that strand of contemporary Conservatism known as the New
Right. The New Right adopts some, but not all of the doctrinal features of classical
liberalism, especially its emphasis on liberty, free trade and the market economy. However,
despite that resemblance this is not the type of conservatism that I have in mind. New Right
Conservatism is itself best viewed as a species of liberalism, closely akin to the Manchester
liberals of the earlier nineteenth century and their proto-liberal economics: in short as a neo-
liberalism. Indeed contemporary liberals such as Hayek and Nozick are frequently
categorised as New Right thinkers,' and many commentators on the New Right have
themselves categorised it as a predominantly liberal mode of discourse, an amalgam of
Austrian liberal economic theory (Von Mises and Hayek), extreme libertarianism (anarcho-
capitalism), conservative state authoritarianism and crude populism," The neo-liberal nature
of the New Right is made even more explicit in the apologia by David Green," who widens
the liberal dimension to include the Friedmanite Chicago School and the ideas of the
Virginia public choice school. But that is not the connection I have in mind.
Let me therefore make it clear exactly what I am claiming when I suggest that both
deontological and communitarian liberals adopt implicitly sceptical conservative arguments.
Sceptical conservatism is based on prejudice in favour of what already exists. It is not
reactionary in the sense of desiring a return to some utopian, idealised version of a non-
4existent past. Instead. such conservatism holds that human beings and the societies they
create are invariably imperfect and will always be so; that the power of human reason is
limited; and therefore any plans for brave new worlds are inevitably doomed to failure.
Burke, in many ways the exemplar of this style of conservatism, explained the problem of
reason thus:
We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason;
because we suspect that in each man this stock is small, and that the individuals would
do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of ages. Many of our men
of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to
discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If they find what they seek and they
seldom fail, they think it more wise to continue the prejudice, with the reason involved,
than to cast away the coat of prejudice, and to leave nothing but the naked reason;
because prejudice, with its reason has a motive to give action to that reason, and an
affection which will give it permanence.'
This conservatism emerged in the 18th and 19th centuries in response to the enthusiasm of
Enlightenment rationalism. In other words, it emerged in response, and in opposition to, the
movement which gave birth to liberalism. It argues firmly that the capability of human
rationality to reshape the world according to some 'right plan' is limited by the inability of
human reason to comprehend and take into account the extreme complexity of hwnan
society. It argues that human beings should instead recognise the value and utility of what
already exists, and should therefore maintain the status quo for fear of making social
conditions worse rather than better. Change should occur only in response to clear and
major abuses; where possible it should be incremental; and it should always be in tune with
existing customs and practices. It is the form of conservatism present in the thought of
David Hume, some works of Edmund Burke and in the 20th century in the ideas of Michael
Oakeshott. This scepticism is rarely attached to any particular institution or practice. Rather
it is what Samuel Huntington described as a positional ideology: 'when the foundations of
society are threatened, the conservative ideology reminds men of the necessity of some
institutions and the desirability of the existing ones." Or as Oakeshott has it:
5To be conservative, then, is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to
the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the
near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, ...
Familiar relationships and loyalties will be preferred to the allure of more profitable
attachments; to acquire and enlarge will be less important than to keep, to cultivate and
to enjoy,"
It is this form of conservative argument - sceptical, traditionalist pragmatic and anti-
rationalist - that I shall identify as being made use of by contemporary deontological and
communitarian liberal theorists. The dominant mode is anti-rationalism:
Rationalism in politics ... involves identifiable error, a misconception with regard to
the nature of human knowledge, which amounts to a corruption of the mind. And
consequently it is without the power to correct its own short-comings ... ; you cannot
escape its errors by becoming more sincerely or more profoundly rationalistic. This ...
is one of the penalties of living by the book; it leads not only to specific mistakes, but it
also dries up the mind itself: living by precept in the end generates intellectual
dishonesty."
Nothing could be further from the belief that society can and should be re-ordered according
to objective and explicitly justifiable principles.
Nonetheless, this is precisely the form of argument adopted by the American liberal Richard
Rorty. Rorty is customarily associated with the Left in American politics, but he adopts
metaphors and approaches in his philosophy which have been more usually associated with
the Right: 11 rejecting the liberal search for foundations, and accepting that liberalism is
inevitably a matter of 'how we do things here'12 - a conventionally conservative position - his
left-liberal commitment stands in contradiction to his epistemological position.l'' My claim
is that this turns out to typify not just what Rorty describes as 'Postmodemist Bourgeois
Liberalism" but in fact more mainstream liberalism. First let me say a little more about
that epistemological position itself Here is how he characterises it:
[Tlo say that convictions are only 'relatively valid' might seem to mean that they can
only be justified to people who hold certain other beliefs - not to anyone and everyone,
But if this were what WdS meant, the term would have no contrastive force, for there
would be no interesting statements which were absolutely valid. Absolute validity
6would be confined to everyday platitudes, elementary mathematical truths, and the like:
the sort of beliefs nobody wants to argue about because they are neither controversial
nor central to everyone's sense of who she is or what she lives for. All beliefs which are
central to a person's self-image are so because their presence or absence serves as a
criterion for dividing good people from bad people, the sort of person one wants to be
from the sort one does not want to be. A conviction which can be justified to anyone is
of little interest."
Moreover, the search for such foundations, he argues, is no more than a descent into
metaphysics or theology:
This book [Contingency, Irony and Solidarity] tries to show how things look if we drop
the demand for a theory which unifies the public and private, and are content to treat
demands of self-creation and of human solidarity as equally valid, yet forever
incommensurable. It sketches a figure whom I call the 'liberal ironist.' Liberal ironists
are people who include among ... ungroundable desires their own hope that suffering
will be diminished, that the humiliation of human beings by other human beings may
cease. For liberal ironists, there is no answer to the question 'Why not be cruel? - no
noncircular theoretical back up for the belief that cruelty is horrible. Nor is there an
answer to the question 'How do you decide when to struggle against injustice and when
to devote yourself to private projects of self-creation? Anybody who thinks that there
are well-grounded theoretical answers to this sort of question - algorithms for resolving
moral dilemmas of this sort - is still, in his heart, a theologian or a metaphysician. He
believes in an order beyond time and change which both determines the point of
human existence and establishes a hierarchy of responsibilities. 16
Rorty's position is epistemologically conservative. He declares:
.. .'moral principles' (the categorical imperative, the utilitarian principle, etc.) only
have a point insofar as they incorporate tacit reference to a whole range of institutions
practices, and vocabularies of moral and political deliberation. They are reminders of,
abbreviations for, such practices. At best, they are pedagogical aids to the acquisition
of such practices."
Compare this with Oakeshott, who insists that
[Plolitical enterprises, the ends to be pursued, the arrangements to be established (all
the normal ingredients of a political ideology), cannot be premeditated in advance of a
manner of attending to the arrangements of a society; what we do, and moreover what
we want to do is the creature of how we are accustomed to conduct our affairs. Indeed,
it often reflects no more than a discovered ability to do something which is translated
into an authority to do it. 18
While liberals see practice as having to conform to theory, Oakeshott - and Rorty - claim the
reverse, and the substance of that claim - the primacy of practice over theory and the
7contingency of circumstance - has been fimdamental to conservative theory since Burke. In
the Reflections on the Revolution in France, for instance, he makes a statement with which
both Rorty and Oakeshott would immediately concur:
[T]he science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it. is,
like every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori. Nor is it a short
experience that can instruct us in the practical science; because the real effects of moral
causes are not always immediate; but that in which the first instance is prejudicial may
be excellent in its remoter operations; and its excellence may arise even from the ill
effects it produces in the beginning."
Oakeshott, Rorty and Burke all have a predisposition in favour of established arrangements,
and agree on the importance of contingent judgements in political and moral considerations.
It is no surprise, then, that Rorty explicitly allies his thinking 00 these matters to Oakeshott,
R.orty first drew 00 Oakeshott's ideas in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,20 where he
USt,'S his metaphor of conversation to explain how he believes philosophical issues, whether
moral or political, should be discussed:
[I]f we see knowing as not having an essence, to be described by scientists or
philosophers, but rather as a right, by current, standards to believe, then we are well 00
the way to seeing conversation as the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be
understood. Our focus shifts from the relation between human beings and the objects of
their inquiry to the relation between alternative standards of justification, and from
there to the actual changes in those standards which make up intellectual history,"
Rorty develops more fully his interpretation of Oakeshott's thought with respect to moral
theory in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity/? In that work, Rorty praises Oakeshott tor
helping to undermine 'the idea of a transhistorical 'absolutely valid' set of concepts which
would serve as 'philosophical foundatioos' of liberalism'. 23 He cites Oakeshott approvingly
when the latter likens morality to a language that has to be learned rather than a set of
general principles; rather it is moral principles or precepts which are derived from the
language. Indeed Rorty's overall conception of morality parallels that of Oakeshott very
closely:
8[W]e can keep the notion of 'morality' just insofar as we can cease to think of morality
as the voice of the divine part of ourselves and instead think of it as the voice of
ourselves as members of a community, speakers of a common language. We can keep
the morality-prudence distinction if we think of it not as the difference between an
appeal to the unconditioned and an appeal to the conditioned but as the difference
between an appeal to the interests of our community and the appeal to our own,
possibly conflicting, private interests. The importance of this shift is that it makes it
impossible to ask the question 'Is ours a moral society? It makes it impossible to think
that there is something which stands to my community as my community stands to me,
some larger community called 'humanity' which has an intrinsic nature."
Compare this with Oakeshott's idea of what a morality should be:
A morality is neither a system of general principles nor a code of rules, but a
vernacular language. General principles and even rules may be elicited from it but (like
other languages) it is not the creation of grammarians; it is made by speakers.25
Rorty actually invokes Oakeshott's notion of societas" - that is, his view of the state as
association in terms of a non-instrumental practice - as the ideal model of the liberal state.
Oakeshott is of course seen as a somewhat politically liberal conservative, and his notion of
societas as a purposeless state which allows individuals to be truly free clearly has liberal
elements. However, Oakeshott's insistence on the primacy of practice over theory is the
epistemologically conservative core of his thought and it is this notion that Rorty has
adopted.
Moreover, the notion of the constitutive nature of communities in establishing morality is
not confined simply to a contemporary (and somewhat liberal) conservative such as
Oakeshott: exactly the same theme is apparent in Burke, when he points out the importance
of affection for the locality and family as the 'first principle (the germ as it were) of public
affection'." This is a fundamental element in conservatism, which Burke clearly expresses
in a famous section of the Reflections:
[W]e begin our public affections in our families. No cold relation is a zealous citizen.
We pass <ID to our neighbourhoods, and our habitual provincial connections. These are
inns and resting-places, Such divisions of our country as have been formed by habit,
and not by a sudden jerk of authority, were so many little images of the great country
9in which the heart found something which it could fill. The love to the whole is not
extinguished by this subordinate partiality."
Even more significant in this context is Rorty's justification of this liberal society: '[I]t is a
society whose hero is the strong poet and the revolutionary because it recognizes that it is
what it is, has the morality it has, speaks the language it does, not because it approximates
to the will of God or the nature of man but because certain poets and revolutionaries of the
past spoke as they did.'29 This is a conservative invocation of the desirability of adhering to a
tradition simply because it is ours which exactly parallels the way in which for example,
Burke lauds the value of prejudice in favour of what already exists. In his criticism of
enlightenment rationalists - the forerunners of liberal theory - Burke states:
They have no respect for the wisdom of others; but they pay it off by a very full
measure of confidence in their own. With them it is a sufficient motive to destroy an
old scheme of things because it is an old one. As to the new, they are in no sort of fear
with regard to a building run up in haste; because duration is no object to those who
think little or nothing has been done before their time, and who place all their hopes in
discovery."
But, as we have seen, such reference to, and reliance on the authority of tradition is also
what characterises the ultimate result of Rorty's position, abandoning as he does the quest
for any rational coherent foundations for liberalism.
The political problem of liberalism's quest for foundations (and hence its present descent
into ever more localist justifications of liberal values, the possibility of foundations having
been largely abandoned) parallels the way the liberal intellectual crisis has hccn interpreted
in moral philosophy by Onora O'Neill. O'Neil131, has pointed out that the loss of
metaphysical and religious foundations has led to a split in ethical theory expressed by the
current dichotomy between predominantly universalist conceptions of justice and
predominantly particularist conceptions of ethics. In the history of ideas framework offered
in Towards Justice and Virtue O'Neill argues that the divergence between justice and virtue
10
in contemporary philosophy - and hence the current crisis in western moral philosophy -
occurred because they drifted apart in their attempts to cope with the loss of metaphysical,
Le. religious foundations by unsuccessful resort to a naturalism, whose content was in fact
derived from religion, to ground ethics. When the religious sources of the science of man are
no longer invoked, what started as objective goods are transformed into subjective goods. As
O'Neill notes:
(O]ne tempting belt and braces strategy ... is to present the Science of Man itself as
founded on metaphysical certainties, for which it can then provide a more accessible
and congenial surrogate. If it can be shown, for example, that human desires are
generally beneficent, or that the moral sense discerns the good. or that happiness is the
measure of all value, then the foundations for a universalist position will be secure.
Once one has a belt it may be tempting to discard the braces - particularly if <mefails
to notice that only the braces are keeping the belt securely in position. At some point
(but not anywhere one could pinpoint) the old metaphysical and religious certainties
are no longer invoked to provide the foundation of a conception of human nature.
which is then supposed to support ethical thinking without independent backing. At
that point the emperor's clothes may fall away. In place of an account of the objective
good, a subjective account of the good may be called upon to provide the basis for
ethical thinking."
This is accompanied by new conceptions of human action and the human subject. Some
aspects of this new philosophical landscape, for instance the idea that happiness is the
measure of all value, are hospitable to universalist ethics and justice; other aspects to
particularist ethics and virtue, for instance the notion that morals are relative to time and
place. Faith in the ability of the sciences of man to supply ethics with the necessary
foundation then crumble, because a historicised conception of the human subject declares
that there can be no such thing as a natural - that is, an ahistorical - science of man. A
particularist ethics, therefore, allows convincing explanations of virtue, but leaves no room
for the universalism that justice requires. In the second instance it has occurred because of
the development ofa minimalist naturalism in the shape of revealed preference theory which
trivialises the good and thereby makes it incapable of supporting a substantive ethics. This
allows a non-empty account of justice - but not of virtue; hence the split between the ethics
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of justice and the ethics of virtue. Justice and virtue are sundered by being supported by
different trends in current thought, which offer informative theoretical explanations of one
but not the other, and so cannot succeed in providing practically adequate foundations both
together. According to ONeill, then:
... the common fate of discussions of justice and virtue has been a loss of those
supposed metaphysical or religious certainties on which the whole of ethics has been
overtly or tacitly based. The unexplained divergence in the way the two domains of
ethics are now discussed may reflect the mere reality that neither is firmly anchored. It
has been tempting to continue to think of justice in universalistic terms because the
broad scope and close-to-cosmopolitan tasks of justice are so important in the modem
world. It has been tempting to think of virtue in particularistic terms because other
approaches seem not merely unavailable but questionable in a culturally diverse world.
If the crisis of foundations is to be taken seriously there is little to be said for
succumbing to either temptation. There is little to be said on behalf of inclusively
universal principles, including those of justice unless they can be based on convincing
practical reasoning, which either sustains or replaces justifications once based on
metaphysical or religious certainties. There is little to be said on behalf of particularist
conceptions of the virtues unless convincing reasons can be found, which show why
appeals to shared traditions or to individual sensibilities justify ethical claims. In the
end divergence between justice and the virtues can best be seen neither solely as a
response to social change, but as alternative ways of reacting to a shared intellectual
crisis."
This is a problem for liberalism because the enlightenment project from which liberalism
developed boldly attempted to provide realist foundations for the good. As ONeill notes:
[I]n place of an account of the objective good, a subjective conception of the good may
be called on to provide the basis for ethical thinking. For example, in many utilitarian
hands happiness is seen as a SUbjectivegood, and further proof of its goodness is not
required, or at any rate not offered. Just institutions are those which do most to secure
human happiness; virtues are psychological propensities that tend to maximise
happiness. A revised universal account of justice and virtue can then be defended as
derivable from claims about human desires and happiness, provided that a subjective
account of the good is accepted. A new science ofman will supposedly serve when the
old metaphysics of the good fails. However, ifno science of man can be established to
replace metaphysical and religious certainties, or if the goodness of human happiness,
or of other conceptions of natural or even primary goods can be called into question the
inclusive universal ethical principles - of justice as well as of virtue - will be put into
question."
The rejection of metaphysical accounts of the good leads to an intellectual crisis 'in
naturalising the basis of action, reason and freedom are all metamorphosed, and many
12
conclusions which were thought to be reached by relying on the earlier conceptions may
prove inaccurate or lack analogues:"
O'Neill recognises that much of this is speculation. However, if she is correct then questions
are raised about how the core liberal value of freedom is to be justified. Freedom, as liberals
originally formulated it, was conceived not as licence but as perfect rationality capable of
discerning the moral law, as exemplified in Kant's insistence that the freedom is a property
of the rational will:
Will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar as they are rational.
Freedom would then be the property this causality has of being able to work
independently of determination by alien causes: just as natural necessity is a property
characterizing the causality of all non-rational beings - the property of being
determined to activity by the influence of alien causes."
Behind this is the traditional conception of the virtuous man ali freed from enslavement to
the passions and so able to follow the path of reason toward objective good. But when the
good is naturalised into subiective preference satisfaction it becomes impossible to make this
decision between freedom and unfreedom because rationality becomes (as in Hume) no more
than instrumental reason in the service of the passions. In effect freedom becomes subject to
the passions. What then is its value?
O'Neill is concerned with the justification of moral values once the metaphysics on which
classical liberalism implicitly rested is no longer accepted. As Gaus" has shown there is a
need for the same sort of justification with respect to liberalism. Nor is this surprising; the
crisis in attempting to discover what is morally good emerged at the same time and from the
same intellectual process as that in respect of what is or is not valuable politically. Just as in
O'Neill's analysis of moral philosophy two forms of justification have emerged in liberal
political philosophy. On the (me hand. there are the universalist, or deontological,
13
justifications in the thought of writers like the earlier Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin and Hayek:
on the other, particularist or communitarian justifications in the thought of Sandel, Taylor
and Rorty.
The divergence between universalist and particularist justifications of liberal value - i.e.
between deontological and communitarian liberal theory - is an example of the same
phenomenon in political philosophy as O'Neill has identified in ethical theory as the rivalry
between justice and virtue. She describes it thus:
[N]early all contemporary writing on justice virtue is universalist: it advocates
universal and abstract principles. Much contemporary writing on virtue is particularist:
it criticizes both abstraction and universality and interprets virtue as a matter of
judging and responding to particular situations and relationships. Theories of justice
argue for universal rights and obligations: virtues are seen as the time- and context-
bound excellences of particular communities and lives."
In the same way, liberalism is divided between those who advocate universalist justifications
for liberal freedom and those who claim that such values can be justified only with recourse
to the claims of local and particularist traditions. Yet, as I shall show, this dichotomy is
more apparent than real. ONeill's model helps us to see that, rather than there being an
inbuilt meta-ethical split between deontological liberals and communitartans, their
approaches turn out, in fact, to be complementary ways of justifying the same particularist
morality." In terms of the substance of their prescriptions there is little difference between a
communitarian like Rorty and a deontologicalliberal like Rawls or Dworkin. However, it is
the justificatory dimension where the complementary nature of the two dimensions of
liberalism are even more apparent. Ironically or otherwise, deontologicalliberals are reliant
on localist and particularist arguments no less than communitarlan liberals, implicit rather
than explicit though that remains. Thus, for example, Rawls' 'universal individual' in the
original position is in fact the liberal individual of western liberal democracies who sees a
common good being established in a society only by ensuring that individuals can get as
14
much a s possible of what they want commensurate with others getting what they want.
Brecher notes that this conception runs counter to classical liberalism:
The explicitness of Rawls' general claim, that individuals consist in their wants, is
usefully revealing, since it runs contrary to liberalism's classical commitment to the
metaphysics-denying metaphysics of empiricism: whereas for Hobbes 'human nature'
would describe the mechanism of being human, for Rawls it refers also to things in the
world towards which such a mechanism is directed. Hobbes' 'wanting thing' is
perhaps analogous to a pendulum being a swinging thing: while Rawls' 'wanting
thing' is analogous to a pendulum's being a swinging thing inasmuch as it is part ofa
clock.40
In other words, Rawls can apply his abstract reasoning only to a world of existing liberal
individuals, a point he makes explicit in his later work Political Liberalism; and it is this
particularist morality which, as I shall show in later chapters, forms the basis of the liberal
use of conservative forms of argument to defend liberal values.
This presents a fundamental problem for liberal theory, in that the inability to ground liberal
values other than conservatively has led to an abandonment, or at least an undermining, of
liberal values themselves. The original core liberal value is that of freedom; that is to say,
freedom from external coercion. This is the substance of the liberal belief in the central
importance of autonomy; of neither being dominated by internal coercion from the passions
or, externally, by the arbitrary will of others. Philosophical pressures - specifically the
demand to justify the core liberal value of freedom - have turned liberals illiberal in two
ways: they have lost touch with the core liberal value of freedom and they have turned to
conservative modes of thought.
Originally the moral value of freedom as it emerged with writers like Locke was
underpinned by the Calvinist religious idea that people needed freedom to behave morally,
so that they could be identified as the elect of God. Once this - or indeed other metaphysical
and religious foundations - was no longer widely accepted, liberalism was left with a type of
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empiricism as its sole foundation; a type of empiricism where freedom became freedom
simply to satisfy desire without external interference, i.e. to be at the merey of the passions,
and where the only common good of society is to establish a set of rules which would allow
individuals pursue their own interests. As Gerald Gaus states:
Although classical liberalism is itself very diffuse, I think that it is safe to say that the
liberalisms articulated by Locke and James Mill, as different as they are, share a vision
of men as essentially independent, private and competitive beings who see civil
association mainly as a framework for the pursuit of their own interests."
These interests may be pursued, according to deontological liberals, insofar as they do not
harm or seriously disadvantage others; or, according to communitarian liberals, they may be
pursued as long as they do not contravene a series of prescriptive local 'goods'. But these
are very different conditions for the pursuit of interests.
The idea of freedom as simply freedom to pursue appetites has led some liberals to place
almost as much emphasis on value neutrality as they do on freedom: if all appetites have
equal value, provided they do not harm others, then the state, or society, cannot promote one
set of values ahead of another because to do so would diminish the autonomy of individuals
in establishing and pursuing their own values.
The situation is further confused by the fact that the notion of liberal value neutrality can be
interpreted in a number of different ways." It can refer to neutrality of justification - that
political and social actions and procedures should not be justified or undertaken on the
grounds that they promote some particular conception of the good; or to neutrality of effect -
that they should not have the effect of promoting one conception of the good over another.
'The neutrality that liberals customarily defend is neutrality of justification. However, while
the competing definitions of neutrality noted above are widely recognised, there has been
less discussion of the site of neutrality: that is, of whether it is specific laws and decisions,
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political institutions, economic and social institutions, or all three that are to be neutral. To
take just one example, for the moment, the advocacy of neutrality; Dworkin, assuming
liberal neutrality to concern governmental decision, has characterised liberalism in the
following way: 'political decisions must be, so far as possible, independent of any particular
conception ofthe good life, of what gives value to life'." However, as John ONeill notes:
Neutrality is often, however, extended beyond specific decisions to include political
procedures and constitutional arrangements: a liberal polity is one that is procedurally
neutral between different conceptions of the good life ..... [Nleutrality can also be
extended to include a society's basic economic arrangements."
ONeill's last point is especially important, as a central component of recent liberal
arguments in defence of the free market is that the free market is a procedurally neutral
device through which consenting adults can, by way of free contractual agreements, pursue
their own conceptions of the good life. Any interference by political institutions in the
workings of the market can then be regarded as an instance of the state's departing from the
neutrality to which it should be committed; because, then, the foundation of many defences
of neutrality is a concern that the state should not impose a particular conception of the good
life by decree or law, it is assumed that the critic of neutrality is concerned to reject
neutrality at the level of political decisions. For example, a governmental decision to remove
value-added tax on computer software while imposing or increasing it on books sends the
message that the government values computer activities more than reading and is using its
power to encourage, and - depending on the level of tax imposed - possibly to compel
individuals to use computers rather than read books. However, most versions of
perfectionism have been concerned with the nature of political and social institutions rather
than with specific laws. Mill, for example, frames the issue in terms of institutions: 'the first
question in respect to any political institutions is, how far they tend to foster in members of
the community the various desirable qualities moral and intellectual'." Thus for Mill, and
indeed tor a contemporary perfectionist such as Raz,46 institutions and procedures must be
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neutral only insofar as they do not directly compel citizens to behave in ways which may be
locally regarded as good. But it is definitely legitimate for states indirectly to encourage
individuals to choose only between worthwhile choices through taxation of the bad and
subsidy of the good.
Developments in the thought of John Rawls, the leading liberal philosopher of the late 20th
century, indicate the seriousness of these problems. In response to critiques, such as those of
Walzer and Sandel," Rawls has shifted his position, most notably in Political Liberalism."
from one where he argues that his model of justice as fairness is universal and neutral
between all competing conceptions of the good, to one where the neutrality claim is
specifically limited to rational procedures: the claim to universal applicability on the basis of
its supposed value-neutrality is dropped. In one sense, dropping universalism means that the
liberal claim to neutrality does not need to be comprehensive, a point Rawls in effect
concedes in Political Liberalism:
[P]olitical liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet
incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human
reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic
regime. Political liberalism also supposes that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine
does not reject the essentials of a democratic regime. Of course, a society may also
contain unreasonable and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines. In their
case the problem is to contain them so that they do not undermine the unity and justice
of society."
Rawls here is granting that within a liberal polity, ethical agreement about the foundations
of a liberal society is improbable. and radical disagreement possible. But instead of invoking
liberal neutrality regarding the politics of illiberal minorities. he suggests such illiberal
minorities should be contained in order to prevent them undermining liberal values. In
effect, Rawls, in Political Liberalism, recommends the types of prescription advocated by
Richard Bellamy, who seeks to develop a form of liberalism stripped of ethical pretensions. 50
However, the problem of liberal non-neutrality extends far more widely than Rawls and
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Bellamy: it is endemie throughout the history of liberalism, as the emergence of the 'new
liberalism' of Green and Hobhouse shows; and in contemporary liberalism it presents a
problem for perfectionist liberals such as Joseph Raz. Moreover, liberalism turns out not
only to be not neutral about forms of the good life, the point conceded by Rawls: in the end it
resorts to conservative forms of justifications of the liberal order. Rawls uses a conservative
epistemology to defend liberalism and as a result endorses conservative political
prescriptions. For example, again in Political Liberalism, Rawls recognises the limits placed
on political philosophy by historical conditions and by political practice:
I also hold that the most appropriate design of a constitution is not a question to be
settled by considerations of political philosophy alone, but depends on understanding
the scope and limits of political and social institutions and how they can be made to
work effectively. These things depend on history and how institutions are arranged."
Far from calling on liberalism's usual preference of reason over tradition, Rawls here seems
to suggest that cautious pragmatism is a better guide to constitutional design than bold
applications of theory - a typically conservative form of argument. Compare, for example,
Roger Scruton's encomium on the durability of the English constitution:
... the English constitution was ... durable precisely because it was never written down,
because it never tried to anticipate conflict but only to remedy it, because it never set up
an absolute standard or an all-comprehending power but only a network of courts and
chambers and councils, in which individual interests could be represented and
reconciled. It grew as the common law grew, in answer to the local needs of an
intensely localised community. 52
Neutralist liberals (including Rawls himself in the Theory of Justice) claim that the 'right is
prior to the good'." Moreover, because neutrality with regard to the good is implied by the
right's being prior to it, liberalism typically maintains that it is both genuinely autonomy-
respecting as to ethics, and universally applicable as to politics. At the very least procedural
neutrality is required to make these claims justifiable. If any system is to be autonomy
respecting with regard to ethics, and hence universally applicable in terms of polities, it
must adopt ethical and political prescriptions that do not impose a specifically 'liberal'
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version of the good on individuals. However, liberals can adopt neutrality in this sense only
if they abandon their core value of freedom as autonomy - an ideal which cannot be
defended on a neutralist basis, as Rawls makes clear in Political Liberalism. This then
leaves liberals with the problem of how to justify their values. It is this problem that leads
them to abandon the claim to neutralism - with respect to ensuring that political institutions
and practices do not promote a specific vision of the good life - and adopt instead
conservative forms of argwnent. In order to show how this has been the case, liberalism's
'official case' notwithstanding, I shall examine the work of three paradigmatic liberal
thinkers: Friedrich Hayek, Josph Raz and John Stuart Mill.
Mill, in terms of the argwnent I sketched earlier is a universalist rather than a
comrmmitarian liberal. He attempts to use the subjective value of happiness in order to
develop a moral theory which is valid for all times and all places. He attempts to put
morality on a firm foundation with his effort to develop utilitarianism as a theory that
claims, although happiness is a subiective value, it can be universally empirically justified.
Classical utilitarianism teaches that the end of human conduct is happiness and that
consequently the discriminating norm which distinguishes conduct into right and wrong is
pleasure and pain. In the words of Mill himself,
the creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility or the greatest happiness
principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness,
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended
pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure. 54
This pushes Mill towards a classical liberal view of freedom in that there are no objective
criteria for what produces happiness other than achieving desires; the best way for people to
achieve happiness is to decide for themselves what makes them happy and to be left alone to
pursue those particular goals. However, Mill is not content with such an unqualified
utilitarian view and extends it to cover not simply the quantity of happiness but also the
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quality: hence Mill's much derided notion of the higher pleasures. This position is
significant for Mill's justification of liberalism's core value of liberty, however, because he
is attempting to defend the idea of freedom as moral freedom to make rational choices rather
than the classically utilitarian view of freedom to pursue any subjective happiness whatever.
This betrays a tension in Mill's thought, and indeed in the thought of liberals generally: on
the one hand they use an empiricist basis for liberty which requires the state or other
institutions to remain neutral, whilst on the other, they often also advocate the idea of moral
freedom, that is to say freedom to make rational choices. Mill tries to square this particular
circle with the notion of 'higher pleasures' - itselfofcourse a conservative notion inasmuch
as what counts as 'higher' is decided on the basis of those whose experience is widest,
namely, in practice those most imbued with the values of the cultural status quo.
A similar difficulty is apparent in Mill's advocacy not just that people's autonomy be
respected, but that it be a particular form, namely that of developing a fine character.
Character WdS of ftmdamental importance to Mill as early as his 1833 essay on Bentham. He
pointed out Bentham's failure to understand the importance of character." Mill's objective,
of course, is to find ways to encourage individuals voluntarily to want the type of things that
will lead them ultimately to develop a fine character; and it is this voluntarism that allegedly
makes liberalism different from conservatism. Values are to be chosen, not blindly accepted.
Moreover, they are to be chosen on the basis of the free play of the individual's reason and
not on account of their being considered by others to be the best, or the best available. For
liberals 'the best' is whatever individuals take to be the best: since 'the best' is the subject of
any political philosophy, that - the content of 'the best' is after all, what distinguishes
liberalism from its rivals, and from conservative philosophy in particular. Now, Mill admits
that not all people at all times are capable of self-improvement; hence his praise in On
Liberty for comparatively enlightened rulers such as Akbar and Charlemagne:" his thought,
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I argue in chapter 2, has an explicitly historicist dimension. Coercion is justified if people
have not: reached a stage where they are capable of being improved by rational discussion.
Mill's doctrine, therefore, is applicable only to individuals within those societies who have
reached the stage of intellectual and moral development where rational discussion can be
engaged in. There is, after all, a right view to take of what is good, and only some people are
capable of taking it. Furthermore, Mill's liberty, like the individuals who are capable of
being improved by it, is also the product of particular histories. l1lUS Mill is in fact
attempting to derive universal values, those of autonomy and rationality, from the
development of a discrete and complex political tradition. Mill is unable to establish either
an empirical or an a priori foundation for his contention that true human happiness rests in
the individuality which comes from autonomy and rationality. Moreover, because he argues
that the reason why no one must interfere with the self-regarding actions of individuals is
that liberty is the means to these desirable ends, Mill is mabie offer empirical or a priori
foundations for the neutrality he espouses in the 'harm' principle.
Thus, individuality, rationality and autonomy are desirable because competent judges desire
them, and not because just anyone desires them. Mill departs from classical liberalism to the
extent that he wishes individuals voluntarily to want things that are good (and good because
individuals of character and judgement want them), rather than maintaining only that things
are good whatever they are because they are wanted." While the latter clearly is his position
- 'the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do
actually desire it,58 - it is not: the whole of his position, since the evidence constituted by
some people's desires counts for more than that constituted by others' desires." Mill has
after all something ofa substantive conception of the good.
In Considerations on Representative Government, for example, Mill makes it plain that he
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regards representative government as the best form of government:
[T]here is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is that in
which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the
entire aggregate of the community; every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise
of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally, called on to take an actual
part in the government, by the personal discharge of some public function, local or
general."
Mill goes on to explain that, apart from certain local conditions which will eventually
disappear, representative government is a form of government that should be regarded as
proper to any society which has reached a certain level of civilisation." Mill, unlike a
conservative such as Oakeshott, is confident that such government is to be understood 'as an
approximation to some ideal manner of government', whereas for Oakeshott, or any other
conservative, it is 'simply what emerged in Western Europe where the impact of the
aspirations of individuality upon medieval institutions was greatest'." Nonetheless, the
argument he adduces for his position is conservative in that Mill sees representative
government as applicable and valuable only to specific societies at specific times of their
development.
Raz's perfectionism suggests that he is the least likely to adopt what I have described as an
epistemologically conservative approach. However, he turns out to do so, no less than Mill.
Raz is concerned with a localist notion of perfectionism. However, he wishes to maintain
Mill's and other early liberals' attachment to the idea of freedom as moral freedom guided
by reason. Unlike Mill, however, Raz makes explicit the fact that his perfectionism applies
only to societies where liberal democracy already exists. In The Morality of Freedom he
states:
The value of autonomy does not depend on choice .... My argument was aimed at those
who regard autonomy as valuable, but as merely one option among many. 'Their
mistake is in disregarding the degree to which the conditions of autonomy concern a
central aspect of the whole system of values of a society, which affects its general
character. 'The conditions of autonomy do not add an independent element to the social
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forms ofa society. They are a central aspect in the character of the bulk of its norms."
The societies to which Raz is referring are western liberal democracies: where autonomy is
not a central feature in the bulk of the norms of a society then it is not (necessarily) a valid
perfectionist goal. However, in western democracies what is necessary for well-being is
being the author of one's own life. However, Raz, like Mill, adopts a perfectionist approach
which states it is not sufficient simply to be author of one's own life: one must be author of a
life which is good. To achieve this people must choose between a series of worthwhile
options and potentially bad options must be discouraged. Conservative forms of argument
figure here in two ways. The first derives from Raz's contention that the value of autonomy
is time- and culture-specific and therefore not universalist. The second is that Raz believes
complete autonomy is impossible and recognises that autonomy must be limited. Again, as I
shall briefly indicate here before discussing Raz in detail in Chapter 4, there are strong
parallels between his position on this issue and that of someone like Oakeshott, despite Raz's
perfectionist claims.
Raz argues that although opportunities to be autonomous are available in non autonomy-
enhancing environments, far more options are available within autonomy-enhancing ones,
including virtually all the same options that are available also in non autonomy-enhancing
cultures. As an example, Raz discusses the change in the western attitude towards marriage,
from the norm of pre-arranged marriages to the general convention that the married should
have chosen each other. Raz notes that such a change increased personal autonomy.
However, it is the means by which it did so that is relevant in this context: ' ... it did not do
so by superimposing an external ideal of free choice on an otherwise unchanged
relationship. It did so by substituting a relationship which allows much greater room for
individual choice in determining the character of the relationship for one which restricted its
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Scope.'64Once these changes had occurred. the personal autonomy which extended to the
choice of a marriage partner began to legitimate changes in relationships per se. Choice has
now extended not only to choice of marriage partner but to the nature of the family, and
whether to marry at all. Thus the existence of an autonomy-enhancing environment not only
changes the nature of relationships within social institutions but also transforms them."
It is the role that personal autonomy plays in establishing new social forms in societies with
an autonomy-enhancing environment that is the basis for Raz's insistence on autonomy as
being a necessary condition of living well in contemporary western societies:
The value of personal autonomy is a fact of life. Since we live in a society whose social
forms are to a considerable extent based on individual choice. and since our options are
limited by what is available in our society, m? can prosper in it only if we can be
successfully autonomous."
Raz's ideas on the unique value of autonomy are, then, based on the claim that in
contemporary society, where social forms are founded on autonomous thought and action, to
be non-autonomous is to be unable to playa valued and valuable role in society. But this is a
localist argument. It declares that to be able to playa role in this particular society requires
these particular qualities, qualities present in, and so valued (or not) only in, a specitic
society. So just as Burke declares that the rights and liberties of Englishmen are; 'an
entailed inheritance derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our
posterity; as an estate specially belonging to the people of this kingdom without reference to
any other general or prior right',67Raz declares that autonomy is necessary for the good lite
within existing western liberal democracies where, and because, it is already extant. He USt..'S
precisely the same form of argument as Burke.
While autonomy is an intrinsic good, then, according to Raz, he nonetheless supposes that it
cannot be an absolute good and can work only in the context of a series of restraints. 68The
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loss of autonomy created by adverse natural conditions, for example, might be just one of the
threats to autonomy necessary to be overcome by coercive intervention. For instance. in
order to prevent a perpetual cycle of drought and famine creating natural conditions which
reduce autonomy, it may be necessary to coerce some farmers to give up some of their land
to establish reservoirs. This is perhaps the kind of example Raz has in mind when he writes:
A single act of coercion of a not too serious nature makes little difficulty to an person's
ability to lead an autonomous life. Of course coercion invades autonomy not only in its
consequence but in its intention. As such, it is normally an insult to the person's
autonomy. He is being treated as a non-autonomous agent, an animal, a baby, or an
imbecile. Often, coercion is wrong primarily because it is an affront or an insult and
not so much because of its more tangible consequences which may not be very grave.
In this respect, however, there is a significant difference between coercion by an ideal
liberal state and coercion from most other sources. Since individuals are guaranteed
adequate rights of political participation in the liberal state and since such a state is
guided by a public morality expressing concern for individual autonomy, its coercive
measures do not express an insult to the autonomy of individuals. It is common
knowledge they are motivated not by lack of respect for individual autonomy but by
concern for it. After all, coercion can be genuinely for the good of the coerced and can
even be sought by them,"?
It is not insignificant that Raz himself recognises that this view has epistemologically
conservative implications, however, a comparison of his position with that of Oakeshott
reveals implicitly conservative political prescriptions arising from his epistemology. Raz
declares:
[W]e explored the limits of the doctrine, which are two. First, it does not protect nor
does it require any individual option. It merely requires the availability of an adequate
range of options ... this lends the principle a somewhat conservative aspect. No specific
new options have claim to be admitted. The adequacy of the range is all that matters,
and any change should be gradual in order to protect 'vested interests'. Secondly, the
principle does not protect morally repugnant activities or forms of life. In other
respects the principle is a strong one. It requires positively encouraging the flourishing
of a plurality of incompatible competing pursuits and relationships."
Oakeshott would have no problem with such a principle. Indeed there is little substantial
difference here between Raz's contention that an adequate range of options (an adequacy
which must be decided in the context of liberal democratic society - we cannot autonomously
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decide to he crusaders) should he available to individuals and Oakeshott's views of freedom
and association as outlined in On Human Conduct.
Oakeshott there postulates a world of individual agents who are in a certain sense free:
[T]he starting place of doing is a state of reflective consciousness, the agent's own
understanding of his situation, what it means to him ... He is 'free' because [his
situation) is an understood situation and because doing is an intelligent engagement. 71
An agent is one who can imagine his situation as different from what it is and recognise it
as alterable by his own action. Such an individual can imagine alternative courses of action,
choose between them and decide what to do. In so choosing and deciding the individual
seeks to achieve a satisfaction, an end, a purpose or the promotion of an interest. Like Raz,
Oakeshott recognises that such a world is contains a plurality of competing interests, and
like Raz, underscoring this individualism is an idea of a community which allows
individuality and autonomy to flourish. As he explains, 'the arts of agency [autonomy) are
nowhere and never to be found save in the understanding of adepts'." Individuals can
become adept only in societies which value autonomy or freedom: again like Raz, Oakeshott
recognises the social construction of autonomy. Indeed the focus of Oakeshott's analysis in
On Human Conduct is modes of human association, one of which is, as we have seen, based
in purposive satisfaction seeking - association between individuals who share the same
goals, who seek to bring about the same wished for state of affairs, who associate together to
better achieve a common purpose. These associations are many, varied and often
competitive For example, a society which includes free agents will, in all probability include
enterprise associations for the promotion of evangelical Christianity whilst at the same time
including atheist societies dedicated to the promotion of humanist values at the expense of
religions such as Christianity.
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In contrast to enterprise association, Oakeshott's other mode of association is civil
association. This he describes as association in terms of a 'non-instrumental moral
practice'." The crucial point about civil association is that it recognises that, for individuals
to pursue incompatible and competing end s, they need a form of association which enshrines
a set of rules which allows them to pursue those ends; it is that that gives civil association its
non-substantive purpose. In itself: it is purposeless, because the values enshrined within it
are not substantive, but only facilitatory. For instance we desire goods like freedom and
security not as ends in themselves but as means to pursue certain ends. We don't desire to be
free per se, we desire to be free to read the books of our choice, travel the to the places we
wish to see and watch the football teams we support.
Oakeshott's position on civil association thus bears a striking resemblance to the point that
Raz makes about autonomy:
Our analysis reinforce[s] the view that freedom is not an independent separate ideal,
that freedom consists in the pursuit of valuable forms of life, and that its value derives
from the value of that pursuit ... [my] analysis ... shows that autonomy is bound up
with the availability of valuable options, those we identified as constituting the
conditions of autonomy, those which are ... bound up with them. But the inseparability
of autonomy does not mean that it is not a distinct ideal. Its distinctness is evidenced
by the fact that it was described without commitment to the substance of the valuable
forms of life with which it is bound Up.74
This, as Raz himself notes," is a conservative statement. It recognises that the value of
autonomy depends on certain conditions whilst at the same time realising that autonomy is
in itself inseparable from the ideals it is used to pursue. Moreover given Raz's insistence
that autonomy is only intrinsically valuable in those cultures whose environment is already
autonomy-enhancing, one is drawn to the inescapable conclusion that Raz's liberalism is a
positional ideology designed to defend the status quo in societies where an autonomous
existence has been shown to be the best way of living a valuable life. Indeed, in its cultural
specificity it adopts just that sceptical conservative argument for the role of politics which I
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have already outlined.
Finally, Hayek offers an empirical account of why liberty is important. It rests on the idea of
spontaneous orders and justifies liberty on the grounds that a free society will allow more
people to live in material prosperity than would otherwise be the case. Hence, the value of
freedom is for Hayek instrumental: his empirical defence of freedom achieves objectivity
only by losing its moral point, namely the intrinsic value of freedom. Hayek reaches this
conclusion by an impeccably conservative defence of the extant order in western liberal
democracies which has allowed freedom to flourish because of the evolution of
univeralizable, non-purposive laws, and also by the establishment - through the unintended
consequences of human actions - of a market order, 'lS[ince such an order lthe market J has
not been created by an outside agency, the order as such also can have no purpose, although
its existence may be very serviceable to the individuals who move within such order' .76 'The
order is 'serviceable' because embodied within it is inarticulable knowledge which can be
destroyed by inappropriate intervention. Therefore, in order to maintain the market order
and law - on which prosperity and liberty rest - state action or planning must occur only in
accordance with the traditions which established both the system of law and the market
order:
'[be important insight to which an understanding of the process of evolution of law
leads is that the rules which will emerge from it will of necessity possess certain
attributes which laws invented or designed by a ruler may but need not possess, and are
likely to possess only if they are modelled after previously existing practices."
Hayek's argument is clearly conservative in that he offers both a pragmatic account of
liberty based on empirical circumstances and justifies that appeal with reference to traditions
in existing political societies. What Hayek is doing is advocating a pragmatic, that is to say
an epistemologically conservative. justification for liberty and arguing that reference to
tradition offers a sounder defence of the liberal values than reason. Hayek's commitment to
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liberty is, therefore, founded on a pragmatic defence of values which have led to the
establishment of liberal market orders, moreover, the laws and practices which secure
liberty can only be amended by reference to the traditions which gave them birth: a
politically as well as an epistemologically conservative position.
What these thinkers all have in common is that their attempt to provide an objective
justification for liberty fails, and that that failure leads them to adopt conservative forms of
argument in the way they try to overcome the lack of metaphysical foundations; the problem
which ONeill argues is at the core of the intellectual crisis in western moral philosophy. For
example, Hayek tries to achieve objectivity on the basis of scientific claims about liberty
providing material prosperity. This is a fairly uncontroversial good but itmeans that Hayek's
defence of liberty, despite claims to the contrary, becomes instrumental, and thus pragmatic
in relation to the nature of particular societies. Rawls's conservatism emerges in his later
work Political Liberalism, a response to the acknowledged universalist shortcomings of a
Theory of Justice; thus, despite Rawls' apparently universalist claims and his definition of
freedom as reason he too finally accepts the historical nature of the subject and abandons his
attempt to give an objective universalist account of liberal justice. I shall go on to argue that
this process begins with the difficulties that John Stuart Mill, the exemplar of modem
liberalism, has in finding a coherent justiflcatlon of his idea of freedom as moral freedom,
rather than simply the pursuit of appetites. I shall show how this process culminates in the
purely materialist defence of liberal moral and political values offered by Hayek and explain
why Raz's perfectionist attempt to justify the morality of freedom resorts in the end to a
localist and at the very least implicitly conservative defence of western liberal values. In
short I shall demonstrate how the localist conservative epistemology used by liberal writers
invariably implies conservative political prescriptions.
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Chapter 2
Mill, Neutrality and Inconsistency
In chapter 1 I examined the failure of liberalism to establish a publicly justified morality
founded on the values of rationality, autonomy or tolerance. As in so many other areas of
liberal theory the thought of John Stuart Mill exemplifies the tensions that liberalism faces
in dealing with the failure to establish such a justification. On the one hand, Mill seeks to
promote the development of individuals into beings of good character; whilst on the other he
believes that the only reason for coercing an individual is to prevent harm to others. Mill
attempts to square this circle, I shall argue by utilising an historicist conservative
epistemology; and this leads him to political prescriptions which arc inevitably of a
conservative character despite his own explicit liberalism.
Mill's objective, formulated in the 'harm principle' in his celebrated work On Liberty, is to
assert that the only justification, collectively or individually, for interfering with the freedom
of action of another individual is self-protection. Such a position appears unequivocally
neutral; however, it is neutral only in the instrumental sense that individuals must be left
free if they are to achieve individuality; Mill is not neutral about the good it is just he sees
this limited neutrality as a means to achieve the good. Nowhere is this more clearly
demonstrated than in Mill's own ambivalent attitude towards the conception of the good that
is, at the very least, implicit within his thought. The roots of Mill's ambivalence lie in the
dichotomy between his conception of liberty - clearly formulated in the 'harm principle' -
and his utilitarianism, which Mill insists is logically prior to his liberalism. I Utilitarianism.
however, is a teleological doctrine which declares that the criteria for judging the moral
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worth of an action is whether or not it promotes pleasure or inflicts pain. Is it possible then,
for Mill to remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good? The heart of the
difficulty lies in the very nature of Mill's commitment to neutrality. It is not clear whether
Mill is committed to neutrality as an end in itself: or whether it is for him simply a means to
his (implicit) conception of the good - in which case his system can hardly be neutral. Mill's
position is further complicated by the nature of the utilitarianism he adopts, of which there
are at least two interpretations. John Gray,2 for example, sees Mill, implicitly at least, as a
rule utilitarian. Mill is not always seen in this way, being more often, in fact, interpreted as
an orthodox act utilitarian/ one who believes it is never morally right to perform an action
when some alternative would produce more happiness. Rule utilitarianism, however,
supposes that it may be morally right to perform an action which is in accord with a moral
rule, on the grounds that the general practice of the rule does more good than the omission
of such a practice or the practice of an alternative rule, even if the specific action concerned
does not itselflead to a balance of pleasure over pain or happiness over unhappiness. Rule
utilitarianism evaluates the moral rightness of an action, not by its actual consequences, but
by the hypothetical consequences were the rule which the action follows generally
practised," The crucial hypothetical consequence to be sought, and which Mill believes the
establishment of liberty will promote, is the development of autonomous rational
individuals. For Mill, only such individuals are capable of being truly happy. Thus Mill's
conception of the good - the development of autonomous individuals - is a product of his
rule utilitarianism.
If Mill is an indirect utilitarian in this way, as Gray alleges, then his neutrality between the
competing conceptions of the good of individuals is adopted as a means of pursuing a higher
good, that of the true happiness of individuals. The problem for Mill, and indeed for other
perfectionist liberals, is that in order to justify their procedural neutrality they must have a
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conception of the good. However, this raises two further difficulties. First they must find a
normative basis for such a conception; and the only one available is founded on assumptions
immanent in the political traditions of the geographical areas where liberalism emerged.
Second, as perfectionist liberals have a substantive conception of the good, they must find
means to promote it without coercion. But liberals have failed to find a convincing answer to
this particular problem.' In order fully to explain these difficulties it is important first to
understand in greater detail competing liberal models of neutrality.
I-Neutrality of Justification and Neutrality of Effect
'The doctrine of liberal neutrality takes several forms. One model is that offered by Nozick in
Anarchy, State and Utopia, where he states:
... there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good.
There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual
lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the
others. Nothing more. What happens is that something is done to him for the sake of
others. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in
this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate
person, that his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from
his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him - least of all a state or
government that claims his allegiance (as other individuals do not) and that therefore
scrupulously must be neutral between its citizens."
This is a paradigmatic liberal view of neutrality of justification. It states that individual
freedom or autonomy demands that political and social actions or procedures should not be
justified or undertaken on the basis that they either promote the conception of the good of
some individuals ahead of that of others, or one conception of the good ahead of another. By
contrast, neutrality of effect demands that political and social actions or procedures should
not have the effect of promoting either one individual's conception of the good ahead of
another individual's, or one conception of the good over another. This leads to the question;
of whether liberal ideas demand neutrality between two individuals who adopt competing
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conceptions of the good, or neutrality between the competing conceptions of the good
themselves. In the passage above, Nozick clearly intends the former: political and social
actions or procedures should be neutral concerning each person's chances of implementing
the ideal of the good he or she happens to have. However, related to this is a far strieter ideal
of neutrality which states that political and social actions or procedures should be neutral
regarding the likelihood that a person will adopt one conception of the good, rather than
another.
The latter principle is fur more radical than the former. However, as I shall show, it is the
former principle that moo liberals adopt, and even in this less radical case, incompletely.
'Ibis principle simply demands that once individuals have a developed conception of the
good liberals will restrain themselves from intervention to promote one individual's
conception of the good ahead of another's. I shall discuss the limits of such a principle
shortly in relation to neutrality of justification and neutrality of effect. However, before
doing so, I shall explain why I believe that moo liberals are neutral between the developed
conceptions of the good of individuals rather than the conceptions of the good in themselves.
There are clearly certain ideals that liberals would reject out of hand on the basis that they
can be achieved only by harming others; the white power ideals of the Ku Klux Klan spring
to mind, as does the desire of certain right-wing groups in Western Europe to expel all
immigrants. However, there are other ideals that, although they might not explicitly threaten
harm to individuals or groups, liberals find damaging to their ultimate goal, the
achievement by individuals of autonomy. There are certain conceptions of the good which if
adopted, however freely, militate against the attainment of autonomy. For example, in
liberal states some individuals could choose to follow a religion which insists that its holy
book is the word of God as revealed to a prophet by the archangel Gabriel. They accept these
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teachings without question, including revealed laws which place severe, if voluntary - at
least in liberal democratic states - restrictions, on the rights of women, If liberalism were to
be entirely neutral between the ideals of liberalism and this fictional religion then it would
accept demands from that religion that the women's votes in elections should he transferred
to their husbands and also accept demands from certain extremist groups that their women
should not be educated at all.
Now liberals would find it very hard to be neutral between ideals such as these and the
ideals of liberal autonomy. Even a theorist like William Galston, who argues for value
pluralism within a liberal paradigm, makes it clear that all individuals should have a right
of exit from any group of which they are members.' Even by accepting the importance of the
right of an individual to choose whether to remain or leave such a religious confession - in
effect to allow an individual to defy the revealed word of God - Galston is being
unequivocally non-neutral between liberal and non-liberal conceptions of the good. This
requirement of choice means - de facto if not de jure - that liberals tend to be neutral
between the conceptions of the good of individuals rather than conceptions of the good per
se. 'This is a contentious point: however, as I shall show later in the chapter it is John Stuart
Mill's position. It is also that of other purportedly neutralist liberals such as Friedrich
Hayek.
The limitations of liberal neutrality become even more apparent when the dichotomy
between justificatory neutrality and neutrality of effect is examined. The concept of
neutrality is a complex one; and to clarify matters I shall express the argument more
schematically:
1. Neutrality of justification demands that political and social actions or procedures cannot
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be justified because they either
a) promote the conception of the good of some individuals ahead of that of others;
or
b) promote one conception of the good ahead of another.
1. Neutrality of effect demands that political and social actions or procedures should not
have the effect of either
a) promoting either one individual's conception of the good ahead of that of other
individuals; or
b) promoting one conception of the good over another.
From this schema it can be seen that principle 2b is the most radical formulation of a
principle of neutrality. Any act a state or society undertakes must both have a neutral effect
on society as a whole, and not discriminate in any way between competing conceptions of
the good even if they run directly counter to the liberal paradigm ali in the example cited
above. I shall argue that principle 2b is not adopted by even the firmest advocates of
neutralist liberalism: all liberals, whatever their perfectionist protestations, have to adopt a
less radical principle or they cease to be liberals.
Neutrality of justification is the weakest version of liberal neutrality. It argues not that the
effect of any political actions should be neutral, but only that any actions taken must not be
justified in terms of conceptions of the good. Consider an example. All governments, even
the minimal state of legend, must decide on priorities for taxation. A group within the
government might argue that a life spent enjoying art is intrinsically better than one spent
playing computer games. They might therefore argue that activities relating to computer
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games should be more highly taxed than activities relating to art, and they would justify
such a decision with moral and aesthetic arguments demonstrating the superiority of a life
spent in artistic pursuits. This plainly contravenes any idea of neutrality of justification.
If neutrality applies to an issue which involves questions over whether a lifestyle dominated
by art is superior to a lifestyle dominated by computer games, then it must also apply to
more significant matters, including the type of society in which individuals wish to live. To
explain neutrality of effect it is again useful to use an example. A government decides on a
policy to ensure that individuals are safe whilst riding motorcycles; they insist on the
wearing of crash helmets. They introduce the policy on the basis that it will cut death rates
amongst the more economically productive sections of society. However, within the state is a
substantial minority whose religion demands the wearing of a particular form of head
covering which makes wearing a helmet impossible. If this head covering is not worn it will
damage the individuals' standing in their own community. The group makes an appeal to
the government for a dispensation not to be compelled to wear crash helmets. 'The
government, however, insists that crash helmets must be worn and points out that no one is
compelled to ride a motorcycle. Such a prohibition does not have a neutral effect in that it
prevents certain individuals doing what they would otherwise choose to do, that is ride
motorcycles. Whether it is justificatorily neutral or not depends on whether or not the
prohibition is independently justifiable. 'The religious group would argue that it is not
because they would place their honour within the community above the imperatives of
personal safety or economic efficiency. The law then could not be justified in terms of
neutrality of effect.
But what about state actions which are independently justifiable? Take for example a small
liberal democratic state which is under threat from a larger, aggressive and repressive
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neighbour. The government of the state wishes to secure it citizens from attack by its
neighbour. It does not wish to compel its citizens to undertake military service and training
but instead offers a series of inducements to its citizens to participate in military activity.
These inducements include continuing education while undertaking military service, free
higher education and professional training at the end of their service, and additional
holidays for those who serve with the reserve or territorial forces. These policies are
designed to fulfil the classical liberal demand of a state that it protect its citizens from harm;
and that its citizens not be compelled to serve if for reasons of conscience or otherwise they
decide they cannot undertake military service. However, although such policies may be well
intentioned, superficially at least, they do not have a neutral effect. However, inasmuch as
they are designed to protect the liberal polity they do offer an independent reason for their
adoption. Thus according to some liberals this means such policies do not contravene
neutrality of justification.
Indeed, Nozick makes a similar response to criticism that his state is non-neutral because of
its political organization and its property and contract laws:
Not every enforcement of a prohibition which differentially benefits people makes the
state nonneutral. Suppose some men are potential rapists of women, while no women
are potential rapists of men or of each other. Would a prohibition against rape be non-
neutral? It would by hypothesis, differentially benefit people; but for potential rapists to
complain that the prohibition was nonneutral between the sexes, and therefore sexist
would be absurd. There is an independent reason for prohibiting rape: ... people have a
right to control their own bodies, to choose their sexual partners, and be secure against
physical force and threat. That a prohibition thus independently justifiable works out to
affect different persons differently is no reason to condemn it as nonneutral, provided it
was instituted or continues for (something like) the reasons which justify it, and not in
order to yield differential benefits ... To claim that a prohibition or rule is nonneutral
presupposes it is unfair."
Neutrality, whether of justification or effect, can therefore be limited by independent
reasons. This case rests on the assumption that so long as the reason for an action is not that
it will favour one party and hinder another, but that - for a valid independent reason - such
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an action does not contravene the liberal demand for neutrality. But such a justification is in
itself problematic. It begs the question what constitutes valid independent reasons. '{be
government seeking to preserve the lives of economically productive citizens might see that
as an independent reason, as it is not seeking to deliberately discriminate against the
minority whose head covering is incompatible with a crash helmet. However, the minority
might claim they are being discriminated against because their faith places personal honour
and spirituality ahead of economic production.
What is clear from this discussion of the nature and the site of neutrality is that neutrality or
neutral political concern cannot be an absolute principle; rather it is a response to the
intuitive distrust that many individuals feel for having particular ideas of the good promoted
by government or elites. Raz makes a similar point in his critique of anti-perfectionism:
At the intuitive level anti-perfectionism responds to a widespread distrust of
concentrated power and of bureaucracies. Any political pursuit of ideals of the good is
likely to be botched and distorted. The best intentions and the wisest council are likely
to misfire if entrusted to the machinery of state action. Beyond that there is a deep-felt
conviction that it is not within the rights of any person to use the machinery of state in
order to enforce his conception of the good life on other adult persons."
Theories of neutrality and neutral political concern are therefore theories of restraint. They
deny the government's right to pursue valuable goals and require it to maintain undisturbed
the status quo, even though it might be able to improve it if it were to try. Raz again makes
the point very clearly:
The doctrine of political neutrality is a doctrine of restraint for it advocates neutrality
between valid and invalid ideals of the good. It does not demand that the government
shall avoid promoting unacceptable ideals. Rather, it commands the government to
make sure that its actions do not help acceptable ideas more than unacceptable ones, to
see to it that its actions will not hinder the cause of false ideals more than they do that
of true ones."
Raz's argument here raises a difficult point for liberals concerning their own conception of
the good. On the one hand, although liberals believe that they know what the good is, if they
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compel any individual to pursue the liberal idea of the good - the pursuit of autonomy - they
are removing his or her capacity for choice and hence any chance of becoming truly
autonomous. So coercion for liberals invariably leads to the destruction of liberal ideas of the
good. This is why all liberals, however forcefully they advocate a substantive conception of
the good, also demonstrate a degree of neutrality or restraint.
In what follows I shall show how these contradictions work themselves out in the thought of
John Stuart Mill. Mill is typical of the type of liberal who offers a neutralist formulation: he
argues in the 'harm principle' that individuals should be allowed to pursue their own
conception of the good, but nonetheless, as he shows in Utilitarianism, he clearly has his
own conception of the good which he believes is more worthy of pursuit than any other.
Mill's advocacy offrcedom for the individual and neutrality by the state is Instrumental; it is
a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. Mill needs the restraint of the state
demanded by neutrality because without such restraint individuals will be restricted from
developing in the way he desires. To explain how this neutralist-perfectionist dichotomy is
worked out in Mill, I shall first examine his neutralism outlined in his 'harm principle', and
then explore his perfectionism and its conflict with his neutralism in Utilitarianism.
II - 'Harm' and neutrality
Before exploring the neutralist dimension of Mill's thought as it is delineated in the 'harm
principle', however, I want briefly to discuss the appropriateness of analysing Mill's thought
in terms of the contemporary debate in liberalism between neutralism and perfectionism.
Mill certainly did not believe that he was being neutral and clearly had a conception of the
good - the development of individuals of fine character. In order to achieve this conception
of the good he was prepared to take any action short of outright coercion. Nonetheless, I
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shall argue that, in effect, the 'harm principle' is precisely a neutralist doctrine in the sense
of neutrality demanding restraints on government action. Equally, Mill"s obiective of
establishing a society comprised of individuals of fine character is clearly a perfectionist
goal. Hence, what became the contemporary liberal debate between neutralists and
perfectionists is first raised through the contradictions present in the thought of liberalism's
exemplar John Stuart Mill, whose attempts to reconcile these contradictions are the
foundation of much of the current debate.
Mill is at his moo neutralist in the 'harm principle'. His objective in On liberty is
... to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of
society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control whether the means
used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public
opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted
individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good either political or moral, is not a sufficient W3JTant.He
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will make him happier,
because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good
reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or
entreating him, but not for compelling him or visiting him with any evil in case he do
otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be
calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone for
which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part, which
merely concerns himself: his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. II
'The 'harm principle' seems unequivocally neutral because it specifies that no one may
interfere with an individual pursuing their own conception of the good even if they believe
them to be mistaken or foolish: where actions affect only the individual in question, no one,
whatever their opinions to the contrary, has the right to compel an individual to act against
their will. From the statement of this principle Mill develops his distinction between self-
regarding actions - that is, actions that affect only the individual concerned - and other-
regarding acts. Where an act affects only the self, no matter how foolhardy, no matter how
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dangerous or immoral others may deem it to be, there should be no force used against the
individual to prevent it.
However, depending re how it is defined, a prohibition against doing 'harm' need not
necessarily be neutral between competing conceptions of the good. There are certain types of
'harm' which, if prevented, would have non-neutral effects. However, it is just these
definitions of 'harm' which Mill explicitly rejects. There are possible separate senses in
which individuals can be harmed: first, someone can be physically harmed; second, they can
be emotionally harmed; and third, their essential interests as human beings can be harmed.
Of these three, only physical harm is straightforward; but Mill cannot restrict his notion to
physical harm because that would mean rejecting the 'harm' caused by failure to keep
contracts or loss of property resulting from fraud. What then does Mill mean by 'harm'? He
recognises that some self-regarding acts can cause moral outrage to others without
unequivocally harming them. As examples, Mill cites the moral outrage caused to some
members of religious confessions by certain acts, and he accepts as a harm the distress
caused by observing others engage in acts believed to be morally wrong, perverse, or
unacceptable. Note his comments on the effect eating pork has upon Moslems:
[T]here are few acts which Christians and Europeans regard with more unaffected
disgust than Mussulmans regard this particular mode of satisfying hunger. It is, in the
first place, an offence against their religion; but this circumstance by no means
explains either the degree or the kind of their repugnance; for wine also is forbidden by
their religion, and to partake of it is by all Mussulmans accounted wrong, but not
disgusting,"
Despite the distress it causes, however, Mill rejects any blanket prohibition of eating pork
even in a society inwhich the majority is Moslem:
[W]ould it be a legitimate exercise of the moral authority of public opinion, and if not,
why not? The practice is really revolting to such a public. They also think that it is
forbidden and abhorred by the deity. Neither could the prohibition be censured as
religious persecution, since nobody's religion makes it a duty to eat pork. I3
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He says of the demands of religious groups such as sabbatarians and Moslems for such
interference:
[S]o monstrous a principle[regarding the perpetration of acts that create moral outrage
as a type of harm done to those outraged] is far more dangerous than any single
interference with liberty; there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify, it
acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps to that of holding
opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them; 14
As Mill argues (see below) neither the intensity of the distress, nor the number of people
who share it affect the conclusion that it is illegitimate for the majority to impose its values
on the rest of society. Such a position, however, runs counter to a strict interpretation of
utilitarianism. After all if someone enjoys eating pork, it gives them momentary satisfaction
from hunger, but it is unlikely to be a necessary condition of their long-term happiness or
well-being in any direct sense of cause and effect; whereas the eating of pork has a directly
harmful effect on Moslems as it causes the pain of moral outrage. But the inadvertent
creation of such outrage is justified, because to allow public opinion, however strongly and
deeply felt, to dictate the conduct of individuals would be to undermine the objective of
limiting interference with the self-regarding acts of individuals.
[H]ow will the remaining portion of the community like to have the amusements that
shall be permitted to them regulated by the religious and moral sentiments of the
stricter Calvinists and Methodists? Would they not, with considerable peremptoriness,
desire these intrusively pious members of society to mind their own business'? This is
precisely what should be said to every government and every public who have the
pretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which they think wrong.IS
He deplores the state of affairs in which 'Wherever the sentiment of the majority is still
genuine and intense it is found to have abated little of its claim to be obeyed.,16Moral
outrage is specifically rejected as a species of harm for two reasons: first because in
undertaking acts which cause moral outrage, such as drinking on Sundays or eating pork,
individuals do not intentionally calculate evil against sabbatarians and Moslems; and
second, because to accept moral outrage as a species of actionable harm would be to accept
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the right of intense. genuine public opinion to interfere with even the 'self-regarding acts' of
individuals. Mill clearly rejects moral outrage as a species of 'harm'.
The third and most complex element of Mill's 'harm' is that done to the essential interests
we have as human beings. That this is likely to be what Mill fimdamentally means by 'harm'
is apparent when we see why Mill deplores interference in the 'self-regarding' acts of
individuals. Mill believes that individuality is a necessary ingredient of human happiness.
For him, happiness is a condition of successful activity in which individuals express their
distinctive natures." It is as one of the dimensions of autonomy, and thereby one of the
conditions of individuality, that freedom, as the absence of coercion, is vital as a condition of
happiness. The promotion and protection of such freedom, however, requires neutrality of
justification. For if state and society are not neutral between competing conceptions of the
good, then they must impinge upon the autonomy of persons which is a pre-condition of
their individuality (and hence their happiness). Therefore, state and society must be neutral
between the purposes of competing individuals and voluntary groups provided they do not
harm each other. For if a state or society attempts to impose its own collective purpose or
conception of the good on individuals, then it must infringe the autonomy of those
individuals - because autonomy, if it is to be meaningful, must include the pursuit of goals
set according to the individual's own conception of the good. It is furthermore, a pre-
condition of the development of individuality that individuals have different and sometimes
competing conceptions of the good. If everyone pursued the same purposes and had the same
conception of the good imposed upon them, they would not then be individuals (individuals,
that is to say, as understood by the liberal tradition"). Hence, to harm someone turns out for
Mill somehow to impugn the essential interests individuals have in autonomy, because
without autonomy they cannot be individuals. It is this essential interest in autonomy that is
harmed if there is interference in individuals' self-regarding actions.
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At its simplest, harm to these essential interests would include the moral harm done to
individuals by, for instance, lying or failing to keep promises. However, as Mill believes that
human beings have an essential interest in individuality, he also insists that they have
essential interests in freedom of speech, association and religion, freedom from arbitrary
arrest and imprisonment, and the security ofperson and property. Physical harm need not be
a feature of any particular interference with these freedoms. But restrictions on them would
be harmful to the essential interest that we have in autonomy. Equally, harm to those
interests might also include harm to the institutions and social conditions that promote
autonomy and individuality. And given Mill's statement that every person should bear 'his
share of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from
injury and molestation'," he clearly regards the failure to perform public obligations as a
species of harm.
Does this mean that, according to Mill, society after all has rights against the individual?
What he argues is that although the self-regarding acts of individuals are not to be interfered
with by society, society is certainly entitled to disapprove of their actions:
[A] person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit - who cannot live within
moderate means; who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgence; who pursues
animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect - must expect to be
lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favourable
sentiments."
Furthermore, in dealing with self-regarding conduct that is regarded as socially
unacceptable, coercion and selfish indifference are not only the only options open to society:
[I]t would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it is one of
selfish indifference which pretends that human beings have no business with each
others conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-
doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of any
diminution, there is need of a great interest in physical exertion to promote the good of
others. But disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to
their good than whips and scourges .... I am the last person to undervalue the self-
regarding virtues; they are only second in importance, if even second, to the social. It is
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equally the business of education to cultivate both. But even education works by
conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion, and it is by the former only that,
when the period of education is passed, the self-regarding virtues should be inculcated.
Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the worse, and
encouragement to choose the fonner and avoid the latter. 'Joey should be forever
stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties and increased
direction of their feelings towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of
degrading, objects and contemplations."
Beyond persuasion and exhortation, however, Mill is not prepared to go. To demonstrate
his hostility to the idea of social rights, Mill invokes the 'social rights' claimed by members
of the temperance organisations that demand interference with what are clearly the self-
regarding acts of individuals. Social rights are understood as follows:
[I]f anything invades my social rights, certainly the traffic in strong drink does. It
destroys my primary right of security by constantly creating and stimulating social
disorder. It invades my right of equality by deriving a profit from the creation of misery
1 am taxed to support. It impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development
by surrounding my path with dangers and by weakening and demoralizing society,
from which I have a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse."
For Mill, such a theory of social rights means 'that it is the absolute social right of every
individual that every other individual shall act in every respect exactly as he ought; that
whosoever tails thereof in the smallest particle violated my social right and entitles me to
demand from the legislature the removal of the grievance'. 23 Yet it appears that nothing
would be more certain to undermine the conditions for the development of individuality, and
hence the essential interests that an individual has in autonomy, than the excessive use of
strong drink. As a section of the community, drinkers - at least while drunk - can hardly be
pursuing their rationally chosen goals. Equally, if people are spending a significant portion
of their income on alcohol, they are not living moderately and are hardly building up the
store of capital that would help make them autonomous and financially secure. Thus on such
an interpretation, the ability to buy strong drink can be seen to be harmful to the essential
interests individuals have in autonomy and security. Mill, however, regards the doctrine of
social rights as pernicious, saying of the temperance campaign's arguments that '[T]he
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doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other's moral, intellectual, and
even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to his own standard .•24
Mill is arguing here against what is a very strong conception of social rights. However, he
also believes that public and private condemnation of socially damaging self-regarding acts
is not only justified. but also a moral duty. Now, although it is possible, or even probable,
that the sale of strong drink causes harm to the wider society, Mill is not prepared to accept
its prohibition. On what basis does Mill argue for this limitation of social rights? As a
utilitarian, Mill cannot resort to using terms like 'natural rights', but nevertheless he does
claim that individuals can have positive rights established by law and convention:
[W]hen we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society
to protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education
and opinion. Ifhe has what we consider to be sufficient claim, on whatever account, to
have something guaranteed to him by society, we say that he has a right to it.25
Later in the same work. Mill attempts to explain the nature of these essential interests that
are to be regarded as rights: '[T]he moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in
which we must never forget to include wrongful interference in each other's freedom) are
more vital to human well-being than any maxims, however important, which only point out
the best mode of managing some department of human affuirs.'26 Transgression of these
moral rules with respect to individuals is what constitutes harm for Mill. They have greater
priority than any issue of managing human affairs, even if such management would secure
greater autonomy than that offered by Mill's insistence on non-interference in the self-
regarding actions of individuals. It is these moralities 'which protect every individual from
being harmed by others, either directly or by being hindered in his freedom of pursuing his
own good, [they] are at once those which he himself has most at heart, and those which he
has the strongest interest in publishing by word and deed ... it is these moralities primarily
which compose the obligations of justice.'27 For Mill, then, the good of individuals as they
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themselves understand it is prior to justice. Injustice. therefore, is anything that contravenes
individual's self-defined good:
[Tlhe moo marked cases of injustice, and those which give the tone to the feeling of
repugnance which characterises the sentiment, are wrongful aggression. or wrongful
exercise of power over someone; the next are those which consist in wrongfully
withholding from him something which is his due; in both cases inflicting on him a
positive hurt, either in the form of direct suffering. or of the privation of some good
which he had reasonable ground, either of a physical or of a social kind. for counting
upon."
In so identifying autonomy and security as the essential interests of individuals. Mill must
believe they are to be regarded as more important than straightforward utilitarian criteria
such as revealed preferences. Indeed, Mill concludes the chapter by saying:
[J]ustice remains the appropriate name for certain social utilities which are vastly more
important, and therefore more absolute and imperative. than any others are as a class ...
which. therefore, ought to be, as well as naturally are. guarded by a sentiment not only
different in degree, but also in kind; distinguished from the milder feeling which
attaches to the mere idea of promoting human pleasure or convenience, at once by the
more definite nature of its commands, and by the sterner nature of its sanctions."
To reiterate, then, harm for Mill consists in both direct harm to individuals - such as
physical injury or failure to honour contracts - and individuals being prevented from
pursuing their own good as they see it - whatever that is. The reason why Mill adopts this
conception is that he sees the essential interests we have as human beings contravened by
any attempt to prevent us from pursuing our own good in our own way. Hence the necessity
for states to be neutral towards individuals having their own conception of the good.
Nonetheless. there remains a substantive conception of the good underlying Mill's neutrality.
This conception is developed more explicitly in works such as Utilitarianism and On
Socialism, but elements of Mill's perfectionism are apparent even in On Liberty. In On
Liberty, Mill recognises, that people can be mistaken; or that they can pursue foolish or even
wrong personal goods - nevertheless, provided they do not harm others. he argues, they
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should be left alone to pursue their own chosen folly. The perfectionist dimension of Mill's
idea of harm as harm to the 'essential interests we have as human beings' derives from its
Instrumentality, Mill demands that governments restrain themselves from prohibiting the
harmless folly and wrongdoing of individuals because freedom of choice is only the means
to attain a higher good, that of the development of rational, choosing individuals possessed
of a fine character. And this constitutes a substantive conception of the good. Indeed in
contemporary terms it is perfectionist. The question that I shall address in the next section
is how far Mill's perfectionism requires neutrality.
III - Utilitarianism vs. On Liberty
Let us see how what Mill says in Utilitarianism on these questions compares with what he
says in On Liberty. In On Liberty he is clear that the development of the capacity to enjoy
individuality is an historical process. Furthermore it is (therefore) culturally specific: the
development of individuality is not available universally, although as a condition it is
universally desirable. Not all people at all times have the capacity to be individuals in the
Millian sense. Until then,
[D)espotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided
the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end.
Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time
when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.
Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a
Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have
attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or
persuasion ... compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for
non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good and justifiable
only for the security of others. 30
Mill's thought thus contains an explicit historicist dimension. Despotism is justified if it
improves mankind; and liberty is valuable only once people have achieved the capacity to he
improved by free and equal discussion. Is the realisation of such a capacity not the
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instantiation of an implicit conception of the good? In Utilitarianism. Mill describes the
ultimate end for all human beings as
... an existence as exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in
enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality and the rule for
measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who in their
opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness
and self-observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison. This being
according also to utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the
standard of morality; which may accordingly be defined. the rules and precepts for
human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described
might be, to the greatest extent possible secured to all mankind."
This description clearly sees human existence as having a developmental and historical
nature. It is not only enjoyment per se that is important for what Mill would see as a
worthwhile existence, but the quality of that enjoyment, which is determined by what is
valued by rational, choosing individuals who have had the opportunity to experience as wide
a range of human pleasures as possible. As people become more experienced. and as they
acquire more knowledge within a developing civilisation, so as their values are changed for
the better and the content of what comus for them as happiness also changes:
[L life would be very poor thing. very ill provided with sources of happiness, if there
were not this provision of nature, by which things originally indifferent. but conducive
to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in
themselves sources of pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures, both in
permanency, in the space of human existence that they are capable of covering. and
even in intensity.32
The autonomy required to make choices is a much 'thicker' conception than that of a simple
capacity to choose between pushpin and poetry. For unless the individuals concerned have
had the opportunity to experience both - unless that is, they are no longer 'primitive' - their
'autonomy' will not be of the requisite nature.
The autonomous individual is the end of the process of human improvement. But Mill's
particular end. like that of many other liberals requires neutrality, or in Raz's terms
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restraint," for its achievement. In On liberty, where Mill is seeking to establish a space for
the clear development of individuality, he states that '[T]he sole end for which mankind are
warranted individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of any of their number,
is self protecuon.!" Two points can be made that link this conception to the substantive
notion of autooomy to which I have alluded, namely the power to pursue one's own
conception of the good, rather than simply freedom from interference. First, it is a normative
rule of liberty, that is to say, it prescribes an area within which individuals ought to be free
(and by freedom Mill means 'liberty of action', not simply freedom from coercion). Second,
and related to the first point, although Mill is generally regarded as an advocate of 'negative
freedom' - the 'harm principle' is a negative principle defining an area of non-interference -
the statement of the principle as outlined above is positive rather than negative. The
substantive question of whether Mill is in the end a negative libertarian or not hinges upon
the kind of concept of freedom which Mill wishes to see applied within the space delineated
by the 'harm principle'. If Mill simply sees that space as one where no one may interfere
with the self-regarding actions of another, then Mill is a negative libertarian. In that case he
can plausibly be accused of inconsistency, and can be said to be neutral at least between
competing individual conceptions of the good. If, on the other hand, Mill wishes to see a
positive notion of freedom or autonomy apply in the space delineated by the 'harm principle',
then not only is his position consistent, but the conditions he seeks to promote rest on a
notion of the good clearly drawn from the political traditions of Britain in the nineteenth
century, a conception which includes ideas of duty, personal responsibility and a leadership
role for elites. The same tradition also includes ideas of self-help, and the ability of
individuals to transcend adverse circumstances by their own efforts. However, most
significant of all as far as Mill's teleological doctrine is concerned, individuals brought up in
that tradition were 'capable of being improved by free and equal discussion'."
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A number of interpretations have been offered of Mill's position on this. H.J. McCloskel6
argues that though Mill starts out with 'doing what one wants' as his 'official' definition of
liberty, he quickly develops a much more positive notion. RB. Friedman maintains that the
typical liberal idea of freedom according to which 'the agent's own desires are taken as given
data. and he is understood 10 be free if no one restrains him from giving effect to them', is
accompanied by a positive conception of freedom embodying a moral ideal of unservile sel f-
assertion. Friedman goes on: 'men are thought of as unfree not essentially because of the
coercive interference of other men, but instead because they 'do not desire liberty', and
servility is not, on this view, a feature of the relations among men, but rather an 'attribute of
characier'." Reasons for scepticism about Mill's adherence to negative freedom are easy to
find. One of his major preoccupations in On Liberty, set out with admirable clarity in the
introductory chapter, is with the rise of democratic conformism. But if freedom is construed
simply as a matter of unfrustrated want satisfaction, how can Mill depict conformity as the
insidious threat to liberty that he does? The conformist is precisely someone who wants to do
only whatever he or she is permitted to do. The core of Mill's position here is probably best
described by Berlin: 'Mill believes in liberty, that is, the rigid limitation of the right to
coerce, because he is sure that men cannot develop and flourish and become fully human
unless they are left free from interference by other men within a certain minimwn area of
their lives, which he regards as - or wishes to make - inviolable.t" In other words, to realise
his perfectionist goals, Mill's theory demands the existence of a degree of neutrality not only
between competing conceptions of the good but also between the good and modes of
existence that Mill would regard as being unequivocally bad.
Let us explore why this is necessary. Berlin has here identified the essential theme of On
Uberty, that individuality or self-development cannot be realised without freedom to pursue
alternative conceptioos of the good, and to do that two conditions are required: first,
S4
individuals must have knowledge of such alternatives; and second, the state must restrain
itself from restricting the conceptions of the good individuals are allowed to pursue. These
twO ideas are worked out in Mill's idea of freedom, and both are necessary components of
his 'perfectionist' view of individuals and society. Berlin's 'rigid limitation of the right to
coerce' refers to the 'harm principle'; freedom in this negative sense is for Mill a necessary
condition of individuality. In his Tlro Concepts of Liberty, Berlin, whilst attributing a
negative conception of liberty to Mill, goes on to insist that this concept is in fact inadequate
for use by genuine liberals:
[Ilf I find that I am able to do little or nothing of what I wish, I need only contract or
extinguish my wishes, and I am made free. If the tyrant (or 'hidden persuader')
manages to condition his subjects (or customers) into losing their original wishes and
embrace ('internalise') the form of life he has invented for them, he will on this
definition, have succeeded in liberating them. He will, no doubt, have made them feel
free....But what he has created is the very antithesis of political freedom."
If this form of negative liberty is what Mill meant by freedom, however, then the 'harm
principle' could not possibly function as Berlin claims Mill intends. It could not guarantee,
or even encourage, the achievement of individuality, because it would inevitably lead to the
passive acceptance of social conformity, since constraints could all too easily be perceived as
freedoms: the person imprisoned by a tyrant, who nonetheless 'feels free', for instance. Such
an acceptance would ensure that autonomy could never be achieved, let alone enjoyed,
because the acceptance of conformity must limit the range of experience and experiments in
living needed if the higher pleasures are first to be identified and later enjoyed. Mill must
reject such a concept of freedom because it would mean that anyone whose desires had been
ironed into conformity would be just as free as one of his rational choosing individuals.
Mill believes in the individual's right to a sphere of freedom, but as Berlin notes, he is also
convinced that 'man differs from animals primarily neither as a possessor of reason, nor as
an inventor of tools and methods, but as a being capable of choice.'" By 'choice', Mill must
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mean rational and informed choice: for otherwise, again, there would be no difference in
value between choosing pushpin and poetry. The conception of freedom actually at work in
On Liberty is intelligible only against the particular view of human beings as beings who
need autonomy to secure happiness. The effective conception of freedom in On Liberty must
be freedom as real, or positive, freedom of choice, not freedom as merely unfrustrated want
satisfaction. Were this not so, Mill would not have spent so much time in that work
condemning the conformity induced by social pressure; nor would he have explicitly
condemned the cooformist tendencies of democracies in his review of Tocqueville's
Democracy in America,
... where the majority is the sole power, and a power issuing its mandates in the form
of riots, it inspires a terror which the most arbitrary monarch often fails to excite. 'The
silent sympathy of the majority may support on the scaffold the martyr of one man's
tyranny, but if we would imagine the situation of a victim of the majority itself, we
must look to the annals of religious persecution for a parallel."
It could of course be argued that real, or positive, freedom of choice is still a fundamentally
negative concept of liberty. Someone who enjoys freedom of choice is simply someone faced
with a range of uncoerced opportunities and the larger the range, the greater the freedom.
This, however, ignores the complications introduced by the idea that options are available
only to beings capable of rational choice. For although it is possible to accommodate this
dimension of free agency by simply stipulating that all human beings, except extreme cases
such as infants, the certifiably insane, or the mentally subnormal, are to be assumed to enjoy
powers of rational judgement and decision - so that the question of freedom remains
restricted to visible and external impediments on human actions - this presents a further
problem. Again a comparison with Berlin is germane. Berlin is reluctant to incorporate
questions of rationality into his concept of freedom as choice because the notion of
rationality in general, and the rational will in particular, is linked with the positive variant
of liberty which he rejects. Berlin thinks that the positive idea of freedom is underlain by a
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monist and rationalist conception of the good. According to Berlin, the Hegelian or Platonic
idea of freedom consists not in choice. but in obedience to the rational will - whereas choice
presupposes genuine rivalry between conflicting goods, rational will points to one, and only
one, course of action, one form of life, for the individual. Mill refuses to recognise the
validity of social rights for precisely the same reasons: such a doctrine would mean that
individuals only have a right to act in their own rational, or in society's, interest. It would
follow from this that others might have a right to coerce them on the basis of a more
accurate discernment of their own, or society's, one true interest. For Mill, given his critique
of social rights in On Liberty - and indeed for Berlin too - this would be unacceptable.
Furthermore, Mill explicitly denies such a position when he says in that 'the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community
against his will, is to prevent harm to others, His own good, either physical or moral is not a
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear ... because in the
opinion of others it would be wise or even right.,42
Mill's position, then, appears to be that whilst freedom is more than the absence of external
constraints, the absence of external constraints is nonetheless its necessary condition. Once
people have 'attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction
or persuasion'," then under no circumstances are external constraints to be placed in their
path, even if such constraints would promote the more positive dimension of freedom.
How then can Mill achieve his 'perfectionist' goals? The answer can be found in his doctrine
of the higher pleasures, and its relationship with his thoughts on freedom of choice. Mill
objects to blind conformity to custom, for the sake of custom, because there is an absence of
choice: 'to conform to custom merely as custom does not educate or develop any of the
qualities which are the distinctive endowments of a human being. The human faculties of
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perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference
arc exercised only in making a choice.r" Our end is to fully achieve our human naturc. We
cannot do that unless we develop the qualities that are exercised in making informed
rational choices between competing conceptions of the good. Individuals can then make
rational informed choices between, for example, poetry and visual art, rather than between
pushpin and pornography. Mill believes that individuals who do not, or who are unable to,
exercise this distinctively human capacity for choice, have lost that which is distinctively
human: because that is what marks us out from the rest of nature." Animals cannot have a
purpose other than survival. Machines cannot have a purpose, but are designed by human
beings to serve the purposes of human beings. Once a machine has been built which
successfully serves its purpose, copies of it will be just as good as the originals. Hurnans,
however, are different: '[H]wnan nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to
do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on
all sides, according to the tendency of the forces which make it a living thing.t"
So, even if a template for a perfect human being could be devised, not all human beings
would be of equal worth even if they were compelled to conform to it:
[IJt is possible that he [a human beingJ might be guided in some good path, and kept
out of harms way ... But what will be his comparative worth as a human being? It really
is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do
it. Among the works of man which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and
beautitying, the first in importance is man himself,"
'Man himself is lost in the forced imitation by human beings of ideal models, however
worthy. It is considered choice between alternatives which allows the development of truly
human potentialities:
lH]e who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him has no
need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan
for himself employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and
judgement to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide,
58
and when he has decided. firmness and self-control to hold his deliberate decision. And
these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct
which he determines according to his own judgement and feelings is a large one."
People who make choices develop a 'character'; their desires and feelings are the products of
their own conscious choices, they will have experienced the consequences of previous
choices and will have developed judgement and discrimination with respect to the higher
and lower pleasures. But what are the alternatives in question? Mill opposed the type of
conformism that developed in democracies in his time because he believed they
circumscribed choice. In his review of Tocqueville's Democracy in America, he is scathing
about both the dominance of public opinion, where 'speculation becomes possible only
within the limits traced by our free and enlightened citizens and our free and enlightened
age': and the state of American 'products of the intellect'. 49 This critique sheds light on the
nature of the choices to which Mill is referring. Mill says of American works of art that,
'[D]istracted by so great a multitude, the public can bestow but a moments attention on each;
they will be adapted chiefly for striking at the moment. Deliberate approval, and duration
beyond the hour, become more and more difficult of attainment.f" He goes on:
[L]iterature thus becomes not only a trade, but is carried on by the maxims usually
adopted by other trades which live by the number, rather than by the quality of their
customers; that much pains need not be bestowed on commodities intended for the
general market, and that which is saved in the workmanship may be more profitably
expended in self-advertisement. There will be an immense mass of third- or fourth-rate
productions and very few first-rate."
What Mill is arguing here is that what matters is not the range of the choices available, but
their quality. This positive conception of choice implies that he is appealing to a notion of
the good within the space of non-interference delineated by the 'harm principle'. He is
convinced that no one who has reached a stage of moral and intellec ..tual development where
they can enjoy and appreciate the 'higher pleasures' would be content with the lower. 52
Choice, therefore, is not just valuable per se, as in choosing whether to get drunk or go to a
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concert; rather it is valuable because once people have chosen to pursue the higher pleasure.
Le. going to a concert. they will recognise that it is more worthwhile. To develop truly
human qualities, and hence individuality, people must freely choose in favour of the higher
pleasures, and reject the lower. However, it is by no means clear that if left to their own
devices individuals will pursue the higher pleasures. What Mill seeks to do in developing his
ideas. then, is show why people would adopt the higher pleasures ahead of the lower. If
Mill's doctrine of the higher pleasures and why individuals would select them ahead of the
lower is at all plausible, then his advocating the use of governmental restraint to achieve
pcrfectiooist goals itself becomes plausible. In the next section I shall attempt to ascertain
just how successful or convincing Mill's doctrine of the higher pleasures is as a means of
realising his perfectionist goals.
IV - Pleasure, conformism and the 'good of humanity'
In On Liberty, Mill paints a devastating picture of the effects of conformism:
[I)n our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, everyone lives
under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship. Not only in what concerns others,
but in what concerns only themselves, the individual or the family do not ask
themselves, what do 1 prefer? or, what would suit my character and disposition? or,
what would allow the best and highest in me to have fair play and enable it to grow
and thrive? They ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? what is usually done
by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances? or (worse still) what is usually
done by persons of a station and circumstances superior to mine? I do not mean that
they choose between what is customary in preference to what suits their own
inclination. It does not occur to them to have any inclination except for what is
customary. Thus the mind itself is bound to the yoke: even in what people do for
pleasure, cooformity is the first thing thought of; they like in crowds; they exercise
only among things commonly done; peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct are
shunned equally with crimes, until by dint of not following their own nature they have
no nature to follow: their human capacities are withered and starved; they become
incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally without either
opinions or feelings of home growth, or properly their own. Now is this, or is it not, the
desirable condition of human nature?"
Such conformist individuals are free inasmuch as they are not suffering interference with
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their self-regarding actions; but they are not free in Mill's more positive sense, because they
are not using their capacities to exercise true freedom of choice. But what makes choice
worthwhile? For Mill, there are two dimensions of a worthwhile choice: on the one hand,
the choices that are made; and on the other, how those choices are made. The first
dimension involves freely choosing the higher pleasures ahead of the lower. Mill believes
that' .., no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be
an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though
they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot
than they are with theirs'." But. what makes a pleasure a higher pleasure'! In Utilitarianism
Mill writes: 'It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that
some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd
that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the
estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone." Mill then equates
the quality of pleasures with their kind:
[W]hat is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost
of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgement of the experienced? When,
therefore, those feelings and judgement declare the pleasures derived from the higher
faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those which
the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled
to be subject to the same regard. 56
So how can the quality of pleasure be measured? Mill argues as follows:
[I]f I am asked. what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one
pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in
amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all
or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference irrespective of any
feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the
two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the
other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount
of discontent, and \\WId not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their
nature is capable of: we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a
superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of
57small account.
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The point, then, is that it is those individuals who have undergone development and self-
development who are in the best position to make judgements about the quality of pleasures.
Mill bases his argument for this position on the reluctance of those who have undergone
development to sink back into a trough of stupidity or ignorance. Despite Mill's believing
that beings of higher faculties require more to make them happy, and are capable of more
complete suffering. he is certain that they would not wish to exchange their condition for
that of someone or something of lesser faculties: '[I]t is better to be a human being
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if
the fool or the pig. are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of
the questioo. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.'" The difference between
the fool and Socrates is an awareness of potential and an ability to compare. An intelligent,
informed being will have developed their capacities to such an extent that they are capable
of autonomous choice among higher pleasures, and between higher and lower pleasures. So
Mill's procedure for determining the value of pleasures involves ascertaining the preferences
of those who are deemed to be competent judges.
This brings in the second dimension of Mill's conception of worthwhile choices. How and
why do some people become competent judges? Education plays a vital role here; it is the
process by which individuals become sufficiently developed to be able to distinguish between
higher and lower pleasures. Development consists in the inculcation of objective standards
for judging the value of happiness; these standards teach individuals to distinguish between,
and evaluate, different pleasurable experiences. Teaching offers models that allow
individuals to discover and appreciate what it is about species of pleasure that makes them
worth pursuing. It is their development as an individual that influences what a competent
judge will find in a higher pleasure. Such personal development can occur only when
conditions allow individuals to have experience of choosing amongst a wide range of
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options. Once they have had that experience, Mill believes, they will have developed in such
a way that they will prefer the higher pleasures ahead of the lower. The picture that emerges
of Mill's individual, then, is of a person who is the product of a tradition that encourages
experiment, self-help and self-improvement. People brought up within that tradition are
capable of self-improvement because they all pursue different, and sometimes competing,
conceptions of the good. Some of the goods pursued will be representative of the higher
pleasures; once these have been experienced, Mill believes, individuals will thirst for more.
The result of these positive choices will be the establishment of what Mill - and other
nineteenth century theorists such as Matthew Arnold, Samuel Smiles and John Morley'"
describe as a character. A person who has developed such a character is not hidebound by
custom; nor is he or she a slave to the baser passions. They are capable of being improved by
rational argwnent and discussion. Moreover, they represent precisely the individuality that
Mill sees as the ideal.
In the preceding discussion of the 'harm principle' I outlined Mill's negative case for
individuality: his doctrine of character offers positive arguments for that ideal. I .iberty
allows the greatest potential for human progress; hence liberty is claimed to be
instrumentally better than any circumstances that inhibit human potential. Yet much of
Mill's argwnent here is aesthetic rather than consequentialist (and thus utilitarian). Mill's
critique of Bentham makes this clear: '[M)an is never recognized by him [Bentham) as a
being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end; of desiring for its own sake, the
conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence, without hope of good or fear
of evil from other sources than his own inward consciousness/'" His justification of the
intrinsic value of individuality is difficult to pin down, but his most clearly developed
attempt to offer such a justification comes in the final chapter of A System of Logic'" 1Ie
begins by drawing a general distinction between art and science. Science is defined as
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'inquiries into the COW'SC of nature'.62 That part of moral philosophy that deals with the
natural consequences of actions (including those that relate to human nature) is a science.
But that part of it which deals in ultimate ends, or precepts, lies in the realm of art. The
relation between the realm of art and the realm of science can be characterised thus:
... the art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to
the science. The science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be
studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends it back to art with a
theorem of the combination of circumstances by which it could be produced. Art then
examines these combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them arc or arc
not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not.63
Art, which can be appreciated only through the development of character and judgement,
tells individuals what given ends are desirable. The result is the enhancement and progress
of humanity as a whole:
... by cultivating it [individuality] and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the
rights and interests of others, ... human beings become ... noble and beautiful obiectls]
of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the
same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing
more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, 64
Mill values individuality because it improves mankind and acts as a motor to progress. It
ensures that not only the quality, but also the quantity, of happiness is increased. But is this
also the reason Mill gives in defence of individuality'! On this Mill is ambivalent. In
Utilitarianism he insists that '[Q]uestions of ultimate ends arc not amenable to direct
proof.,65Then Mill says - famously - that
...the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do
actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in
theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any
person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable,
except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own
happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case
admits of but all of which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each
person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a
good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends
of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of'morality/"
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Now, let us accept for the time being that Mill is the utilitarian he claims to be, lie has
proved by way of an arguably, but perhaps not necessarily viciously. eire..ular argument that
happiness is desirable because individuals desire it.67 Why, then, does Mill believe that the
development and protection of individuality is the key to promoting the greatest happiness
for the greatest number? In an apparently contradictory section in A System of Logic, Mill
first commits himself to the principle of utility: 'I ... declare my conviction, that the general
principle to which all rules of practice ought to conform, and the test by which they should
be tried, is that of conduciveness to the happiness of mankind, or rather, of all sentient
beings: in other words, that the promotion of happiness is the ultimate principle of
Teleology.'68 But he immediately qualifies this statement in such a way as to suggest that he
is to be taken as a rule utilitarian:
I do not mean to assert that the promotion of happiness should be itself the end of all
actions or even of all rules of action. It is the justification, and ought to be the
controller of all ends, but it is not in itself the sole end. There arc many virtuous
actions, and even virtuous modes of action, ... by which happiness in the particular
instance is sacrificed, more pain being produced than pleasure. But conduct of which
this can be truly asserted admits of justification only because it can be shown that on
the whole more happiness will exist in the world if feelings arc cultivated which will
make people, in certain cases, regardless of happiness."
Mill then goes on to argue that the good of hwnanity as a whole is best served if human
beings take for their ultimate aim the development of what is best in themselves, irrespective
of whether this would promote the happiness of the individual, or indeed the happiness of
humanity. How then can Mill still claim to be a utilitarian, when he says the 'cultivation of
an ideal nobleness of will and conduct' should not be subordinate to the individual or
collective pursuit of happiness to The point is that Mill values excellence of character in the
same way as he values individuality, the pre-condition for developing a character: that is he
values both solely as a condition of happiness. However, this is not simply happiness in the
sense of the lower pleasures and absence of pain. but rather the happiness that comes from
nobleness of character:
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[Tjhe character itself should be, to the individual, a paramount end, simply because the
existence of this ideal nobleness of character, or of a near approach to it, in any
abundance, would go further than all things else towards making human life happy,
both in the comparatively humble sense of pleasure and freedom from pain, and in the
higher meaning of rendering life, not what it now is almost universally puerile and
insignificant, but such as human beings with highly developed faculties can care to
have."
Mill, insofar as he is concerned with individuals pursuing fineness of character for its own
sake and no other, in this remains utilitarian. Mill clearly believes that the development of
fineness of character is likely not only to promote the happiness of the individual concerned.
but also the happiness of those around them. Developing a character is a surer WdY than
adopting a felicific calculus of becoming a practically wise agent and promoting the public
happiness.
Mill's objectives are not neutral between different conceptions of human flourishing. llis aim
is what is now termed a perfectionist one, it is to establish a society where, through
education, individuals develop fine, well-rounded characters in which intellectual rigour
coexists with imagination, liveliness and prudent judgement. Such qualities are desirable,
both because they are grounds for happiness in themselves, and because people who possess
such qualities are likely to be more sympathetic to others, and hence promote their
happiness.
Where does this leave Mill's neutrality? His adherence to neutrality is based on the idea of
lexical priorities.72 He recognises that individual, self-regarding actions can and do damage
the wider development of individuality; but coercion of individuals, once they have reached
a certain stage of historical development, can do more harm to this ultimate goal them any
harm done by individual actions. However, this leaves open the possibility of using non-
coercive persuasion and leadership by elites to protect and promote conditions that allow
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individuality to flourish. So although the use of coercion is forbidden to achieve perfectionist
goals, non-coercive methods manifestly are not.
Although self-regarding acts may not be interfered with, nonetheless, if such acts 'arc
hurtful to others or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going to the
length of violating any of their constituted rights,' then the individual may be 'justly
punished by opinion though not by law." Mill also makes clear that individuals who pursue
'animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intelleet'" must expect to be judged
unfavourably by their fellows. He believes that it would be doing such a person a favour to
warn and persuade them against committing any acts that would result in justifiable public
opprobrium. Moreover, individuals who indulged in the lower pleasures at the expense of
the higher will be, and indeed should be, subject to the spontaneous penalties of society:
[W]e have a right, also in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of
anyone, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We arc
not bound, ...to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it...fhr we have a right to
choose the society most acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to
caution others against him if we think his example or conversation likely to have a
pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others a preference
over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his improvement. In
these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others lor
faults which directly concern only himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so far
as they are the natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults
themselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of
. hm t 75punts en.
Mill is saying that if people choose to prefer the lower pleasures over the higher, if they
behave in ways which will not lead them to develop 'fineness of character', then they must,
at best, be persuaded of the error of their ways; and at worst, ifthcy still refuse to conform to
his ideals, then they may be justifiably shunned by the rest of society. Mill's neutrality. then,
is not an end in itself, but a means to achieving his goal of a society of rationally choosing
individuals, which in tum, is his utilitarian way of indirectly achieving the greatest
happiness for the greatest number.
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That this really is Mill's position is confirmed by his argument on slavery. The act of an
individual's selling him- or herself into slavery must be a self-regarding act. It affects the
essential interests of no one but the person who has agreed to be a slave. It could. of course.
be argued that by doing so the individual coocerned WdS damaging the well-being of the
wider society by their act: but so, in Mill's view, were drunkards, gamblers and fornicators.
and he insisted that they should not be punished for their actions beyond public censure, The
act of selling one's self into slavery though is different from those because
[T]he reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others with a person's voluntary
acts is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that what he so
chooses is desirable, or at least endurable, to him, and his own good is on the whole
best provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. But by selling
himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he forgoes any future use of it beyond that
single act. He therefore, defeats, in his own case, the very purpose that is the
justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. lie is no longer free, but is
thenceforth in a position which has no longer the presumption in its favour that would
be afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require
that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his
freedom."
On the one hand this position seems inconsistent, in that it limits the right of individuals to
undertake self-regarding acts without interference. But in the light of previous discussions of
the relationship between Mill's principle of utility and the higher pleasures. it is remarkably
consistent. Freedom, although of some intrinsic value, is fundamentally to be seen as the
in!>1nunentby which human beings attain individuality. That is how they become rational
choosing individuals and possessors of Mill's fine character. The possessors of such
characters are not only happy in themselves, but they are more likely to promote happiness
amongst their fellow human beings. Thus if Mill is to be read as offering a consistent view
of the value ofindividuality, he must also be seen as regarding liberty not as an end in itself:
but the means to the end of fine character.
This is the conception of the good that is implicit in Mill's thought. His neutrality is not like
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that of deontological liberals such as Rawls, who declare that the 'right is prior to the good';
rather it is neutrality with regard to the means whereby the good is to be achieved. For Mill,
the good is prior to the right, since the latter is a question of the efficiency of the actions
concerned in helping to achieve the good. In all cases where choices arc made that still
allow people to retain freedom, that is the means to their good, and they arc not to be
interfered with other than by persuasion. However, in a case such as making a choice to
become a slave, where the choice cuts off any hope of attaining the good, then that act is
prohibited. Mill's ultimate good is the true happines. s that comes from individuality and a
fine character and Mill defends liberty because it is the means to that particular end.
v -Mill and Conservatism
In Chapter 1 I outlined the ways in which liberalism has a tendency to U'iC conservative
forms of argument and a conservative epistemology to justify its core value of autonomy, In
the remainder of this chapter I shall show how this is also the case with Mill. Just to
reiterate I argued that liberals use conservative forms of argument. In this form of argument
liberals state that these liberal values are ours. We have found much utility in them and wc
will not change them unless there is overwhelming evidence that they arc damaging, and
even then we will retain as much as possible of our own values in any new system.
Liberalism becomes politically conservative because of its cultural specificity; a specificity
that recognises that liberalism can only flourish within a certain matrix of manners, morals
laws and institutions. It therefore falls back in its self-justification on the conservative
sceptical justification of political activity.
Mill uses a conservative form of argument in that his justification of autonomy and
individuality rests not on universalist empirical or a priori arguments, hut <m their being
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desired by individuals deemed to be good judges within societies whose political and social
traditions are compatible with liberalism. Mill is adamant that the happiness that comes
from individuality and a fine character is worthwhile only because people desire them and
having experienced them would not willingly return to a previous condition. On the other
hand, people who do not desire these suffer from a lack of development. What, then, comes
first? In the end his position is an empirical one: his 'good' is desirable because people desire
it. This is surely the antithesis of what liberalism is supposed to be about. '[be liberal project
is predicated on the idea that it is possible to form a social order in which individuals could
emancipate themselves from the contingency and particularity of tradition by appealing to
genuinely universal tradition-independent norms." By his insistence that ultimately the only
evidence we have that something is desirable is that people desire it, Mill is abandoning the
liberal quest for universal foundations because, as he recognises with his concern for the
development of democratic conformity in the USA and elsewhere, what people, as a matter
of fact, desire is socially conditioned. What Mill does not grasp is that if desires in general,
are a product of the social context then so is the particular desire that he wishes to Sl.'C
encouraged, namely the desire for individuality. Nevertheless his acceptance of the
argument that desires, including the desire for individuality, arc socially conditioned, is
clear evidence of Mill adopting a conservative form of argument.
What of the idea of Mill as being politically conservative, in the sense of writers like
Oakeshott? Evidence that Mill might adopt politically conservative prescriptions can he
found in the essays on Bentham and Coleridge". In his Essay on Bentham Mill offered a
critique of what he believed was the moral and spiritual vacuwn at the heart of Bcnthamitc
utilitarianism. He criticised Bentham for reducing human nature to the level of interests and
passions at the expense of conscience, character and moral sense. Moreover, he argued that
Bentham WdS guilty of subverting those forces in society (m which morality depended.
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Thinking logical clarity to be everything, Bentham had dismissed ali 'vague generalities' the
entire moral history and experience of mankind. Mill condemned this view stating: 'It must
be allowed that even the originality which dares think for itself is not a more necessary part
of the philosophical character than reverence for previous thinkers, and for the collective
mind of the human race.'" Lacking any respect for tradition, Bentham also failed to
recognise the existence of 'national character', the collective spirit which alone 'enables any
body of human beings to exist as a society,' which causes one nation to fail, one to 'aspire to
elevated things, another to grovel in mean ones.' Bentham's philosophy might be appropriate
for the 'business' part of life; but it was totally inappropriate for the moral and spiritual
side. so
In his Essay on Coleridge, Mill carried these ideas still further, criticising not only Bentham
but the French philosophes for adopting a wholly critical and negative stance toward society.
Instead of attacking the old regime for failing to provide the essential conditions of a durable
order, for 'sapping the necessary foundations of society', the philosophes exulted that these
foundations were being destroyed:
In the weakening of all government they saw only the weakening of bad government:
and thought they could not better employ themselves than in finishing the task so well
begun - in expelling out of every mind the last vestige of belief in that creed lID which
all the restraining discipline recognised in the education of European countries still
rested, and with which in the general mind it was inseparably associated: in unsettling
everything that was considered settled, making men doubtful of the few things of
which they felt certain; and in uprooting what little remained in the people's mind of
reverence for anything above them, of respect to any of the limits which custom and
prescription had set to the indulgence of each man's fancies or inclinations, or of
attachment to any of the things which belonged to them as a nation, and which made
th .' ch 81them feel err umty as su .
Burke himself would have been comfortable with such a critique, and there are in fact strong
echoes in Mill's critique of the French Revolution in the Essay on Coleridge of Burke's
Reflections on the Revolution in France. For instance, Burke's appeal to the 'little platoon"?
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as the basis for allegiance offers, at the very least, a parallel to the views of Mill cited above
on nationality. Moreover it is in opposition to the negative, subversive, philosophy of the
French Revolution - as he sees it - that Mill posits the essential conditions t<)f a permanent
political society:
In all political societies which have had a durable existence, there has been some fixed
point; something which men agreed in holding sacred; which might or might not he
lawful to contest in theory, but which no one could either fear ()f hope to sec shaken in
practice; which in short (except perhaps in some temporary crisis), WdS in the common
estimation placed above discussion. And the necessity of this may easily be made
evident. A state never is, nor, until mankind are vastly improved, can hope to he, for
any long time exempt from internal dissension; for there neither ever is nor ever has
been any state of society in which collisions did not occur between the immediate
interests and passions of powerful sections of the people. What, then, enables society to
weather these storms, and pass through turbulent times without any permanent
weakening of the ties which hold it together? Precisely this - that however important
the interests about which men fallout, the conflict does not affect the fundamental
principles of the system of social union which happen to exist; nor threaten large
portions of the community with the subversion of that on which they have huilt their
calculations, and with which their hopes and aims have become identified. But when
the questioning of these fundamental principles is (not an occasional disease, but) the
habitual condition of the body politic; and spring naturally from such a situation, the
state is virtually in a state of civil WdI"; and can never long remain tree from it in a1.1
and fact.83
Mill has here identified three essential conditions necessary fiJr permanent political society:
allegiance, education and nationality. One of them, allegiance, is 'above discussion'," which
suggests that Mill's is a very conservative liberalism, and one which would definitely link
him closely to writers like Burke who also see allegiance to the state as imperative and to he
abrogated only in extreme circumstances. However, it is Mill's views (ID nationality which
see him at his most conservative. He sees nationality as a positive idea because it express, ..'S a
sense of sympathy rather than hostility, of union rather than separation. It is the 'feeling of
common interest' which tied together those with a common polity, history, and geography,
which made them cherish that tie, feel that they were one public indissolubly bound
together.8S What Mill is arguing here is that the ties than bind a polity rest on feelings of
affection rather than on self-interest. But this is exactly what Burke and Oakeshott rest their
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ideas of allegiance upon. Burke notes;
... we have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood; binding up the
constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties; adopting our fundamental
laws into the bosom of our family affections; keeping inseparable, and cherishing with
the warmth of all their combined and mutually reflected charities. our state. our
hearths, our sepulchres, and our altars."
Similarly, Oakeshott characterises the conservative disposition thus:
The general characteristics of this disposition ... centre upon a propensity to usc and
enjoy what is available rather than to wish for or look filr something else; to delight in
what is present rather than what was or what may be. Reflection may bring to light an
appropriate gratefulness for what is available, and consequently the acknowledgement
of a gift or an inheritance from the past; but there is no mere idolizing of what is
87passed and gone.
The nature of government that is derived from such a disposition must be limited, for if it
were more activist it would destroy the conditions which have been discovered to be so
valuable. As Oakeshott says, ' ... governing is recognized as a specific and limited activity;
not the management of an enterprise, but the rule of those engaged in a great diversity of
self-chosen enterprises; and with activities only in their propensity to collide with one
ther,88ano .
Given that Mill also desires to see limited government it is easy to sec the connections
betweCIl his use of a conservative form of argument and the conservative substantive
arguments that emerge from it. However, whereas Mill takes an indirectly perfectionist
approach to government and society, a sceptical conservative such as Oakeshott would not.
The perfectionist strand in Mill's thought is apparent from his earliest writings. In a speech
on 'Perfectibility' in 1828,89 Mill asks whether the moral character of individuals can be
improved. His answer is that it could be if two forces were brought to bear upon individuals:
a sound moral education in their early years and the 'insensible influence of the world. of
society, and public opinion upon their habits and associations in after life,.9() If some men
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were morally inferior to others, it was either because their education had been faulty, or
because the influence of public opinion had been insufficient. And Mill interpreted public
opinion in the largest terms, as representing the opinion not of the group immediately
surrounding the individual but of society at large. He advised that men be removed from the
'opinion of their private and separate coteries' and made 'amenable to the general tribunal of
the public at large'. Only if that were done, ifpublic opinion itself were elevated to a higher
moral level by a proper system of education, and if that public opinion exercised the
influence it was capable of, could a 'high state of general morality' be attained." By contrast,
conservatism is a doctrine of imperfection. Oakeshott, for example, argues that political
society is not 'concerned with moral right and wrong' and its business is not to 'make men
good or even better'.92 In filet it is this perfectionism that distances Mill most from sceptical
conservative prescriptions: nonetheless Mill recognises the importance of values like
allegiance and affection in the maintenance and establishment of political societies. 'Inc
tension in Mill's thought then is not so much between his perfectionism and his neutrality -
a tension in which, as I have argued it is his perfectionism that wins out - but between his
conservatism and his perfectionism.
Where does this leave the normative foundations of Mill's thought? lie wishes to sec the
maintenance and development of rationally choosing individuals, but offers no non-circular
defence of the desire of people to become such individuals; he simply observes that they do
indeed desire to do so. In other words, they have a prejudice in favour of the establishment
of individuality, because, according to Mill, they believe, or at least those qualified to judge
believe, that true happiness lies in individuality. The only justlflcation he offers of this is
that individuality is a quality that at least some - developed - people have, as a matter of tact.
been found to enjoy and that therefore we should have a predisposition in its favour. The
reason for that predisposition is simply that people have enjoyed the experience of
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individuality.93 Mill's normative foundation amounts, then, to this: individuality is good
because people enjoy it. However, individuality itself and its enjoyment was not something
that appeared out of the blue on the eve of July 14th 1789 or even November 5th 1688: rather
it was the development of a long historical process which allowed the development of
traditions institutions and attitudes which held that individuality was a good." This is the
defence of something on the grounds that it has existed. and because people have found
much to enjoy in it: it is a classical conservative defence of institutions, traditions or modes
of life - as Mill himself recognises in his strictures against conformity, Of course, and
despite accurately perceiving the historically grounded nature of the liberal tradition, Mill
does not himself draw the conservative inference that to preserve and encourage
individuality, it is necessary to preserve and maintain existing traditions and institutions lest
the conditions which allow individuality to flourish be lost. Had he been consistent he would
have had to drop either his perfectionism or his neutrality of justification. To do the first
would have been to leave his liberalism without justification (that is to say in just the
position liberalism finds itself today). To do the second would have been to give up on
liberalism, a liberalism he can maintain only at the cost ofinconsistcncy.
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Chapter 3
Raz, Contextualism and Conservatism
Raz is an explicitly perfectionist liberal: he argues that it is legitimate for the state to seek to
promote the well-being of its citizens in a way that involves it in the business of judging the
value of particular ways of life. For Raz 'it is the goal of all political action to enable
individuals to pursue valid conceptions of the good and discourage evil or empty ones'.'
What, allegedly, allows Raz's perfectionism to remain a liberal conception is his claim that,
at least in contemporary western societies, a good life must be an autonomous life: a
person's well-being depends on their being the author of their own life and on the
availability to them of a multiplicity of valuable options, What Raz has attempted to do is to
sever the link between liberalism and its traditional anti-perfectionism or neutrality (which
has existed since Locke) whilst nonetheless maintaining liberalism's no less traditional core
values of autonomy and moral pluralism. As I noted in chapter 1, the notion of liberal value
neutrality can be interpreted in a number of different ways.l It can refer to neutrality of
justification - that political and social actions and procedures should not be justified or
undertaken on the grounds that they promote some particular conception of the good; or to
neutrality of effect - that they should not have the effect of promoting one conception of the
good over another. The neutrality that liberals customarily defend is neutrality of
justification. Raz specifically rejects such a conception under the pressure of his
perfectionism which is expressed in his desire for individuals to choose between good
options, rather than between good and identifiably bad options.
At the heart of Raz's theory is a conception of autonomy which may initially suggest,
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however, that he should rather be advocating the kind of neutral attitude towards the state
favoured by Rawls. After all, how can the decisions that individuals make about how they
should live be genuinely autonomous if the state is using its (coercive) power to back up its
own judgements of the relative merits of the choices individuals might make'! Raz believes
this misunderstands both the nature of autonomy and its value: •... the autonomy principle
is a perfectionist principle... The autonomy principle permits and l,'VCD requires
governments to create morally valuable opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones'.'
Such an understanding of autonomy and its implications for the legitimate role of the libe...al
state requires Raz to offer a substantive account of what constitutes a valuable life and what
constitutes a repugnant one. He has to argue both for the value of the individual's freedom
to make their own choices, and also that the choice that the individual makes has to be one
that is - independently of the individual's subjective view of it - a valuable one because
'[A]utonomous life is valuable only if it is spent in the pursuit of acceptable and valuable
projects and relationships,.4 In effect Raz is attempting to offer in the political sphe...e the
same form of synthesis that O'Neill offers in moral philosophy in Towards Justice and
Virtue. Both attempt to develop limited prescriptions based on practical reasoning in the
context of existing societies.
In Chapter 1 I outlined ONeill's position with respect to what she takes to be the current
crisis in western philosophy,' To reiterate. she suggested that the loss of metaphysical and
religious foundations has led to a split in ethical theory expressed by the current dichotomy
betweCIl predominantly universalist conceptions of justice and predominantly particularist
conceptions of ethics. O'Neill argues that the divergence between justice and virtue in
contemporary philosophy - and hence the current crisis in western moral philosophy -
occurred because they drifted apart in their attempts to cope with the loss of metaphysical,
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Le. religious, fOWldations by unsuccessful resort to a naturalism, whose content WdS in fact
derived from religion. When the religious sources of the science of man can no longer be
convincingly invoked, what started as objective goods are transformed into subjective goods.
In parallel fashion Raz's perfectionism is an attempt to restore some measure of objectivity-
based on the moral value of autonomy - countering what he describes as anti-perfectionist
liberalism which, he argues, rests upon the intuitive idea that
since morality is an expression of one's rational nature • it is essentially sell:'
determined. Given the social determination of the concept of a person and the absence
of unanimity in the outcome of moral deliberation, the only proper course seems to be
to endorse constitutional arrangements neutral between competing conceptions of the
good in order to enable all individuals to develop and pursue their own conception of
the good. Since no conception of the good which expresses the rational nature of the
person upholding it is better than any other, the constitutional arrangements should be
neutral between them .... this intuitive idea relies on a plausible looking but unfounded
belief in the acceptance of a need for unanimously approved principles of justice as in
everyone's highest interest. This is enough to reject it.6
Raz then goes on to say he that he rejects this neutralism in favour of perfectionist moral
pluralism, a pluralism in which: 'many forms of the good ... are admitted to be so many
valuable expressioos of people's nature, but pluralism which allows that certain conceptions
of the good are \WI1hless and demeaning, and that political action may and should be taken
to eradicate or at least curtail them'. 7 Autonomy is for Raz a means to an end, and not. as on
the traditiooal liberal account, an end in itself. Far from liberalism's commitment tu
autonomy requiring that the state remain neutral between individuals' conceptions of the
good. it is to promote just those conceptions of the good which are valuable (and which
autonomy serves).
What I intend to do in the rest of this chapter is show that whilst Raz's perfectionism
attempts to provide a substantive notion of the good it in fact turns out to offer a
conservative form of argument in defence of a set of ideals that are local to the area" which
gave liberalism birth. However, the Wrly Raz uses a conservative form of argument is slightly
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different from the one that, as I have argued, Mill, Hayek and, indeed, a communitarian like
Rorty employ malgre eux, While they have used conservative forms of argument to replace
lUliversalistjustifications of liberalism, Raz does something diffe...cnt. Earlier I noted that he
has to offer a substantive account of what constitutes a valuable life and what constitutes a
repugnant one; and it is in justifying the content, rather than the scope, of his perfectionism
that Raz adopts a conservative form of argument. In order to demonstrate how this works I
shall first examine how his perfectionism is a product of its social, intellectual and political
context. In the final section of this chapter I shall show how that constitutes conservative
form of argument.
1- Raz's Contextual Perfedionism
Raz's perfectionism suggests that he would be the least likely of the libe...als examined in
this thesis to offer a conservative form of argument: after all his perfectionist claims that
some things are objectively good and that it is the role of state and society to engage in
policies which promote the good and discourage the bad are the opposite of what a
conservative would say. But to leave it at that is misleading. Ra7~ as I have said, sees the
good as ftmdamentally concerned with autonomy but rejects the idea that this requires
governments to refrain from promoting a vision of the good life. Instead, he argues that a
flourishing society, in which people can pursue the variety of good options, on which his
version of autonomy depends, requires the maintenance of a certain kind of communlty: and
it is the maintenance of that which is the central task of liberal government. For Raz, a
'good life' is one that allows and promotes 'value pluralism' so that citizens have sufficient
options to choose from in creating their own lives:
Belief in value pluralism is the view that many different activities and forms of lite
which are incompatible are valuable. Two values are incompatible if they cannot he
realized or pursued to the fullest extent in a single life. In this sense value pluralism is
a mundane phenomenon. Once cannot be both a sprinter and a long-distance runner,
82
both valuable activities, for they require the development of different physical abilities.
and also tend to suit different psychological types. Philosophers do not make good
generals and generals do not make good philosophers. One cannot pursue both the
contemplative and the active life, and so on and so forth."
Raz's emphasis on autonomy is just as clear. In Ethics in the Public Domain, for instance.
he writes:
Liberalism is more than just a political morality. It arises out of a view of the good of
people, a view which emphasizes the value of freedom to individual well-being,
Liberalism upholds the value for people of being in charge of their life, charting its
course by their own successive choices. Much liberal thought has been dedicated to
exploring the ways in which restrictions on individual choices, be they legal or social
can be removed, and obstacles to choice - due to poverty, lack of education, or other
limitations on access to goods - overcome,"
Value pluralism is fundamental for Raz because he rejects what he describes as 'a still
petVdSive belief in the reducibility of all values to one which serves as a common
denominator to the multiplicity of valuable ways oflife'.lo According to him, this occurs in
contemporary society through the development of a subjectivism that reduces all values to
the common denominator of being happy or getting what we want. For Raz,
[Vlalue pluralism is the doctrine that denies such a doctrine is possible. It takes a
plurality of valuable activities and ways of life to be ultimate and ineliminable. 'Ibis
radically changes our understanding of pluralism. On a reductive-monistic view, when
one trades the pleasures (and anxieties) of family life for a career as a sailor (me is
getting, or hoping to get, the same thing one is giving up, be it happiness, pleasure.
desire-satisfaction or something else. So long as one plans correctly and succeeds in
carrying out one's plans there is no loss of any kind. One gives up the lesser pleasure
one would derive from family life for the greater pleasure of life at sea. If value
pluralism is correct, this view is totally wrong. What one loses is of a different kind
from what one gains. Even in success there is a loss, and quite commonly there is no
meaning to the judgement that one gains more than one loses. When one WdS faced
with valuable options and successfully chose one of them, then one simply chose one
way of life rather than another, both being good and not susceptible to comparison of
degree,"
Raz believes that, since in contemporary societies there are many ofthcsc competing choices
available to individuals, there cannot but arise tensions between them - both in the case of
individuals who are not sure that they have made the right choices fbr them, and between
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groups of individuals who are coovinced that their set of choices <x-chosen lifestyle are
superior to others:
Cooflict is endemic. Of course plmalists can step back from their personal
commitments and appreciate in the abstract the value of other ways of life and their
attendant virtues. But this acknowledgement coexists with, and cannot replace, the
feelings of rejectioo and dismissiveness towards what one knows is in itself valuable.
Tension is an inevitable coocomitant of accepting the truth of value plurallsm.'!
If Raz's descriptioo of the nature of value pluralism is accurate, then it is not surprising of
course that be adopts the fimdamentalliberal value of autooomy to deal with it. F<x-seeking
to be the autb<x-of one's own life and attempting to achieve one's own satisfactions can be
the only satisfact<x-yreason f<x-being compelled to choose between - for example - the life of
a scholar or the life of an athlete. However - as in the case of Mill - Raz is not coocerned just
with the choices we make, but with the basis upon which they are made:
[Tjo a coosiderable degree the claim that freedom is actioo in accordance with reason
is no more than a coosequence of the fact that freedcm pre-supposes the availability of
~ioos to choose from, and that optioos - all except the very elementary ones - have
an internal structure, an inner logic, and we exercise our freedom only if we comply
with their inner reasoe."
For Raz, then, autooOOlYis exercised in choosing between a plurality of genuine goods;
goods which can be only established by reason; and autonomy is a necessary ingredient of
the good forms of life accessible to those agents who live in cultural and historical eras such
as our own - eras that are highly mobile and discursive, which demand skills in deliberative
reasoning and reflective choice making, that may undergo rapid change, and so on. '[ne
value of autooomy is cootextual: it is an ingredient in the forms of human flourishing that
are feasible in certain definite historical cultural cootexts such as our own. It is not
autonomOUS choice, still less choice itself that is valuable but instead the life that is
autooomously chosen. The autonomous choice of a worthless life, if there can be such a
choice, is valueless even though it is autonomous. Raz's view of the relations of autonomous
choice with the good life seems in fact to be coosiderably Aristotelian, in that autonomous
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choice, though it enters into many forms ofhmnan flourishing and excellence as a necessary
ingredient, has value roly when it is a COOlponent of a fmn of life <X'activity that has itself
intrinsic value: its value is instrumental rather than intrinsic. In effect, the value of
autonOOlY depends on circmnstance. Now compare this with what Burke, f<X'instance, says
of freedom (rather than autonomy):
Abstractedly speaking. government, as well as liberty, is good: yet could I, in common
sense, ten years ago have felicitated France on her enjoyment of a government ...
without enquiry into what the nature of that government was, or how it WdS
administered? Can I now congratulate the same nation upon its freedom? Is it because
liberty in the abstract may be classed amoogst the blessings of mankind that I am
seriously to felicitate a madman who has escaped frOOl the protecting restrain and
wholescme darkness of his cell, on his rest<ration to the enjoyment of life and liberty'?
Am I to congratulate an highwayman and murderer, who has broke prison, upon the
rfX,("Jllel'yof his natural rights? This would be to act over again the scene of the
criminals condemned to the galleys, and their heroic deliverer, the metaphysic Knight
of the S<nowful Coentenance."
Burke is the exemplar of conservatism. He believes that what is good or bad, <X'whether
change is desirable or not depends on the context of events. Change, for example, is not bad
per se but it is bad if it is not in tune with the traditions manners and mores of a particular
society. Burke argues that what is <X'is not valuable depends on local circumstances and
local conditions, which is precisely the point Raz insists upon. Autonomy is a good which
governments have a duty to promote only in the kinds of cootemporary societies where life
without autooOOlY is substantively less valuable than an autooomous existence. For Raz
autonomy, in such societies, is not simply one value among many rather 'the conditioos of
autonOOlY concern a central aspect of the whole system of values of a society, which affects
its general character. The conditioos of autonomy do not add an independent element to the
social f<X'ffiSof a soctety,'" Raz's perfectionism is a local one. Nonetheless, he wishes to
maintain Mill's and other early liberals' attachment to the idea offreedom as moral freedom
guided by reason. Where then does this leave the comparison with Burke I made earlier?
Raz's version of perfectiooism is local but maximal; he wishes to pursue the intimations in
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contemp<I'3I'Ysociety which will allow all citizens to enjoy the advantages of autonomy
because any citizen. in such a society, who is not autonomous has a less valuable life than
those who are autooomous. By contrast Burkean conservatism might be said to adopt a
perfectiooism that is local but minimal; it recognises that existing societies can be defended
00 the basis that they promote liberty, but such cooservatism deplores too rapid or extensive
change in case the limited but still valuable good of freedom be lost. In effect, Raz is using a
Burkean form of argument to defend the liberal content ofhis argument.
The liberal content ofRaz's argument emerges in the argument he uses to maintain the idea
of autooomy as moral freedom guided by reason, To do this Raz very carefully distinguishes
between self-interest and well-being.
... a persoo's self interest, to the extent that it is served bywhat he cares about is served
by the success in those of his pursuits and relatiooships which he does not enter into to
improve the well-being of others. This explanation is a negative one. It works by
exclusion. Self-interest is what remains after subtracting from the wider notion of well-
being success in those projects whose value (in the eye of the person in question) is
their contributioo to the well-being of others. 16
Well-being consists not ooly in pursuing our own self-interest (in certain circumstances) but
also in pursuing goals which are to the benefit of the wider community, Well-being, unlike
self-interest. cannot be divorced from the context of the corrununity in which an individual
lives. This \WI'ks in two ways: first, the individual cannot flourish in isolation from the rest
of the community, and second, the values of the corrununity will help define self-interest.
Well-being, therefore, is the total of what might be described as self-regarding and other-
regarding goals. In other wads, it depends not ooly 00 the goals we set for ourselves, but on
the goals we would wish to see attained by our community, Thus Raz argues that some goals
are more valuable than others on the basis that, although a person may believe a particular
goal to be in their own best interests, it may nevertheless not in fact contribute to their well-
being. For a person's well-being depends on reasons independent of their belief about it.
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Raz further differentiates between self-interest and well-being by comparing the well-being
of a livestock fanner and a gambler:
A person who spends all his time gambling has. other things being equal. less
successful a life, even if he is a successful gambler. than a live stock fanner busily
minding his farm. Their self-interest may be equally served by their activities, but their
well-being is not. The reason is that they engage in what they do because they believe it
to be a valuable vwrthwhile activity (perhaps but not necessarily because of its value to
others). They care about what they do 00 that basis. To the extent that their valuation
is misguided it affects the success of their life.17
For Raz, then, a person's well-being does not depend 00 them living a life that they believe
to be of value. but upoo living a life that is valuable for reasons independent of their belief in
its value: 'a person's well-being depends 00 the value of his or her goals and pursuits'," as
Raz has it, and not 00 their belief in the value of those goals and pursuits. It is entirely
possible for a person's belief about the worth of their conception of the good to be mistaken,
and. if it is, we do not respect them or promote their well-being by ignoring the fact. The
fundamental point here is the reason-dependent character of goals. People pursue goals for
reasons. namely that they are valuable. If they are mistaken. they are not living successful
lives: the '[S]atisfactioo of goals based 00 false reasons does not cootribute to one's well-
being'.19 And once we admit that some ideals are valid and some are not, that there arc
(good) reasons for pursuing some ideals and none (or lesser ones) for pursuing others -
acknowledging that a person derives no well-being from a life spent in pursuit of the latter.
then. according to Raz, we have no reason to respect a person's mistaken belief that the
invalid ideal they hold is in fact a valid one,
The problem of course is that the reasons why an ideal is valid or invalid are themselves
context dependent. The reason why autooomy is valuable in contemporary liberal
democracies is that societies are highly mobile and discursive and to flourish in such
societies requires the skills of deliberative reasoning and reflective choice making. Not all
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societies fit this model and it is in Raz's recognitioo of this fact that one can discern his use
of a conservative f<rm of argmnent. It is to an examination of that argument I now turn.
U - Raz and Conservatism
In order to make my case that Raz employs a cooservative form of argwnent to j~1itY the
content of his perfectiooism, it is important first to explore the reasons for his claim that
'[A] person's well-being depends to a large extent 00 success in socially defined and
determined pursuits and activities. ,20 This recognition of the social constructioo of
individual well-being is the foundatioo of his localism. It has two components: first, that
individual well-being depends upoo success in achieving individual comprehensive galls;
and second, COOlprehensive goals are based on social forms of behaviour.
Comprehensive goals are, for Raz, the goals that people have, the ramificatioos of which
pervade important dimensions of their lives, provide the structure in which lesser galls are
nested and give their life its overall shape and orientatioo. If he is right to think that a
person's well-being consists in the successful pursuit of their galls, then success in
achieving them will be the source of their well-being. Now, Raz's conception of well-being
occuPies a middle ground between two diametrically opposed views: one which holds that a
person's life can go well even if they are not content in their situation, even if they do not
willingly accept the goals set for them; and another which holds that something is valuable
for a person only if it seems so to them. Raz argues that whilst the wishes of individuals play
a part in their well-being they do not exhaust it. For instance, someooe may be a very
talented history teacher, but very discontented with their lot, preferring to immerse
themselves entirely in the English Civil War re-enactments of the Sealed Knot. They may be
successful in that world, they may even be more content than when they were a talented
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teacher, but, Raz would argue, their well-being was substantially less because their
COOlprehensivegoals are not based 00 the social forms of behaviour widely practised in their
society. This localism emerges, foc instance. in the claim that; 'a persoo can have a
COOlprehensivegool ooly if it is based 00 existing social fmIlS, Le. 00 foems of behaviour
which are in fact widely practised in his society·.21He presents two kinds of reason in
suppoct of it. First, there is the point that the significance of individual behaviour depends
00 the existence of social fmIlS. While this is most obvious in the case of activities which
directly involve social institutioos - 'me cannot pursue a legal career except in a society
governed by law. roe cannot practise medicine except in a society where such a practice is
recognised ... •22 - the idea that what actions mean depends necessarily 00 the social and
cultural practices and cooventioos that surround them embraces also less thoroughly
institutiooalised areas. Although any sighted persoo in the vicinity of a bird can watch it
that does not make the individual in question a bird watcher. To be that, they must be in a
society that recognises bird-watching as a leisure activity. and which has certain attitudes to
wild life. What it means to be a bird-watcher depends 00 the inevitably social environment
of significance that surrOlDldsthe activity of watching birds. And comprehensive goals,
those that pervade Important decisions of an individual's life, are no less inevitably going to
be botmd upwith social f<rIDSin this way.
Not ooly do the activities of individuals derive their meaning from society. but also - and
this is Raz's second point - individuals can acquire and maintain goals ooly through
continuous familiarity with social f<rIDS.According to him, people do not learn how to be
parents, a' friends through processes of explicit instructioo; indeed, the conventions
governing appropriate behaviour in specific friendship contexts, roc example, are too dense
to be codified. Micro-sociologists, fa' example, claim that the development of a relationship
betWeCll twO peq>le depends 00 the significance of thousands of bits of 'body language'.
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And as Raz says,
All these are derived mm the commoo culnee, from the shared social fams, and
though they receive the individual stamp of each persoo their foundatioo in shared
social forms is cootinuing and lasting. Just as the eye cootinues to guide the hand all
the way to its target, and is not limited to determining its original traject<ry, so our
crotinued awareness of the COOlIIlOO culture cootinuously nowishes and directs our
behaviour in pursuit of our goals.23
Although people's canprehensive goals are necessarily derived from social forms this does
not mean, in Raz's view, that there is no room fa deviation from, a even transcendence of
existing conventioos. He claims that his thesis that comprehensive goals arc inevitably based
00 socially existing forms is coosistent with expcrimentatioo and with variatioos on a
commoo theme. and sometimes these may be so extensive as to coostitute real innovation:
It is not that a persoo cannot, through the development of his own variations and
combinations, transcend the social form. People can, and sometimes do, do this, but
inevitably in such cases the distance they have travelled away from the shared fams is,
in these cases. the moo significant aspect of their situation. It mae than anything else
then determines the significance of their situation and its possibilities for those
people.24
Deviations frOOl social forms themselves always derive their meaning from the matrix of
meanings in which they are embedded, a matrix that is itself necessarily social. Although
the individual is not bound by existing practices, and although an individual can live a
valuable life by transcending existing conventioos, they nevertheless cannot escape the
significance of social cooventions.
Since, as Raz argues, autooomy requires the availability of a variety of valuable options, and
since valuable options depend largely 00 social forms, it follows that autonomy requires the
existence of a variety of social forms, It then follows that
autonomy is only possible if various collective goods are available. The opportunity to
form a family of one kind a another, to forge friendships, to pursue many of the skills
professioos and occupations, to enjoy fiction, poetry, and the arts, to engage in many of
the commoo leisure activities: these and others require an appropriate common culture
to make them possible and valuable."
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The general thrust ofRaz's argument is unequivocal. Since 'the provision of many collective
goods is constitutive of the very possibility of autonomy' ,26 he rejects the individualism of
classical liberalism. Instead, he ~ a cootextua1 and localist definition of such liberal
staples as the right to autonomy:
A right to autonomy can be had only if the interests of the right-holder justifies holding
members of the society at large to be duty-bound to him to provide him with the social
environment necessary to give him a chance to have an autonomous life. Assuming
that the interests of one person cannot justity holding so many to be subject to
potentially burdensome duties . . . it follows that there is no right to personal
27autonomy.
For Raz, collective goods are constitutive of the very possibility of autonomy, yet no
individual can have a right to collective goods because that \\WId imply implausibly
onerous duties. It follows that no individual can have the right to autonomy. Autonomy, for
Raz, is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, but it is a means to persooal well-
being founded on the context of existing societies.
Rather than being tied to the traditionally individualistic picture of the relation between
individual and society, rights should be cooceived and defended in terms of their
contrirution to the public culture. Raz argues
that the liberal tradition is not unequivocally individualistic, and that some of the
typically liberal rights depend for their value 00 the existence of a certain public
culture, which their protectioo serves to defend and promote ... [T]heir role is not in
articulating fimdamental moral (X' political principles, not in the protection of
individualistic persooal interests of absolute weight. It is to maintain and protect the
fimdamental moral and political culture of a cooununity through specific institutional
arrangements a political cooventiooS.28
Now, although Raz insists that his argument for the content of personal well-being depends
on social forms this is
not a conventionalist thesis. It does not claim that whatever is practised with social
approval is fa that reason valuable. It says that the comprehensive goals a person finds
valuable are based 00 social fenos, whether (X' not these are socially approved social
forms. In other words the thesis merely sets a limit to what comprehensive forms can
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be valuable for any persoo. They can be valuable ooIy if they can be his goals and they
can be his goals ooly if they are fOlDldedin social forms.29
Now, this argmnent is ofa clearly conservative form, that the value of typically liberal rights
is culture dependent. It is again apposite to offer a quotatioo from Edmond Burke, in his
discussioo of the Petition of Right, he says:
In the famous law of 3d of Charles I, called the Petition of Right, the parliament says
to the king, 'your subjects have inherited this freedom,' claiming their franchises not
on abstract principles 'as the rights of men' but as the rights of Englishmen, and as a
patrimooy derived from their forefathers. Selden, and the other profow1(Uylearned
men, who drew this petition of right, were as well acquainted, at least, with all the
general themes concerning the 'rights of men' as any of the discoursers in our pulpits
. .. But for reasons \\U1hy of that practical wisdan which superseded their theoretic
science. they preferred this positive, recorded, hereditary title to all which can be dear
to the man and the citizen, to that vague speculative right. which exposed their sure
inheritance to be scrambled for and torn to pieces by every wild litigious spirit. 30
This statement by Burke is the definitive claim that the rights and liberties of Englishmen
were dependent 00 concrete social forms rather than on abstract a priori claims of natural
right. On that point Raz would not disagree, but he would be concerned that such claims
rested on only approved social forms rather than 00 social forms that may exist WIder
disapproval and 00 sufferance. This. for Raz, could well reduce valid and valuable choices
for individuals. However. this assumes that cooservatism is based 00 no more than a blind
resistance to perceived change whereas this is not the case. All cooservative theorists have
to incorporate change into their political thtuy. In the famous ~ds of Burke:
A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation.
Without such means it might even risque the loss of that part of the constttutlon it
wished mart religiously to preserve."
However. what is perhaps more relevant is Oakeshotfs descriptioo of political activity:
Politics is the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a collection of people
who, in respect of their commoo recognition of a manner of attending to its
arrangements. compose a single community. To suppose a collection of people without
recognized traditioos of behaviour, or one which enjO)'ed arrangements which
intimated no direction for change and needed no attention. is to suppose a peopte
incapable of politics. This activity. then. springs neither from instant desires, nor from
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general principles, but fran the existing traditioos of behaviour themselves. And the
form it takes, because it can take no other, is the amendment of emting
arrangements by exploring and panuing wllat is intimated in them. 32
Raz may claim that his argmnent is not cooventiooalist because he rejects the idea that
everything practised with social approval is necessarily valuable; but by the same token
conservatives such as Oakeshott and Burke recognise no less, that societies change and
develop. They can and indeed do readily agree with Raz's assessment, namely that his' ...
thesis merely sets a limit to what comprehensive forms can be valuable fa any person. Tilt..')'
can be valuable only if they can be his goals and they can be his goals ooly if they arc
founded in social forms. ,33
Let us pause briefly to coosider Oakeshott's view in a little more detail. He Identities
political activity as 'the amendment of existing arrangements by exploong and pursuing
what is intimated in them'," amendments that may even be radical feY their time and
initiated by even a traditiooal culture:
the legal status of WOOlenin our society was fa a long time .,. in comparative
confusion, because the rights and duties which composed it intimated rights and duties
which were nevertheless not recognized. And, on the view of things I am suggesting,
the only cogent reasoo fa the technical 'enftanchisement' of WOOlenwas that in all or
most other important respects they had already been enfranchised. Arguments drawn
from ahstraCt natural right, frOOl 'justice', lY some general concept of feminine
personality, must be regarded as either irrelevant, a as Wlf<Ytlmatelydisguised forms
of the one valid argmnent; namely, that there was an incoherence in the arrangements
of the society which pressed coovincingly flY remedy."
The enfranchisement of WOOlen was a radical step when it was proposed but it had to be
intimated in the existing traditiooal culture a it would not have been considered, never
mind become a cause celebre. This must be what Raz means when he says (despite claiming
that his argwnent is not conventiooalist because it does not state that whatever is practised
with social approval is fa that reason valuable) 'that the comprehenslve goals a person finds
valuable are based 00 social forms, whether a not these arc socially approved social
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forms,.36 The enftanchisement ofwanen was fa- a very long time looked upon with grave
social disapproval, even by large numbers of women. Nonetheless, accordlng to Oakeshott,
the imperative foc the enfranchisement of WOOlenwas immanent within the political culture
of western liberal democracies such as Britain because it was intimated in the arrangements
of that society, despite widespread social disapproval. On this evidence Raz would have no
quarrel with such a cooservative view of the argument in faVO\D' of remedying such an
incoherence in social arrangements.
That this indeed \\WId be Raz's paritim can be demrostrated by explaing further his views
on autmomy. I have already noted that Raz insists that there is no autOOUltic right to
autmomy, but rather that any such right exists ooly if the interests of the right-holder
justifies holding members of society at large to be duty-boond to provide them with the
social envirooment necessary fer an autmOOlOUS life. Asswning that the interests of one
person cannot justity holding so many to be subject to potentially burdenSOOle duties, it
follows that there is no right to persooal autooany.37 Raz argues that what matters is the
existence of a public culture and that the value of liberal rights is that they 'maintain and
protect the fimdamental moral and political culture of a community through specific
institutional arrangements <Y political conventions' .38
This canparisoo shows that there are two areas where Raz and Oakeshott use the same form
of argwnent. They both deny the validity of rights-based arguments to defend personal
autonomy oc choice; and they both identity liberty as being best defended by a public culture.
This latter point is crucial to the case that I am making about Raz. At the beginning of this
chapter I argued that Raz's use of a cooservative form of argument was different from Mill's
and Hayek's. I suggested that this was because, as a perfectiooist, Raz had to defend a
substantive cooceptioo of the good life - and it is in developing such a conception that Raz
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employs a conservstive foon of argmnent. Let us return to Oakeshott to show how.
()akeshott encapsulates his point of view 00 the relatiooship between autonomy and society
in a passage in On Hwnan Conduct which is vuth quOOngat SOOlelength as it iIlwninates
so clearly his position:
What is called 'mood autooOOlY'does not require moral choice to be a gratuitous,
criteriooless exercise of a so-called 'will' ... in which a looely agent simultaneously
recognizes <r even creates a 'value' f<X'which he is wholly respoosible and places
himself under its command, thus miraculously releasing himself fran organic impulse,
ratiooal cootingency, and authaitative rules of cooduct. Na' is it cooditiooal upon an
agent's critical coosent or approval of a rule of conduct in terms of a recognition of
p1.Jl1XX1edreasoos fm' coosidering it to be desirable. N<X' again does it require some
other release frool having to recognize a rule of cooduct merely in terms of its being a
rule; that is in terms of its authaity. Indeed, strictly speaking, there is no such
experience as a 'mood choice'. What is chosen in cooduct is substantive action or
utterance in which an agent embarks upon the adventure of seeking an imagined and
wished-for satisfactioo in the response of another. And his 'moral autonomy' lies first
in his character as an agent (that is, in his actioo <r utterance being a response to an
understood want and not the coosequence of an <rganic impulse), and secondly, in his
action or utterance as self-disclosure and self-enactment in a cmtingent subscription of
his own to the cooditioos of a practice (which cannot tell him what to do or to say)
recognized in terms of its authooty. Human cooduct is not first having unconditional
wants (individual <Y COOlIDunaI) and then allowing prudential reason and moral
sensibility to indicate m' to determine the choice of the actioos in which their
satisfactioo is sought; it is wanting intelligently (that is, in recognition of prudential
and moral coosideratioos) and doing this successfully m' not sueeessfully,"
The practice to which Oakeshott is referring is the practice of civility which occurs in •a
civil state' where people are united by commoo mood rules rather than by common
sentiments. These moral rules are, according to Oakeshott, derived from a concrete tradition
of behaviour already extant in such a society. Ma'aI rules are abridgements of concrete
moral practices which 'coocentrate into specific precepts considerations of adverbial
desirability which lie dispersed in a moral language.'4O General moral considerations or
'intimatioos' are tranSformed into relatively precise prescriptions. But these more stringent
consideratioos are not self-cmtained m' self-sufficient: they are abstractioos which cannot
survive apart frOOI the tradition of morality from which they were derived. Moral rules and
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duties 'give only an abbreviated accoont of the cooditions containing the cootinuous flow of
diurnally enacted genial relatiooships. which constitute unaffected moral association; no
moral practice can be reduced to the rules. the duties or the 'ideals' it obtrudes, and
rightness is never more than an aspect oflllOOll response' .41 Further, Oakeshott argues, rules
and duties. though relatively specific, remain unavoidably indeterminate. They do not
specify choices or performances but only considerations to be taken into accocnt when
acting: '[Tjhey are not commands to be obeyed but relatively precise coosiderations to be
subscribed to. They are used in cooduct, not applied in conduct. ,42 In short, Oakeshott
maintains that rules alone are never enough to determine concrete activity; they 'are not
criteria of good cooduct ... they are prevailing winds which agents shwld take account of in
sailing their different courses' .43
What Oakeshott does is to offer a cooservative defence of freedan based on established
moral practices in existing societies. He discusses how moral practices and the rules derived
from them apply to human behaviour largely in terms of what he describes as 'self-
disclosure', that is to say individuals disclosing themselves in actions aimed at procuring
satisfactions composed primarily of the responses of other agents. And there is a further
aspect of human behaviour which Oakeshott emphasises within this context. This aspect of
human conduct concerns not the intention of an action - that is, its imagined or wished for
outCOOle - but the motive or sentiment with which an action is performed. In acting, an
agent not only chooses an action aimed at sane specific satisfaction, but also chooses a
sentiment or motive with which to perform that action (e.g., fear, benevolence, pity,
compassion, envy). Neither consideratioo is directly related to or deducible front the other.
A person may kill, for example, out of a variety of motives such as love, hatred, compassion
and so forth; a they might perform the duties of an office out of pride or fear. Actions do
not specify motives, and motives do not specifY actions."
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To this second aspect ofhmnan cooduct - relating to the sentiments <r motives with which
actions are perfmned - Oakeshott gives the name 'self-enactment':
In regard to cooduct in respect of the sentiments <r motives in which actions are
chosen and preformed, a morality specifies conditions of worthy self-enactment. The
COOlptUlctioos it enjoins are not coocerned with recognizing agency in others but with
an agent's exercise of agency in respect of himself. And they are genuine
COOlptDlctiOOS. The fashiooable so-called 'morality of cooscience' in which good
conduct is identified with the cootingent self approval of the agent is no less
preposterous in relatioo to self-enactment in motive than it is in respect of self-
disclosure in actioo.4S
Hence, a moral practice - such as civility - is just as coocerned with self-enactment as with
self-disclosure. A moral practice specifies the conditions not ooly of moral self-disclosure,
but also of \\Uthy a' 'virtuous self-enactment'.46 Oakeshott rejects the idea that there is
anything merely 'private' a' 'suijective' in modves": they, no less than, actioos are
governed by the compunctions of a COOlIIlOO language and practice. Nevertheless, he does
admit that the cooditioos of virtuous self-enactment 'are apt to be less emphatic than those
of moral self-disclosure';48 and that we tend to judge others less strictly or exactingly with
respect to the fmner rather than the latter. But he insists that this greater tolerance does not
stem from indifference to one another's exploits in self-enactment; rather it sterns from a
'recognitioo that in ordinary intercourse a man's choices of what to do and the
comPWlctioos they exhibit matter ma-e than the sentiment in which he makes them'. 49
What this concern with individual self-disclosure and self-enactment testifies to is freedom,
which, fa' Qakeshott, is a postulate of agency simply as such, because all cooduct - even a
slave's - is an 'intelligent' response to drcumstsnce," Freedom is not an unconstrained
will, because circumstances are coostraints and cooduct cannot appear independently of
them. Na- is freedOOl, at least at this elementary level, identical with the self-direction or
autonOOlYwhich civil association fosters. Autonomy, however, does develop out of the
freedOOlinherent in agency.
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The conversioo of this type of unsought freedom into autOOOOlY<r self-directioo is not
spontaneous. It is a process which has to be learned so that it becomes a satisfactioo in its
own right; and it is this form of autooOOlYwhich is a virtue - virtuous self-enactment:
This di~itioo <r quality of character is not to be understood as a surrender to so-
caUed 'subjective will', <r as a relapse into the eff<X'tless indulgence of inclination, or
as the canooizatioo of 'cooscience'; it is a difficult achievement. The self here is a
substantive personality, the oetcome of an education, whose J'eS(U'CCS are collected in a
self-wuterstanding; and cooduct is recognized as the adventure in which this cultivated
self deploys its resources, discloses and enacts itself in response to its contingent
situations and both acquires and coofirms its autooOOlY.N<r does the experience of this
dispa;itioo imply the ~p ofnoocoofmnity, a devotioo to arbitrary so-called 'self-
expressioo', oe a resolutioo to be different at all costs. The cooduct it prompts is not
composed of uncondltional choices, and it does not require indifference to moral or
prudential practices <r aversioo fiml any but self-made rules. It is composed of actions
and utterances which reflect the contingent sentiments, affections, and beliefs this
particular self has made its own. The autooOOlYof such a self and the independence or
originality of such conduct lies not at all in an unconcern f<r the conditions which
specifY the arts of agency. N<r, again, does this disposltlon f<rbid association in a co-
operative undertaking to pursue a COOlffiOO purpose; what it requires is that such
associatioo shall be in terms of continuous choices to be associated which reflect the
self-understanding of the persons concerned. In short, what is postulated and
emphasized here is a collected persooality, actooomocs 00 account of its self-
understanding and its command of resources it has made its own. And the half of this
self-understanding is knowing its own limits. 51
This Oakeshottian versicn of autonomy is both the condition and product of civil
associatioo. It presupposes a graceful acceptance of obligatioos and it consists in
endeavouring to meet them in the most creative and appropriate way. Unlike the allegedly
'natural' freedOOl endorsed by most thinkers in the liberal tradition (including Locke and
Rawls and even in SOOlerespects Mill), it can be learnt ooly in society. Moreover, this type
of freedom can flowish ooly under its complement law. Oakeshott's conception of freedom
is not so much that of a right as an individual and collective accomplishment. To reiterate,
the moral character involved, Oakeshott says is 'autonomoes 00 account of its own self-
understanding and its command of the resources it has made its own.' And as he concludes
'the half of this self-understanding is knowing its own limits".'
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To sum up this brief survey of Oakesbott's view of autooOOlY; it is predicated upoo the rules
and practices which emerge fi'00l a common culture. Fwthermore, it is possible, although
Odkesbott \\OOld believe it to be usually unwise to transcend the limits laid down by the
common culture 00 roe's autroOOlY. But even if those limits are transcended that
transcendence is itse1fa product of the coounoo culture.
Now, let us return to Raz. I have already shown that Raz's cooceptioo of autooOOlY requires
the maintenance of a certain kind of cooununity and that that maintenance is the central
task of liberal government. Now, Raz claims that aetonomy is a coodition of achieving (in
liberal democratic societies at least) anything that might be ratiooally regarded as a good.
Thus, Raz argues, it is the task. of government to promote autonomy in societies such as our
own where, without autOOOOlY,people cannot flourish. In effect, Raz is offering an argument
for autonomy 00 the basis that it is a necessary cooditioo fa' living a good life where that -
the content of a good life - is determined by the specific features of a local state of affairs,
namely cootempoouy western liberal democracy. And that is a form of argument which is
ftmdamentally cooservative because he is not advocating radical change to existing societies;
rather he is suggesting changes intimated within their existing arrangements to ensure more
successful human flourishing. Maeover, human flourishing fa' Raz means precisely the
good life as defined by the traditions and cultures of western liberal democracies. Again a
comparisoo with Oakesbott is apposite. In me of his most famous descriptioos of political
activity he states:
In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither
harbour fa shelter nor floor fa' anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed
destinatioo. The enterprise is to keep afloat 00 an even keel; the sea is both friend and
enemy; and the seamanship coosists in using the resources of a traditional manner of
behaviour in order to make a friend of every hostile occasion. 53
Now, this seems to be, indeed is, a loog way from the perfectiooist ideals of Raz. But
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Oakeshott goes 00 to qualify what he says in a'der to offer what he takes to be an acceptable
conservatism:
A depressing doctrine, it will be said - even by those who do not make the mistake of
adding in an element of aude determinism which, in fact. it has no place for. A
traditioo of behaviour is not a groove within which we are destined to grind out our
helpless and lUlS3tisfYing lives: ..• But in the main the depressioo springs from the
exclusion of hopes that were false and the discovery that guides, reputed to be of
superhuman wisdool and skill, are, in fact, of a SOOlewhat different character. If the
doctrine deprives us of a model made in heaven to which we should approximate our
behaviour, at least it does not lead us into a moeass where every choice is equally good
or equally to be deplored. 54
Oakeshott's conceptioo of the nature of any justifiable political activity remains localist.
However, this cooceptioo is still mirrored by Raz's perfectiooism that declares autonomy
serves the good society. Both he and Oakeshott recognise that a traditioo of behaviour
cannot be fixed and that choices are not good or bad qua choice, but rather 00 account of
their cootent - a content moreover, the evaluatioo of which cannot but be coostrained by the
accepted norms of the particular society in which it is made. F<X'Raz, even choices which
transcend existing norms are products of social fa'ms and provided they promote autonomy
are valuable choices. This is not, of course, what Oakeshott would say. Nooetheless, the
manner in which even that 8M of transcendental choice is constrained by social forms
remains the same fa' both Raz and Oakeshott. Moreover, Raz's view parallels that of
Oakeshott in that it rejects any subjectivism that reduces all values to a common
denominator such as being happy or getting what we want. Raz's doctrine of value pluralism
declares that different substantive choices lead to different types of satisfactions and if <me
makes <me valuable choice ahead of another, then it is often the case that these two choices
are inimical and making one choice rather than another leads to loss. ss But this is something
Oakeshott would accept and welcome; it is on just those grounds that he advocates a
conservative position with regard to how political choices - and actions - may be justified.
For instance. when speaking of the motivation. f<X'action, he insists that
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an action is a chosen respoose to an understood cootingent situation and is related to
an imagined and wished-f(Y ootcome; that is the spring of cooduct in a situation in
respect of it being recognized to cootain a specific unacceptability. Ff<YO this ... it
follows that it cannot be understood as a means to the achievement of an end not
implicit in itself. But it follows, also, that there can be no independent scale which
converts these specific misliked situations. (Y these specific sought-flY satisfactions,
into commensurable fractioos of a single general cooditim (e.g. amocnts of 'pain' or
'pleasure') and in terms of which all situatioos may be measured, or at least compared,
in respect of their unacceptability and all actims in respect of their sought-f(Y (Y actual
yield of satisfaction. Or, in other wa-ds. the spring of actim cannot be understood as a
situatim unacceptable in virtue oflack:ing an acceptable degree ofsuch measurable and
homogeneoos satisfaction, and what is wished f(Y and sought cannot be understood as
an ootcane imagined in terms of its having an acceptable degree of such measurable
satisfactioo. I cannot want 'happiness'; what I want is to be idle in Avignon (Y to hear
Caruso sing.56
Equally, Oakeshott notes in Rationalism in Politics that
Changes are withoot effect only 00 upoo those who notice nothing, who are ignorant of
what they JXBie8S and apathetic to their circwnstances; they can be welcomed
indiscriminately ooly by those who esteem nothing, whose attachments are fleeting and
who are strangers to love and affectioo .... the inclination to enjoy what is present and
available is the ~ite of apathy and breeds attachment and affection. Consequently
it [a cooservative dispa;itim] is averse fran change, which appears always in the first
place as deprivation. A storm which sweeps away a copse and transfcrms a favourite
view, the death of friends, the sleep of friendship. the desuetude of customs of
behavioer, the retirement of a filvourite clown, involuntary exile, reversals of fortune,
the loss of abilities enjoyed and their replacement by others - these are changes none
perhaps withoot its compensations. that the man of conservative temperament regrets.
But he has difficulty in reconciling himself to them, not because what he has lost in
them WdS intrinsically better than any alternative might have been lY was incapable of
improvement, n<wbecause what takes its place is inherently incapable of being enjoyed,
but because what he has lost was sanething he actually enjoyed and had learned how
to enjoy and what takes its place is something to which he has acquired no
attachment. 57
This is the difficulty that Raz identifies with value pluralism. When choices are made
between ccmpeting goods there is often loss when me choice excludes the other. For
instance, someone who has been a devout Ranan Catholic may have become disillusioned
by SOOleof the Church's teaching with respect to alxxtioo or homosexuality, For moral
reasons they have made a choice no loo.ger to attend Mass. Instead they decide to perform
voluntary \\Uk amongst the nonetess 00 Sundays. The persoo in question has made a valid
moral choice and has replaced their activity with something that is morally good and of
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great service to the cooununity. Nooetheless, it is easy to see that that person could well
suffer a profOlPld sense of loss engendered by their decisioo to no looger attend Mass. Now,
when applied to politics this becomes a very conservative doctrine because it recognises -
notwithstanding any visible moral and pragmatic benefits of reform - that during any
process of change established valuable institutioos, insights and knowledge may well be lost
whilst any benefits, however great, are inevitably uncertain, This is precisely the point of
Qakeshott's cooservatism.
ID - Coadusioa
In order to demoostrate how Raz's epistemological cooservatism develops into political
cooservatism we must again turn to Onora O'Neill. What O'NeiU attempts to do in Towards
Justice and Virtue is to provide thea'etical S1.lpJUt f<r a oosmopolitan scheme of values and
concerns, 00 the basis of practical reason and without resoet to suijective naturalism, in the
same way that Raz attempts to defend his pe:rfectiooist model of political philosophy. She
claims her \-\Uk is coostructive bOO! in the sense of being directed towards questions of
policy and legislatioo, and also in that it relies solely 00 principles that can be established on
the basis of reflectioo about the presuppositioos of agency and the general nature of human
agents. At the heart of the argmnent however is the attempt to identitY practical rationality
with 'reliance 00 principles which (it is judged) can be principles for all, where the scope of
'all' is taken to vary with cootext.'SI O'Neill, like Raz attempts to mediate between
universalists and particularists by showing that these two concepts should not be seen as
dictating rival approaches to the whole of ethics <r politics but rather as complementary
elements of the same localist m<rality. And it is this localist morality which gives rise to
epistemological cooservatism
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This is demoostrated by the conparison between Raz and Oakeshott noted above. Moreover.
the conservative form of justificatay argument adopted by Raz leads inevitably to a
substantive political cooservatism. Society's epistemic norms govern knowledge, as Rorty,
for example, has argued.S9thus the norms ofa society must bmd the basis of \\bat is or is
not good. If that is the case the good life cannot but be justified by cootempa-ary social
values, AutooOOlYthen becomes the means to an end of a good life ooly in those societies
which are highly mobile and have a diSClU'Siveculture; thus autooomy is the necessary
conditioo for a good life ooly within cootempa-ary liberal democratic societies.
What Raz has dooe is devel~ a perfectiooist model of liberalism based 00 an idealised
versioo of existing society: just as a cooservative such as Oakeshott offers a prescription for
human floorishing based 00 the norms and practices of an existing society, so Raz otTers
(limited) prescriptioos f<r hwnan flourishing that are developed fran an existing public
culture. The emphasis 00 autooOOlYwhich makes his positioo a liberal one turns out to be
dependent 00 its being a means to ends given by the norms and practices of particular
societies. Thus the primary goal of government, on his perfectiooist model, is to maintain
the public culture on the basis of which autooOOlYallows individuals to pursue good lives.
But that is just what the cooservative says. Of course Raz insists that his is not a
conventiooalist - and thus conservative - argument because it allows individuals to
transcend the social forms that exist in that public culture. But we have already seen that as
all conservatisms have a theory of change, Raz's insistence that his argument is not
conventiooalist is uncoovincing. Purthermore, no sceptical conservative of any description
would deny an individual's opportunity to develop alternatives from existing social firms:
however, like Raz, they recognise that those opportunities are themselves products of the
same public culture which Raz sees it as the duty of liberal government to protect. The need
to protect the public culture from civil strife leads directly to Raz's epistemological
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conservatism evolving into an overt sceptical pragmatic cooservatism. For example:
The pursuit of full-blooded perfectimist policies, even of those which are entirely
sound and justified, is likely in many countries if not in all, to backfire by arousing
popular resistance leading to civil strife. In such circumstances compranise is the
order of the day. There is no abstract doctrine which can delineate what the terms of
the comproonse should be. All me can say is that it will confine perfectimist measures
to matters which command a large measure of social consensus. and it will further
restrict the use of coercive and of greatly confining measure and will favour gentler
measures favouring me trend or another. 60
A reminder of Oakeshott's padtioo is germane at this point. It will be recalled that
Oakeshott argued that political activity is derived from concrete traditioos of behaviour
extant in societies. Political behaviour pursues intimations which are inherent in the
traditioos of behaviour which gave them birth. This is precisely what Raz is advocating in
the quotatioo given above. His wrsioo of political activity is based 00 localist pragmatism
and COOlproolise. Lest there be any mistake that this is indeed what Raz intends, consider
the final paragraph of the Morality of Freedom:
FreedOOl based 00 fear of civil strife, like freedOOl based m the unreliability of
governments, depends on SOOledoctrine of 'ideal' freedOOl. It presupposes an ideal
doctrine of freed<m, f<r it tells us when and how to compromise, just as the
unreliability of government is measured by its inability to achieve targets set by the
doctrine of the 'ideal'. Furthermore these doctrines of freedool by necessity and
COOlproolise bring us the freedan of imperfection, the liberty from governmental
action which all too often is an admissim that perfect freedool in Wlobtainable.61
This seems perilously close to an admissioo that politics must be imperfect and, therefore,
only limited political activity which seeks to remedy gross and obvious abuses which arc
obviously out of tune with existing political traditioos is acceptable to even a perfectionist
liberal. Raz, therefore. is more far more cooservative than an obviously perfectionist liberal
like Mill. Raz sees autonomy as a means to an end only in the type of social context, such as
western liberal democracies, where people require autmomy if they are to have a good life.
By cootrast Mill insists that autonomy is valuable irrespective of the social context, and
whether it leads to a good life or not. In effect Raz's thought is closer to the anti-essentialist
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liberalism ofRmy than to the perfectiooist universalism of Mill.
Rorty argues that the canmunitarian conceptioo of the situated self is better suited to liberal
democracy that the Enlightenment notion of a transcendental self.62 This is because, instead
of having individuals who are detached from society, we have people who are socialised into
being liberal democrats. In this case, the danger of fanaticism over ultimate values is much
reduced as people take a pragmatic apprmch to politics, by not fa'Cing onto others their
value judgements coocerning the good life. As Rorty puts it, given our history we put
'liberty ahead of perfectioo' .63 The fact that this removes passioo frmt the public sphere is
accepted by Rorty as he recognises that this is a price worth paying f~ political freedom;
'even if the typical character types of liberal democracy are bland, calculating, petty, and
unheroic, the prevalence of such people may be a reasooable price to pay for political
freedan,.64 Rortythus argues that both demtological and cornmunitarian liberalism must he
rejected in order to embrace a pragmatic acceptance of liberalism as a system which works
for us by protecting our freedom.
Given what Raz says at the end of The Morality of Freedom and which I discussed above it
is apparent his perfectiooism adqJts just the same type of pragmatic, limited liberalism as
does Rocty. Raz's perfectiooism is dependent 00 defending things as they are here and now
within western liberal democracies. And that is a substantively cooservative position.
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Chapter 4
Hayek's Libertarian Nentrality
Mill straddled the divide between the classical and the new liberalism. While he
unquestiooably valued the liberal principles of 17th and 18th century liberal thinkers. he
attempted to provide a normative basis f<r freedom and the rule of law by arguing that
prot<rliberal values were a necessary. if not sufficient. cmdition for the voluntaristic
devel~ent of the ultimate goo! of liberalism, the evoIutim of rational choosing
individuals. Hayek. by contrast, claims that his w<rk is an attempt to restate and refine the
arguments of the early thinkers of classical liberalism: David Hwne. Adam Smith. James
Madison, Immanuel Kant and Alexis de Tocqueville.' He believes that precisely the
developmental element that emerged in liberalism thanks to Mill's emphasis m the
evolution of character fimdamentally undermined the elements in liberalism that had led to
what he described as the 'Great Society'. Ha)'clc attempts to prove two things. First, that the
liberal <rder is 'natural', in the sense that it is unplanned. the product of hwnan actions but
not of humen design; and second, m the basis of his epistemology and empirical
psychology, that the liberal <rder is the best fam of society if hmnan beings are to have
satistying lives. Indeed. Hayek would go further and argue that the ooIy meaningful forms of
good life are to be found in liberal societies, where individuals can pursue their own
p~, and 00: have the purposes of others imposed upon them. Ironically, despite these
claims. Hayek is rig<W'ousin his disavowal of any conceptioa of the good. His putative
neutrality rests m his claim that the case for liberty rests m value-free empirical
foundations. in contrast to Mill. who. as we have seen. argued that the establishment of
ultimate moral ends could not be a scientific enterprise.'
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In this chapter, I shall argue that Hayek's cooceptioo of a 'spentaneous order' is not,
however, neutral in the sense of being value-free. Furthermore, I shall argue, his
epistemology and empirical psychology cannot bear the weight of proof that his theory
requires. Hayek's oeuvre ranges over several traditiooal academic disciplines and he
participated in SOOleof the key intellectuaI debates of the 20th century; this chapter therefore
cannot claim to be a comprehensive account even of his work on liberalism. What it is
concerned to do, however, is to demonstrate that underplnning his allegedly value-free
conceptions of the hwnan mind and the spontaneous order is a tacit cooceptioo of the good,
and that for all his claims to be scientific and value-free, Hayek's thought ultimately rests 00
a subjective adherence to the liberal tradition. Only those elements of Hayek's thought
directly relevant to achieving this objective will be examined indetail.
Hayek, of course has often been interpreted as a conservative.' However. what appears not to
have been noticed is the cootradict<ry nature of his empirical and Kantian argwnents and
the role of that tension in his (conservative) thinking. Moreover, an examinatioo of these
tensions demoostrate that Hayek, fur frOOl being an aberrant liberal as is usually claimed, is
in fact clearly representative of the liberal traditioo. Hayek's normative prescriptions depend,
either in part or in full, on empirical psychological and epistemological fOWldatiooS.
Whereas Mill believes that tradition and conformity are threats to individuality, Hayek
argues that they are -as a matter of filet - its fO\Dldation. How does Hayek reach these
conclusions? Hayek's thought is both explanatory and prescriptive: he explains the nature of
man and society and on the basis of those explanations develops a prescriptive theory which
allows him to defend liberty as the foremost value in society.
Hayek's objectives were always clear. His aim, set out in a series of works beginning with
The Road to Serfdom in 1944 and culminating with the publication of the first volume of his
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collected \\Uks, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism,4 in 1988, has been to
demonstrate that socialism in all its forms is untenable, and that the good society must be
ooe governed by liberal institutioos upholding the market economy and the rule of law.
Indeed as ooe recent auth(Yhas canmented, Hayek had two intellectual personas:
[H]e was a patient, thoeoegh, wide-ranging scholar, who emerged as ooe of the most
important and original thinkers of the century, but also as one of the century's most
renowned ideologues, a leading critic of all fams of socialism and a passionate
advocate of classical liberalism.
. . , Hayek's reputatioo as an ideologue has f(Y long been a barrier to a wider
appreciation of his intellectual cootributioo to social science. This is hardly surprising.
The two are hard to disentangle. because Ha)'dc f(Y the most part saw no reason to
keep them apart. His ideological views flow from the same methodological
assumptioos as his scientific wait and his writings are all part of the same intellectual
iect 5proJ .
The unacknowledged dichotany between Hayek the ideologue and Hayek the scholar is
what is centrally problematic about his thought. Although Hayek's themy seeks to offer both
normative and allegedly empirical scientific justificatioos6 f(Ymaking liberty the foremost
value in society, neither is ultimately successful - (Yso I shall seek to show. Hayek attempts
to do two things. First, he tries to show, through his epistemology and psychology, that a
free society offers the best ~pmunity f(Y progress, prosperity and the fulfilment of the
diverse and proliferoos wants of individuals. This is an empirical claim abrut the value of
liberty and it offers a reasoo, other than suggesting that liberty is an end in itself, why liberty
is valuable. Secood, he attempts to offer a namative defence of liberty that does in fact
claim that liberty is of value as an end in itself, rather than in terms of the effect that it
might have 00 the material well-being of individuals. I shall argue that his attempt fails in
twOWd)'S.
First, he does not succeed in demoostrating that his model of society as a rule-governed,
purposeless. spontaneous order - the product ofhmnan action but not of human design - is in
filet neutral. This was what I described in chapter 1 as neutrality of justificatioo, in the sense
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of being free fi'ool value-laden nodons of the good society. While the putative neutrality of
Hayek's \\Uk rests 00 the idea that, as 'spmtaneous <rder' describes how things are, the
rules which emerge unintentiooally to regulate them do not have a normative element and
hence are neutral between the premeditated compedng cooceptioos of the good of
individuals, the very fact that he argues that interventioo in certain types of ~der can create
or improve the qualities of those orders in such a way that their efficiency - in meeting the
diverse and proliferous wants of individuals - is improved suggests that, undetlying the
notioo of'spootaneous order', is SOOlefmn of instrwnental good. That instrumental good,
however, assumes an object and that is material well-being, that is to say a substantive good.
Second, Hayek offers no coosistent moral defence of the maintenance of what he describes
as a free society. Hisjustificatioo for his political programme of maintaining and promoting
liberty through the free market is that it is such a system that allows the survival, in relative
material ~ty, of a greater nmnber of people than \\WId otherwise be the case - again
what we have is an assumed substantive cooceptioo of the good. The survival in relative
material prosperity of a greater rather than a smaller nmnber of people is neither self-
evidently nor necessarily a good, difficult though that thought might be: consider, for
example, the ascetics of various religious and philosophical traditioos. Hayek uses three
types of argument to defend freedan. The first, implied by the cootentioo that a free society
with a free market allows a greater mnnber of people a better quality of material life, is
coosequentialist. The second, which is related to the first, offers what is in fact a
conservative defence of the established order, based 00 a psychology and epistemology
which tells him that as there is no archimedean point whence societies can stand back and
objectively reform themselves by reason, they are more likely to retain their freedom, and
hence their material prosperity, by adhering to established traditions and institutions. Both
these arguments are teleological, a justificatioo of the morality of the liberal order on the
basis of the ultimate well-being of individuals. The third argwnent is a Kantian one, based
no
on the idea that liberty is a v.uthwhile end in itself Difficulties, however, arise from the
combinatioo of these arguments: fa' they are clearly incoosistent with each other. On the
one hand, attempting to maintain and secure a system - based on what Michael Oakeshott
described as the 'plausible ethics of productivity'7 - is not neutral between competing
conceptioos of the good; and 00 the other, if liberalism fails to deliver the prosperity
promised. then it cannot be empirically justified 00 that basis. N<r can Hayek then falt back
on his Kantian defence of freedan, because its ratiooalist basis cootradicts his (earlier)
empirical psychology and epistemology. It might be suppo!ied, however, that I have
miscoostrued the problem f<r the te:nsioo I have described is evident ooly if Hayek's two
lines of argmnent are understood as either/or possibilities; but, as Hayek after all insists. the
claim that liberalism is the mart effective way of satisfYing human wants is not a moral
claim; and thus the notioo that freedan is valuable in itself could be seen as an additional
reason f<r ad~ liberalism. To put it mae fmnally.s there is no actual incoosistency
between (a) the notion that liberalism is the most effective way of satisfYing the aggregate of
human wants, as a reason for espousing it; and (b) that freedool is valuable in itself, as an
additional reasro for espousing it. We only get into meta-ethica1 problems if we claim (a) is
a moral claim - Le. if (a) - that liberalism is the most effective way of sanstymg the
aggregate of human wants - is a moral reasoo for espousing it. And this is precisely what
Hayek wants to avoid claiming as (a) is meant to be value neutral. But this objection
asswnes that (a) can be regarded as other than a moral claim, as Hayek indeed intends. It is
only if we assume a liberal view - and indeed Hayek's version of it - that (a) could be seen as
not a moral claim. On a liberal view the claim that 'liberalism is the moo effective way of
satisfYing the aggregate of human wants' can be other than a moral claim because 'most
effective' is \Dlderstood as either an empirical or value-free claim, or at any rate as one
which does not rest 00 any substantive 'good'. But that is precisely the point at issue. What is
simply 'moo effective' for Hayek might well be morally outrageous for, for instance, a stoic
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or a pre-medieval Christian. M<reover, the very pa;sibility of regarding the claim as value
neutral, is already to subscribe, at least to the viability of liberalism's alleged neutrality
concerning the good as itself a good.
To reiterate, the problem Hayek faces is that he is attempting to nul an empirical and an
ethical argument simultaneously. The empirical claim is founded on empirical psychological
and epistemological evidence about the nature of society which he claims demonstrates that
the most effective erder fer satistYinghmnan wants is a liberal order; and moreover, because
these claims explain how the \\a'ld actually is, they are value-free and neutral,
consequently, if liberalism tails to deliver prosperity the justification fails, By contrast,
Hayek's ncrmative argument claims that liberty is of value in itself: whether er not it
prOOIoteshuman material good. The empirical argument, however, cannot do the work
demanded of it because the evidence does not suppa1 it; while the normative argument -
being normanve - requires a justification of the relevant values which Hayek does not
provide. Thus Hayek's attempt to provide a foundation fer the visioo of a society founded on
individual liberty tails: but, I shall argue, such a visioo might mere plausibly be defended on
a conservative understending of the empirical evidence.
I - 'SpontaDeous order' IDd the valae of liberty
Hayek, then, sees his \\Uk as an attempt to restate and refine the ideas of classical
liberalism. Althoogh he is not a natural rights tneorist, he would accept Locke's contention
that the reason why individuals associate with others in society is the 'Preservation of their
lives liberties and estates'.9 What Hayek attempts to do is to show that states which confine
themselves to such roles not ooly preserve liberty by limiting coercioo to ensure that people
obey the law, but that such states are not coercive at all. To overcome this apparent
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contradictioo Hayek argues that. provided the rules established to protect liberty are general
and can be applied universally, the state which administers them is both neutral between
competing cooceptioos of the good and does not itself have a substantive purpose, Where
does this leave the idea that the purpose of entering political society and placing oneself
under government is the 'preserwtion of lives liberties and estates'? His answer is that no
one, <Y no institutioo seeks security of persoo <Y property as an end in Itself. Security of
person <Y property is always a good that is needed in order to achieve other substantive
goods.
Hayek suggests that ooly those fmns of associatioo governed by internally abstract universal
rules can achieve the security of lives, liberties and estates," The maintenance of these rules
is not what a themst like Michael Oakeshott - who bears certain similarities to Hayek in
this respect - woold describe as a 'substantive' independent puI'pQ§e, but is rather a pre-
conditioo which allows citizens to pursue their own ends. The additioo of the adjective
'substantive' is important here. Substantive means subsisting separately and independently
apart frorn the individual ends of the citizens of a state. II Thus 00 Hayek's preferred model.
the state must not have a separate independent purpose fi'00l the individual purposes of the
citizens who live under its jurisdictioo if it is to maintain the liberty of its citizens. The state
is a compulsory institutioo in that no me has a choice whether <Y not to be a member; if it
has a specific purpose of its own, beyood allowing individuals to pursue their own purposes.
then it imposes 00 its citizens its own particular goals and so destroys the liberty it was
established to protect. The nature of this type of purposive state can be made more explicit
by comparing it with an organisation. Organisatioos such as sports clubs, community
associatioos <Y charities unite their members in the pursuit ofa commoo goal: if they did not
share that goal. they woold not be members of the organisation. The rules of the
organisatioo exist to facilitate members in the pursuit of this commoo end By contrast, in
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Ha)'ek's terms, the rules of a state exist to prevent individuals and organisations clashing in
the pursuit of their own self-set goals.
The arena in which individuals pursue these self-set goals is civil society. Civil society is a
complex associadon of individuals joined together with one another in a series of
relationships shaped by persooal interest, eeonomlc inter-dependence, conventions and laws.
Included within civil society are associatioos of individuals linked in pursuit of common
goals through commerce, charitable institutioos (l' commlUlity groups; (l' in enjoyment of
common pastimes such as sport (l' art; (l' as commlUlicants ofvarious religions, Specifically
excluded from civil society are political relatioos and the institutioos of the state. But the
state is, nevertheless, responsible f(l' the maintenance of civil society through enforcing sets
of general universal rules. These rules, however, are ntt coercive, inasmuch as they do not
restrict individual purposes; they merely state universal cooditioos that must be taken into
account when acting. One way of understanding how Hayek's ideal non-purposive rules
would work is to compare them to the laws in existing states that regulate traffic. Such laws
do not specifY the destinatioo of any journey that is undertaken; rather they speci tY the
cooditioos which must be taken into accwnt if the traveller is going to reach his or her
destination safely and without risking the lives of other travellers. Similarly, Hayek's
universal rules do not impose the purposes of the state upoo us, As they are general, they
provide the necessary conditioos under which we may pursue our own purposes without
arbitrary restriction by others (l' by the state. They \\a'k in the same way as the rules of the
road, in that they will allow us to pursue our own goals without risk of harm (l' improper
hindrance fron others.
If states do not possess such a character, then, to a greater (J' lesser extent, they coerce their
citizens. Although Hayek declares that liberty is the f<l'elllost value in society. a significant
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element in the case he makes f<r liberty surrounds the damage dale by coercion. Indeed,
Hayek begins his fullest account of individual liberty by saying: '[Tjhe state in which a man
is not subject to coercioo by the arbitrary will of another <r others is often distinguished as
'individual' or 'persooal' freedan. and whenever we want to remind the reader that it is in
this sense that we are using the W(rd 'freedom' we shall employ that expression,' 12
At this point, Hayek cites F.R Knight to the effect that 'coercioo' is the term that really
needs to be defined, 13 and in the definitioo cited above he has specified the coercion he has
in mind, namely the 'coercioo by the arbitrary will of another or others'. The rule of law.
acc<rding to Hayek, is not arbitrary, but general and universal; and is therefbre not a
restriction 00. individual liberty - f<r Hayek, the rule of law is not coercive. It has been
argued by sane that Hayek's insistence m universality as a basis f<r law will not protect
individual spheres of liberty, and overlooks SOOlefOOIlSof coercion." However, Hayek's
position is that the rule of law is not coercive, and that furthermore it is mly the version of
the rule of law that Hayek espouses which will allow society to flourish.
In order to make his case that his cooceptim of the rule oflaw is noo-coercive, Hayek makes
a distinctioo between spootaneous <rder and <rganisatioo.1S Hayek claims that laws are
neutral and noo-coercive because they are products of orders in society that he declares to be
'spontaneous': that is, the product ofhwnan actioo but not ofhmnan design. The conception
of the 'spootaneaJS <rder' is at the heart ofHayek's social theory and is the foundation of his
neutralist claimS. F<r Hayek, 'the foonatim of spootaneous <rders is the result of their
elements following certain rules in their responses to their immediate environment'. 16
Furtherm<re, '[T]he individual responses to particular circwnstances will result in an overall
order only if the individuals obey such rules as will produce an <rder. Even a very limited
similarity in their behaviour may be sufficient if the rules, which they all obey, are such ali to
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produce an <rder.'17 Hayek devel~ his idea ofa 'spootaneous social order', '[T]o explain
how an overall order of economic activity was achieved which utilised a large amount of
knowledge which was not coocentrated in any me mind but existed ooly as the separate
knowledge of thoosands or millions of different individuals.''' 'Ibis point was to show how a
market society could functioo without the co-ordination of a central authority; and his
answer is that '[A]n adequate insight into the relatims between the abstract rules which the
individual follows in his actions, and the abstract overall order which is formed as a result of
his respooding, within the limits imposed upm him by those abstract rules. to the concrete
particular circumstaIlces which he encounters.,19
From this passage it seems that the mechanism 00 which 'spootaneous order' rests has two
compments. 'Spmtaneous <rder' first arises out of the rootine observance of general rules of
behaviour; and secood, fran the modificatioos which individuals make in response to local
cmditioos. The mlers established by such rule-governed behaviour can be distinguished
from the type of <rder f<rmed by organisanons.
The distinction between 'spootaneous <rder' and <rganisatioo is folmdatiooal for Hayek's
social theoey, Acc<rding to Hayek, however, it is a distinctioo which goes against the widely
held belief that society, and the social orders which comprise it, are all constructed by
conscious human design. People have 'anthropool<rphic habits of thought', 20 and this
inclines them to think that all social orders are deliberately created by human beings in
order to serve substantive human ~ that they are all organisaticaal in character.
However, to regard all social formatioos in this way, as social corporations based upon
hierarchical re1atims of a coounand and obedience, is a mistake. Of course. many social
institutions are '<rganisatims' - e.g. companies, clubs, charities even famili~l - but they are
integrated into an all-encompassing social <rder that is not itself hierarchically structured
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and must not be mistaken f<r an organisaticn. This 'overall <X'der,22 of society is the most
extensive spootaneous order that Hayek identifies in social life, but it is not the only one.
Other examples of spootaneous social <rders are '[m)orals, religion and law, language and
writing, mooey and the market', 23 and the thing that all of these orders have in common is
an intersubjective process of mutual discovery through exchange.24 The crucial difference
between spootanOOUS<rder and <rganisatioo is that spootaneous orders, because they are the
products of human actioo but not of human design, do not have purposes: therefore they
cannot coerce their members - unlike <rganisatioos, which operate by canmand in order to
achieve collective goals.
Five elements distinguish spootaneous <rders from oeganlsations. The first distinction is one
of origin, The origin of spootaneous <rders is not intentiooal, unlike that of organisations, as
we have seen spootaneous <rder is the 'result of human action but not of human design'." It
is the product of self co-ordination amoog its members, each seeking their own objectives
but not making any deliberate e1fms to establish an order. By cootrast, co-ordination in
ocganisations is the product of central directioo in ocder to achieve collective goals: hence,
unless unanimity can be reached 00 the nature of these, individuals who dispute the validity
of: or who oppose, collective goals must be coerced. The second distinctioo lies in the nature
of the co-<Ydinating medium. The aHrdinatioo between individuals that exists in
spootanOOUSorders is a product of rules: individuals co-ordinate their activities by accepting
rules that specifY conditions to be taken into accoont when acting. The order that emerges is
the result of both the regular observatioo of these nues of conduct by individuals; and of
individuals adjusting to the specific circwnstances in which they find themselves whilst
following the rules of conduct. To clarify this point, it is important to understand that one
reason why Hayek values spootaneous orders is that their regularity allows us to co-ordinate
our actions with the actions of others without the necessity of coercion. We can do that only
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if we can predict the actions of others within certain given parameters. The rules of conduct
provide these parameters, and as a result the responses of individuals to their environment
will not be randool but will be, to a certain extent, predictable. That is why, for Hayek,
spontaneous orders are indeed orders and not a series of discoonected responses to isolated
singular events. In an organisatica, by contrast, ~tioo is achieved either by
commands ftool those in charge, fa example, a committee, a manager, or a commander; or
by the will of a ~ooty of aganisatioo members; these commands coerce those who are not
vohmtarily part of the aganisatioo. The third element of difference between spontaneous
orders and <Yg3Ilisatioossurrounds the nature of purposes that they allow individuals to
pursue. A spontaneous ader filcilitates the pursuit of many individual purposes: 'not having
been made it cannot legitimately be said to have a particular purpose, although our
awareness of its existence may be extremely important fa our successful pmsuit of a great
variety of different purposes,.26 This is clearly distinct from the purposlve nature of an
organisatioo established to serve a specific objective defined in advance, and this distinction
determines the nature of the co-ordinating devices 00 which spontaneous orders and
organisatioos rely. The rules of cmduct, which are the co-ordinating medium for
spontaneous a-ders. are 'negative', merely framing a sphere of allowed individual activity.
but leaving members free to choose their ends according to their own plans," The
commands that ensure co-ordlnatien in an <rganisatien, en the other hand, determine
members' activities in a-der to further the <rganisatien's established collective goal as
effectively as possible, whether <r not these ccnflict with the goals of individuals. The fourth
difference is their level of complexity, Ha)'ek believes that there are no inherent limits to the
complexity which spontanoous orders can acquire. By contrast, organisations are 'confined
to such moderate degrees of complexity as the maker can still surveY.28 Finally, only
spontaneous orders raise genuine explanatory problems and thus require explanatory social
theory: their intricacy and variety, according to Hayek, requires explanatory social theory so
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that the mechanisms they use to co-ordinate the multiplicity of activities of individuals may
be understood. Social thea'}' is further necessary here because, unlike in the case of
organisatioos. these spootaneous orders 'do not obtrude themselves 00 our senses but have to
be traced by our intellect. We cannot see or otherwise intuitively perceive this order of
meaningful actioos. but are only able mentally to reconstruct it by tracing the relations that
exist between the elements.'29 It is the task of social thea'}' to undertake such reconstruction:
'Social theory begins with - and has an object only because of - the discovery that there exist
orderly structures which are the product of the actioo(s) of many men but are not the result
of human design.,30 The specific task of social thea'}' is to discover the rules. the observance
of which has led to the evolutioo of the sp<Dtaneous order. In Hayek's view organisations do
not pose similar social theoretical problems because their complexity is limited to what can
be understood by the mind. or group of minds. which has coosciously designed the
organisation. The co-ordination of activities taking place in an organisatioo is explained by
reference to the intentioos of those that establish and direct it.
If Hayek's model is accurate. spootaneous orders - unlike organisatioos - are non-coercive
and neutral because they do not impale external purposes on individuals. Bence Hayek's
claim to neutrality between the pursuit of individual purposes depends on the validity of his
distinction betweeI1 spontaneous order and organisatioo. Two questioos arise. First, is the
distinction between organisation and spontaneous order as clear-cut as Hayek supposes'!
Second. is the spontaneous order as bereft of purpose as he supposes? If not then the claim
that the rules of cooduct governing spontaneous orders are value-free is called into question.
If this is indeed the case then the validity of Hayek's claim that liberty is the foremost value
in society comes to rest 00 his normative justificatioo of liberty as an end in itself.
Hayek himself is equivocal about whether orders are to be classified as either a spontaneous
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order or an organisation; <r whether spootaneous <rder and organisation arc
characterisations of two ideal types of social co-ordination. Even in the course of a single
chapter" Hayek demoostrates the ambiguity of his position. After presenting spontaneous
order and <rganisatioo as a dichotOOly,32and establishing that one of the fundamental
differences between the two is that the co-ordination of spootaneous ada' is rule governed
while that of <rganisatioo is command centred, he says:
[T]o some extent every aganisation must rely also 00 rules and not only on specific
commands. The reason here is the same as that which makes it necessary for a
spontaneoos ooler to rely solely 00 rules: namely that by guiding the actions of
individuals by rules rather than by specific commands it is possible to make use of
knowledge which nobody possesses as a whole. Every organisatioo in which members
are not mere tools of the <rganiser will determine by commands ooly the function to be
performed by each member, the purposes to be achieved, and certain general aspects of
the methods to be employed, and will leave the detail to be decided by the individuals
on the basis of their respective knowledge and skills.33
Hayek appears to be arguing that an organisation, if it is to operate successfully using the
knowledge and skills of its members, must possess at least SOOleof the features of a
spontaneous order, especially in respect of individuals being guided by general rules rather
than by specific commands. The problem is that he obscures his own distinction between
'spontaneous' and 'made' orders, One example is that cited above, where he notes that
organisations also depend 00 rules. Ma'e significant is that Hayek suggests that changing
the rules may influence the general character of a spontaneous order: ' ... even where, as is
true of a society of human beings, we may be in a JDitioo to alter at least some of the rules
of conduct which the elements obey. we shall thereby be able to influence ooly the general
character and not the detail of the resulting order'. 34 Further confusioo is generated when
Hayek discusses the possibility of inducing a spootaneous <rder by designing and
introducing appropriate rules:
...it is paiSible that an order, which would still have to be described as spontaneous,
rests on rules which are entirely the result of deliberate design. In the kind of society
with which we are familiar, of course, only some of the rules which people in fact
observe, namely some of the rules of law (but never all, even of these) will be the
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product of deliberate design, while most of the rules of morals and custom will be
owths 35spontaneous Sf .
Hayek has blurred the botmdaries between organisation and spontaneous order, which he
had previously argued were unequivocal. If a spontaneous order is designed, even in part, or
its general character is to be changed, even in part, then the designers of the order, or those
who wish to change its character, must have SOOlereason fiy doing so. He starts by arguing
as follows: '[M]ost important, however, is the relatioo of a spootaneous order to the
conception of purpose. Since such an order has not been created by an outside agency, the
order as such also can have no purpose, although its existence may be very serviceable to the
individuals which move within such an order'. 36 And interventioo in the spontaneous order
can be extremely damaging because '[T]he spontaneous order arises fran each element
balancing all the various factors operating on it and by adjusting all its various actions to
each other, a balance which will be destroyed if SOOleof the actioos are determined by
another agency 00 the basis of different knowledge and in the service of different ends.,37In
conclusion he claims that:
What the general argmnent against 'interference' thus amoems to is that, ai/hough we
can endeavour to improve a spontaneous order by revising the general rules on which
it rests, and can supplement its results by the eff<ns of various organizatlons, we
cannot improve the results by specific commands that deprive its members of the
possibility of using their Icnowledgefor their purposes. 38
So the reason why Hayek believes that amending of the general rules of a spontaneous order
is justified is that it allows people to utilise their own knowledge to their own advantage.
That being the case. those who wish to preserve the spontaneous order in some way must be
happy with the spontaneous order as it is: and those who wish to restore or amend a
spontaneous order must believe a restored or amended order will be better in the sense that
it will allow individuals to use their own knowledge in their own way. There is clearly, then,
a normative dimension to spontaneous orders. If they can be changed or designed they must
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have the capacity to be evaluated. If they are to be evaluated, it must be against some
conceptioo of what is <r is not good, in this case the individual utilisatioo of knowledge.
And if this is so, then the cooceptioo ofspootanews <rder cannot be neutral: it must have a
normanve dimensioo.
The reason why Hayek wishes to induce <r otherwise adapt spontaneous orders is to promote
liberty and prevent coercioo. He believes that associatioo in terms of spootaneous order -
and governed by the rule of law - is the ooly mode of human (X'der that does not coerce its
members by imposing external purposes upoo them. Hayek's normative position, therefore.
must be that liberty is good and coercioo is bad: and he offers three types of justificatioo t()I'
this positioo. The first is an instrumental defence of liberty: liberty is justified because it is
the means to achieve other values, such as pra;perity, (X' perhaps an overall increase in a
happy populatioo. This defence emerges fnm Hayek's philosophy of mind and theory of
knowledge. The secood is built 00 the same intellectual foendadoes: because we can never
know our own mind, we must distrust the 'coostructivist ratiooalism' which claims that
reason can tell us how to build idealised versions of societies. Thus we must hold a prejudice
in favour of the established institutions and traditions which have allowed liberty, and with
it the ability of individuals to use their own tacit knowledge, to flwrish. Again, this defence
of liberty is instnDnental: the societies which have in the course of their natural
(spontaneous) devel~t maintained market economies, and have an established rule of
law, have usually enjoyed moo: material ~ty, and hence have been able to maintain
greater populations in greater relative COOlfm than those which have not. Hayek's third type
of justificatioo is this: liberty bas an intrinsic moral value of its own; intrinsically it is so
preciOUS that other values must be sacrificed so that it can be protected. 111is mixture
presents three related problems f(X'Hayek. First, his instnDnental pa;itioos can neither be
neutral, nor ultimately offer any secure normanve justificatioo f<Y liberalism: f<r if they
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happen to fail in providing the desired ends, then it would be legitimate to replace the liberal
order with an order that did deliver them. Second, Hayek's approach does not offer the
defence of liberty as the foremost value in society that he needs because it rests on
questiooable empirical assumptioos, and ones that coofirm Hayek's subjectivism. Finally.
Hayek is left with a canbinatioo of two types of theoretical argwnent, normative and
empirical, which he attempts to nul together but which cannot be nm together. A consistent
philosophical case for a particular view of society such as Hayek's can be based either on the
consequences of what liberty can produce in measurable terms, such as pra;perity. increase
in populatioo, or, most famously, happiness (an instnunental view): or it can be based on
the moral value of liberty, which should be secured, irrespective of whether or not it
promotes other valuable ends (a Kantian view). But it cannot be based 00 both together. In
the remainder of the chapter I shall examine each in turn.
II - The empirical case for liberty
What is the basis of Hayek's empirical caIiI!?And why can't it be neutral? To explain the
problems of Hayek's empirical case its foondatioo in his phila;ophy of mind and
epistemology must first be examined. F<X'his instnunental defence of liberty rests on his
empirical psychology and epistemology, the conclusioos of which lead him to assert that the
only way for human society to flourish is to have liberty as the foremost value in society.
Hayek's mail complete versioo of his empirical psychology and its relationship to his
epistemology appears in The Sensory Order,39 in which he wants to discover 'the kind of
process by which a given physical situatioo is transformed into a certain phenomenal
picture' .40 In other \\UI"ds, the questioo that Hayek is addressing is this: why is it that the
way we perceive the W(J"ldthrough our senses is different from the way we might describe
the world in the language of science? Hayek's answer to this questioo is the beginning of his
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theory of how the mind operates.
FCI" Hayek. the mind is a product of two evoiutiooary processes, one physical, the other
cu1turaJ. According to Ha)'ek the physical structure of the Inin has evolved in certain ways
that are reflected in the coosistency of perceptim that mart human beings share. At the
same time, the envirmment and experiences of particular people will lead individual minds
to evolve in different directioos and guide perceptioos in different ways. As people live, the
various experiences they eneoemer all affect their mental evolutioo and development, so that
at any given point the mind can be seen as the product of these histoocal and experiential
events. Thus the mind is a cultural product that evolves from a particular physical
structure." Hayek \WUld accept that there is a physical basis to the mental <rder, but he
believes that the mind cannot be reduced to simple physical categOOes. '[be self-organising
properties of the mind take it beyood wr ability to lDlderstand in physical terms, despite its
ultimately physical basis.
The neural order of the mind is, fCl"Hayek, largely an 'apparatus of classificatioo'. 42 To
recognise sanething as a distinct seIlSCI"y 'datum' it must be differentiated from other
sensatioos. Hayek's theay suggests that the mind has evolved to perfcrm this furu..1ion _ the
mind is a 'process that creates the distinctioos in questioo'. 43 The various COOlbinations of
neural firings that comprise a given mental event have evolved as the means by which we
interpret the \\«ld The mechanism of that evolutioo is the success of any given picture of
the \\«ld in guiding individual actioos in that \Q"ld Sets of classification that do not
successfully guide actioos (that is, ones that do not in SOOle sense correspond to the physical
world) will prevent the Cl"ganism whose actioos are being guided flun thriving.
Classification processes which survive are those which most accurately coofmn to external
events.
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Hayek employs the metapbors of 'map' and 'model' to describe the mental order more
precisely.44 The 'map' refers to the semi-permanent neural coonectioos and linkages the
brain has built up as the result of past experience. In some sense it is the classifying
structure that drives mental fimctioos. The 'model' refers to the 'pattern of impulses which is
traced at any moment within the given network of semi-permanent channels"? derived from
the specific envirooment in which the person is currently placed. The map generates the
model. Based m previous sensory experience. the mind gives us a model of the present
envirmment that serves as the baclcdrq) fa classifYing ineaning sensory infa-matim in the
current context. The model is also f<YWard-lookingin that it enables actoes to anticipate the
likely consequences of both their own actions and of external events. Hayek envisions a
feedback process between the two, as input from the various existing environments can
eventually change the map, while the map is what creates any specific model. lienee, the
mind is both the product of experience and what classifies that experience.
What is Hayek's purpose in presenting this account of the operatim of the hwnan mind? At
the beginning of this chapter I pointed out that his goal was to restate and refine the
arguments of the early thinkers of classical liberalism. M<ROVer,Hayek particularly points
to Hwne and Kant as his two mart impcetant intellectual progenit<n.46 From Hume comes
Hayek's emphasis m spmtaneous crder and the empirical basis of society and morallty,
From Kant comes Hayek's emphasis m freedom and the importance of universal rules of
justice. Indeed, Chandran Kukathas? interprets Hayek's project as one that attempts to
bridge Htune and Kant in crder to achieve an integrated theory of the liberal <rder:
[H]ayek's critique of cmstructivist ratimalism, and his 8CCOWltof the evolution of
rules of conduct in the thecey of the spmtaneous order are strikingly I hunean in
character. His political phil<Jq)hy is, to a considerable extent, foonded in Humean
assumptions about the nature of society and the place of justice within it. He sees
morality as a social institutioo composed of rules of cooduct which have evolved within
the social order and derive their legitimacy, ultimately, from the fact they facilitate the
e<r<X'dinatimof human activities and enhance society's prospects of survival. He thus
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follows Hume in regardingjustice as an institutioo which enables man to cope with his
circwnstances and denying that the rules of justice can be discovered by reason. At the
same time, however, Hayek appears to reject the ideas of such a 'conservative'
justificatioo of the liberal order. In attempting to uncover the principles of a liberal
social order he turns to aKantian emphasis 00 the importance of freedoot as the master
of the Great Society. His cooceptioo of freedoot as 'independence of the arbitrary will
of another' is indeed strikingly Kantian, emphasising as it does that liberty means 'the
absenCe ofa particular obstacle-coercion by other men'."
For Hayek. the mind is a classificatioo system in the Kantian sense where the classes are
part of the structure of the mind, not of the world itself. However, there is also a Humean
dimension to Hayek's theory of mind, for he denies that these Kantian categories are a
permanent part of the structure of the mind. Rather, the categories are the product of biology
interacting with empirical experience, 49 that is, they evolve as the particular human actor
grows and learns. Hayek's theory of mind, then, tries to provide an empirical explanation fbr
the source and cootinuing evolutioo of these a priori categories. It is in this Wdy that he is
trying to straddle Hwne and Kant. The mind, for Hayek, is what enables the to world appear
organised and sensible to individuals, rather than as a chaotic blur of random images and
movement. The orderliness of the wa-Id is a product of the mind, not a feature of the world
itself. Hwnan \Duierstanding of the wa-Id is orderly because the mind orders sensations -
hence 'the sensa'Y order'. The mind, therefore, does not translate sensatioos into a mental
picture; it is the means by which we classify sensatioos in the first place. It is not, however.
an unchanging, universal classificatory structure, but itself an empirical phenomenon.
The most important implicatioo of this 'Hmneo-Kantian' theory for Hayek's social and
political views is that individuals can never fully explain their own minds. If the mind is the
way in which individuals classify the world around them, they can never step back and
attempt to view the mind itself as a sensory input. As Hayek says, 'any apparatus of
classificatioo must possess a structure of a higher degree of complexity than is possessed by
the objects which it classifies ... therefore, the capacity of any explaining agent must be
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limited to objects with a structure possessing a degree of complexity lower than its own'. 50
Therefore, he coocludes, 'there also exists ••.an absolute limit to what the hwnan brain can
ever acronplish by way ofexplanatioo,.51 The CCl'ollary of the fact that no one can ever fully
know his or her own mind is that na: all hwnan knowledge can be fully articulated. Hayek's
psychology declares that the <rder of coonectioos in the mind is
., .modified by every new actioo exercised upoo it by the external \\Uld. and since the
stimuli acting on it do not operate by themselves rut always in conjWlctioo with the
process called forth by the pre-existing excitatory state, it is obvioos that the response
to a given canbination of stimuli 00 two different occaslons is not likely to he exactly
the same. Because it is the whole history of the organism which will determine its
action. new factors will contribute to this determinatioo 00 the latter occasion which
were not present at the first. We shall find not cnly that the same set of stimuli will not
always produce the same responses, but also that altogether new responses will occur.
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The crucial point here is that the knowledge that allows the mind to evolve is not built up by
itself: but through selectioo amoogst mechanisms producing different patterns. The mind's
evolutioo is blind. It depends not 00 premeditated objectives or foresight, rut on a process of
evolutioo, or a discovery procedure, that gropes through the space of what is possible, and in
some instances chances upoo rules that fit the requirements of survival and flourishing:
[I]t seems to me that the organism first develops new potentialities for actions and only
afterwards does experience select and confirm those which are useful as adaptations to
typical characteristics of its envirooment. There will thus be gradually developed by
natural selectioo a repertory of acticn types adapted to standard features of the
envirooment. Organisms become capable of ever greater varieties of actions, and learn
to select among them, as a result of SOOle assisting the preseryaticn of the individual or
the species, while other possible actioos COOle to be similarly inhibited or confined to
some special coostellatioos of external conditioos.53
Thus it is Impossible to state or communicate all of the rules which govern our actions,
including our communications and explicit statements.
The limits of explicit hmnan knowledge form the basis for Hayek's political and social
thought. Social co-ordination processes and the institutioos that comprise them ultimately
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consist in the cammmicatim and use of knowledge. S4 The problem of social co-crdinatlon
is the problem of how best to discover and utilise the diverse and fragmentary pieces of
knowledge embedded in individual minds. In the same way that classical economics focuses
on the role of markets in ro«dinating the divisim oflabour so that the economy can grow,
Hayek emphasises the divisim of knowledge inherent in complex social orders and argues
that spootaneoosly evolved institutims, such as the market, are the only way to achieve the
epistemological eo-ordination necessary f<r economic growth, and hence prosperity. This
point is fimdamental to Hayek's epistemological and empirical psychological case fa' the
liberal order. The necessity of the role of spontaneously evolved institutims lies in this, that
only they can enable a society to make use of the knowledge possessed by individual
ecooomic act<YS, because a substantial pmioo of that knowledge is tacit and cannot be
coosciously known and communicated linguistically.
Hayek's case fa' the rule of law, and his demand that the remit even of thoroughly
democratic governments be limited, follow directly from his epistemology and theory of
mind. As I shall now show, however, the flaws in Hayek's empirical defence of Uberty also
emerge from these argmnents. If Hayek's analysis is accurate, then his two instrumental
defences of freedooI flow from his explanatory social the<Yy.The first is consequentialist.
Freedom produces good results. InKnowledge, Evolution and Sciencess he claims that the
measure of the success of a social system is the number of people it is able to sustain. His
theory of human evolutim is that of the 'natural selection' of traditions which enhance the
group's survival prospects, The exercise of liberty under the rule oflaw is valuable because it
offers the best ~ty f<r every individual to utilise their own tacit knowledge. The
utilisation of this widely dispersed knowledge facilitates the increased productivity that
allows both human ~ation and their level of material prosperity to increase. Such
arguments have led John Gray to classify Hayek as an indirect utilitarian. 56 Roland Kley also
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understands Hayek as offering an instrumental justificatioo fa" the liberal order:
.. , it is ultimately his view that the institutioos together forming the basis of the liberal
market society can be shown to be morally legitimate by demoostrating that they alone
are capable of co-oedinating social and ecoooolic life in a way that prevents mass
hungee, produces general prosperity, and ensures social peace,"
This point is crucial fa" Hayek's first instrumental argmnent fO' the defence of liberty. Any
instrumental defence of liberty autOOl8tically leads to the questioo that, if the liberal order
fails to deliver the goods of preventing mass hunger, promotlng general prosperity and
maintaining social peace, should the liberal a"der not then be discarded in favour of a
society which does produce those goods? This is a dilemma for Hayek; and its implications
for his the<YYwill be examined later in the chapter. For the moment I shall put that aside
and coocentrate 00 Hayek's positive argwnent fa' liberty and the liberal order.
The liberal a"der is a dynamic order characterised by what Hayek describes as 'progress'.
The 'progress' facilitated by the liberal a'der is a process of development and transformation
of the human intellect. It is an adaptive, educative process in which wants and values
constantly change. However, what are the coosequences of this coostant change? And. if
Hayek is to have a coherent instn.unentalist moral theory, then by what norms are such
changes to be evaluated? The difficulty which Hayek faces is that 'progress' brings with it
changes, not oaly in the form of individual accomplishments, but also in terms of individual
goals: these are no less subject to the dynamic process of 'progress'. It is therefore doubtful
whether the new circumstances created by 'progress' can be seen as 'better' than what has
gone before, Individuals' goals are coostantly changing; even if the liberal order is indeed
the most effective way of facilitating the pursuit of individual goals, there is no way of
evaluating whether a" not individuals are better off fa" having achieved them. Hayek
concedes this when he says:
... often it [progress] also makes us sadder men. Though progress consists in part in
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achieving things we have been striving f(X', this does not mean that we shall like its
results (X'that we shall all be gainers. And since OW' wishes and aims are also subject to
change in the course of the process, it is questiooable whether the statement bas a clear
meaning that the new state of affairs that progress creates is a better one. Progress in
the sense of the cmnulative growth of knowledge and power over nature is a term that
says little about whether the new state will give us more satisfaction than the old. The
pleasure may be solely in achieving what we have been striving f(X', and the assured
possession may give us little satisfaction. The question whether, if we had to stop at
OW' present stage of development, we would in any significant sense be better off or
happier than if we had stopped a hundred (X' a thousand years ago is probably
unanswerable. S8
Hayek is here denying the possibility of a normative ranking of 'states of affairs' - as he has
to on the basis of his philosophy of mind Hayek cannot rank states of affairs because of the
claims he makes about the inarticulable nature of human knowledge and the impossibility of
individuals knowing their own mind Hayek's whole empirical psychology and epistemology
denies the po;sibility that, by using reason, an individual (X' group of individuals can
SOOlehow stand outside an existing social (X'der and evaluate competing social 'states of
affairs'. F(X'Hayek, as Kukathas notes:
[R]eason cannot provide us with the criteria by which to compare states of affairs; it is
merely a capacity which is produced (X' created (and modified) by progress. Thus
reason can identifY incoosistencies among rules within a situatioo «X' tradition) of
behaviour but cannot stand outside the evolutiooary process to evaluate the different
states of affairs that ratiooal actioo might lead to. S9
Hayek's criticism of 'coostructivist ratiooalists' is based 00 the idea that it is impossible for
anyone to have the complete knowledge required to 'evaluate the different states of affairs
that rational actioo might lead to'. Their argwnent is based '00 the fiction that all relevant
facts are known to SOOleme mind, and that it is possible to coostruct from this knowledge of
the particulars a desirable social <X'der.t60 Thus, according again to Kukathas:
Hayek's defence of the liberal <X'der is based not on the claim that its rules will produce
end-states we \Wuld choose if we knew what alternatives were available, but on the
cootentioo that the rules of the liberal <X'der enable us to adapt to a changing
envirooment which is always creating states of affairs which we can never wholly
anticipate, let alone choose, 61
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Hayek, then. is definitely neither a rule n<r an act utilitarian. Is it possible that his critique
of 'constructivist ratiooalism' might still accoounodate SOOle other form of coosequentialist
moral the<ri/ But how can Hayek be seen as a coosequentialist of any sort if he denies the
possibility ofcanparing and choosing between states ofaflBirs? Indeed, '[I]fthere can be no
comparative evaluatioo of alternative states of affairs. it is difficult to show how a liberal
order (which facilitates adaptatiro to a changing enviraunent) can be regarded as superior
or preferable to that cooditioo in which a nro-liberal order sustains an impoverished and
diminishing populatioo.r62 Whatever fmn of coosequentialism one adopts, it has to allow for
one state of affairs to be identified as superi<r <r preferable to another, and Hayek's theory
explicitly excludes such a possibility.
By contrast, Hayek's insistence 00 the limits of reason allows an instrwnental defence of
liberty - but ooly in those societies which have an already established liberal tradition,
because it is established liberal orders that have allowed liberty to tlowish. This is what I
term Hayek's conservative defence of fteedan, a defence which emerges frOOl his insistence
that the power of reason is limited because of the imJOSibility of complete knowledge, and
the inability of individuals to know their own mind Having shown that Hayek's philosophy
of mind is in tensioo with his consequentialist argument, I shall show how it supports a
conservative normative defence of liberty within established orders.
DI - The couenative case for liberty
Bef<X'egoing 00 to do that, however, it is important to establish what might allow a defence
of the liberal <X'derto be described as a cooservative roe. A good point to begin a discussion
of putative conservatism in relation to Hayek is with Michael Oakeshott, the conservative
wha;e ideas bear the closest resemblance to those of Hayek's liberalism. Oakeshott states:
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[TJo be cooservative. then, is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried
to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded,
the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the
perfect, present laughter to ut~ian bliss. Familiar relationships and loyalties will be
preferred to the allure oflllO"e profitable attachments; to acquire and to enlarge will be
less important than to keep, to cultivate and to enjoy; the grief of loss will be more
acute than the excitement of novelty lY prOOlise. It is to be equal to me's own fortune,
to live at the level of roe's own means, to be content with the want of greater perfection
which beloogs alike to oneself and ooe's circumstances.63
What Oakeshott is saying is that cooservatives value those practices and institutions which
exist here and now. This is clearly different :frool Hayek's view that liberty is valuable
because it allows 'progress', which in Hayek's terms is a restless dynamic process, a process
that facilitates change and innovatioo.64 Oakeshott, however, does offer one important
proviso, namely that the inclinatim to conservatism will, 'if the present is arid, offering little
or nothing to be used or enjoyed' be 'weak or absent'.65 The inclination to conservatism
'asserts itself characteristically when there is much to be enjoyed, and it will be strongest
when this is COOlbinedwith an evident risk OflaiS'.66 This has been a constant theme within
conservatism since it emerged as a recognisable traditim in Western thought. It is a point
made most famously by Burke when he said of attempts to overthrow established
government that 'it is with infinite cautioo that any man ought to venture upoo pulling down
an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of
society, or 00 building it up again, without having models and patterns of approved utility
before his eyes,.67 Contemporary cooservatives take a similar line. Irving Kristol, for
instance, notes that 'institutioos which have existed over a long period of time have a reason
and a purpose inherent in them. a collective wisdool incarnate in them, and the fact that we
don't perfectly explain why they '\\Uk' is no defect in them, but merely a limitation in US,.68
This implies of coorse that cooservatism is fimdamentally a subjective69 doctrine, that there
is no need flYthe social or political order to be objectively justified. Indeed, it cannot be thus
justified because 'objectivity' is itself internal to traditioo. On the basis of Hayek's contention
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that it is impossible ratiooally to choose between states of affairs his doctrine too is
subjective. matching the strong subjectivist strand within cmservatism which, again,
originates with Burke. When discussing liberty he notes:
I flatter myself that I love a manly, moral, regulated liberty as well as any gentleman of
that society, be he who he will; and perhaps I have given as good proofs of my
attachment to that cause, in the whole course of my public cooduct. I think I envy
liberty as little as they do, to any other nation. But I cannot stand forward, and give
praise (J" blame to any thing which relates to hwnan actions, and human concerns, on a
simple view of the object, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness
and solitude of metaphysical abstraction. Circwnstances ... give in reality to every
political principle its distinguishing colour, and discriminating eifect.70
Equally, Burke makes clear that whether a value like liberty is good a" bad depend" on
circumstance. 71 And that there are limits to hmnan reasoo: '[W]e are afraid to put men to
live and trade each 00 his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in
each man is small, and that each man would do better to avail themselves of the general
bank and capital of natioos and of ages. t12 These canparisoos indicate a prima facie case for
suspecting that Hayek's normative outlodc is cooservatlve. Now, how good is this prima
facie C3!!J!? Let US start by pursuing the canparisoo with Oakeshott's 'mainstream'
conservatism.
His most imp<J"tant justificatioo of cooservatism is that people within an existing order have
a dispadtioo to maintain that <J"der because they enjoy the benefits which accrue from it.
But, beyOOd that basic cootentioo, Oakeshott offers a series of arguments about why people
should be attached to already extant institutioos and mlers. These argwnents bear a striking
resemblance to Hayek's anti-ratiooalism. Oakeshott, like Hayek, believes that there are two
types of knowledge, knowledge of technique that can be articulated, like the knowledge in a
cookery book. and practical knowledge embodied in skills, such as driving a car, which
cannot. Furtherm<Ye immanent within Oakeshott's epistemology is a critique of rationalism
based 00 the impossibility of possessing complete knowledge," Finally, Oakeshott, like
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Hayek. also identifies two ideal fmns of human associatioo: civil associatioo (which
corresponds in some ways to Hayek's spootaneous order); and enterprise associatioo (which
parallels Hayek's notioo of an a-ganisatioo).
Oakeshott's cooservative defence of the established ~ stems frOOl the dichotomy he
identifies between civil associatioo and enterprise associatioo. Civil associatioo is a formal
relatiooship, while enterprise associatioo is a substantive relatiooship. ~ott explains
the distinctioo in the following terms. All actioos and choices have a substance and a form.
The substance of an actioo is a perfmnance in which an individual seeks to achieve a
satisfactioo: f~ example, the perfmnance of playing the violin, selling a house ~ asking
directioos. The form of an actioo is not what is dooe (the perfmnance) but the manner in
which it is dale: playing in ~ out of tune, selling legally ~ fraudulently, asking the way
politely or impolitely. The fam of an actioo is the actioo in respect of its acknowledgement
of a procedure: musical pitch. law, <r good manners." Oakeshott calls the procedure
acknowledged in an actioo a 'practice,.75A practice is a set of formal coosidcratioos to be
taken into account when acting. These fmnal coosideratioos may be maxims. principles.
rules. manners, uses, observances, offices a' cestoms. They do not identitY a' specitY what
choices an individual shall make; they are coosideratioos to be taken into account when
acting. They qualitY but do not determine substantive choices and performances: the rules of
music do not tell a violinist to play a particular tune, they invite him or her to play in tune;
the law governing prqx::rty transfer does not tell some one to whom they may sell their
house, <X' at what price, but that they must not misrepresent what it is they are selling; good
manners do not tell an individual what to say, simply the manner in which it should be said.
When individuals act they use a practice (X' set of practices COOl~ of various procedural
consideratioos. However, they also do SOOlethingin particular - to return to the example
used earlier in relation to Hayek, the form of driving does not specitY the substance of a
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destinatioo. Fa Qakeshott, when individuals are associated in virtue of acknowledging a
common practice their relatiooship is formal, Civil associatioo, as Oakeshott defines it, is
one such relatiooship; it is the fmnal relatiooship of individuals who acknowledge a system
of law?6 'Ibis system includes a legislative procedure fa making, repealing and amending
law, a judicial procedw'e fa resolving uncertainties and disputes about whether or not on
any particular occasioo a law has been adequately subscribed to, and a procedure for
enforcing and administering law.77
Oakeshott further describes civil associatioo as a moral practice.78 It is non-instrumental in
that it is not in any way coocemed with the success a failure of subrumtive transactions and
enterprises. It is not coocemed with the satisfactioo of wants, but solely with the terms under
which the satisfactioo of wants is sought. Civil associatioo is associatioo devoid of
substantive purposes, theretoee, and does not impinge 00 the fteedOOl of individuals to
pursue their own purposes. Ibvever, although there are similarities between civil
associatioo and spootaneous <rder, civil associati<mdiffers fran the latter in two important
respects. On the <meband Qakeshott makes clear that civil associatioo is an ideal type, that
no state has ever confined itself exclusively to associatioo in terms of a manner of living, or
in terms of rules. All states combine, in different proportions, the character of the
purposeless state, civil associatioo and the purposive state, enterprise essociadon." The
advantage of states where civil associatioo is daninant is that they may be expected to afford
the citizen
.. ' the right to pursue his chosen directioos of activity as little hindered as may be by
his fellows a by the exactioos of government itself: and as little distracted by
cooununal pressures. Freedom of movement, of initiative, of speech, of belief and
religious observance, of associatioo and disassociatioo, of bequest and inheritance;
security of person and property; the right to choose me's own occupatioo and dispose
of one's labour and goods; and overall the 'rule of law: the right to be ruled by a known
law, applicable to all subjects alike.1IO
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Furthermae. the rules of civil associatioo are recognised in terms of their authority, rather
than their desirability. The rules of civil association do not ask to be approved, they are not
designed to persuade and they do not offer reasoos why they shwld be obeyed. They are
authoritative prescriptioos and as such they neither require nor solicit approval. Individuals
may argue about a rule and they may try to persuade their fellow citizens that the rule is
good a bad, but the rules themselves do not argue or persuade. Citizens of the state as civil
association (or ewes as Oakeshott describes them) are related in virtue of recognising civil
rules fa what they are in themselves, namely authoritative proclamations of law. In other
wads they recognise the terms of their associatioo, the rules, as authoritative.
The nomanve element of civil associatioo derives from the approval of these terms, not
simply of law, although law does play an important pan. The approval of the practice of
civil associatloo is general and f<rmal rather than the approval of specific purposes, Not
every single rule a law needs to be approved by all individuals. But whether the desirability
of a specific rule is accepted or not, members of civil associations accept its authoeity and
they recognise that. until it has been changed or amended by the authoritative procedure tOr
changing rules, it must be obeyed. Most significant, though, is that if the character of the
way of life is enjoyed. rules that dramatically change that character must be avoided. Let me
illustrate this point with a sporting analogy. Take the game of cricket. Some players and
followers of the game may think that the current 'leg before wicket' law is inconsistent and
needs to be amended. Nooetheless, ootil the body recognised as being auth<ritative alters it.
players and spectators accept that a batsman trapped 'leg before wicket' is out. Such
amendments are often debated and an adjustment in such a law \\UUld not dramatically
change the nature of the game that players enjoy playing and spectators enjoy watching.
What is not debated or discussed is change to the law which fabids the bowler throwing the
ball at the ~g batsman instead of bowling it at him; fa to do so would be to entirely
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change the nature of the game which players and spectstors enjoy and appreciate.
Oakeshott's defence of the state as civil associatioo stands 00 two pillars, then. both of which
have an instnBDentai element. The first is the typically cooservative approach. that we
maintain this type of associatioo because, imperfect as it is. we have it and we value it:
'[W)hat is esteemed is the present; and it is esteemed not 00 account of its connectioos with
a remote antiquity. nor because it is recognised to be mae admirable than any possible
alternative. but (Il account of its familiarity.,11 In <tber \\Uds we seek to maintain what is
for no better reasoo than it is there and it affads us sufficient enjoyment fa- us to want to
keep it. The second defence is also instrmnental, but it is mere complex, Oakeshott's fullest
account of this defence is in 'The Masses in Representative Democracy'12 where he traces the
emergence of individuality in Europe, being coocemed to explain that the emergence of
individuality was an hista-ical process, as 'artificial' and as 'natural' as the landscape:l)
[T]he character of the individual who emerged was determined by the manner of his
generatioo. He became munistakable when the habit appeared of engaging in activities
identified as 'private'; indeed, the appearance of 'privacy' in hwnan conduct is the
obverse of the desuetude of the communal arrangements fran which modern
individuality sprang. This experience of individuality pnMiced a dispositioo to explore
its own intimatioos. to place the highest value upon it, and to seek security in its
enjoyment. To enjoy it came to be recognised as the main ingredient of 'happiness'.
The experience was magnified into an ethical thea-y; it was reflected in manners of
governing and being governed, in newly acquired rights and duties and in a whole
pattern of living. 84
The emergence of individuality is the pre-eminent event in modem European history. Thus
individuality, and hence the fteedan to express it, are the product of the European
intellectual traditioo. Individuality and freedom are \\UI1h defending f(J" no other reason
than that they are the product of this particular traditioo.15 The potential clash between
individuality and freedan and <rder are reconciled in Oakeshott's thought (as in Hayek's but
in a slightly different way) by the recognition that, if individuality is to be enjoyed, rules
must exist to prevent individuals impinging 00 the protected danains of other individuals.
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Similarly Oakeshott sees no m<l'8l defence fa' what he desaibes as 'modern representative
democracy'. 'It [modern representative democracy] is not to be understood ... as an
approximation to SOOleideal manner of government. ... It is simply what emerged in Western
Europe where the aspiratioos of individuality UJKIl medieval institutioos of government
were greatest.,86 Furtherma-e, the botmdaries of representative. a' indeed any other form of
government which defends individuality cannot be determined by reasoning from first
principles; they can be established, always provisiooally and never indisputably. only by
reasonings that are circumstantial and which invoke precedents, judgemenl~ and practices
that are present in cmrent political life. Oakeshott ftmdamentally reject" liberal rationalism.
Although he would be in agreement with Hayek's noo-ratiooalism. he \\OO1dnot share his
account of its f<Uldatioo: as he says in Rationalism in Politics. Hayek's theories are simply a
species of doctrine. although a marginal improvement 00 the rest.17 It is also clear that
Oakeshott has Hayek in mind when he rejects 'the saddo,1 of all misunderstandings of the
state as 'civil association'.'
.,. that in which it is p1'q)erly presented as associatioo in terms of non-instnunental
conditioos Imposed upoo cooduct and specified in general rules from whose obligations
no associate and no cooduct is exempt, but defended as the mode of association mae
likely than any other to prcmote and go 00 promoting the satisfilctioo of our diverse
and proliferant wants.8I
Oakeshott's defence of 'civil associatioo' and hence of freedom, is consequentialist. but of a
different sort from Hayek's. Hayek recommends liberty as the only system which will
maintain prosperity and an increased populatioo, while Oakeshott recoounends it because it
is what we have and value. He also recognises that in the event of it ceasing to be valued a
appreciated, change is inevitable, although it is probably undesirable, as there is no
guarantee that change will be fa' the better, and there is always the possibility that things
that are valued will be lost by change. Thus, fa' Oakeshott, a' any conservative for that
matter, while change is inevitable, it must be slowly mediated and in tune with existing
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traditions of behaviour, and it is always accompamed by a sense of 1~1\.
Let me make clear that I am not claiming that this cooservative position can be simply
foisted on Hayek. Rather, it illustrates that what I have described as Hayek's cooservative
instnnnental defence of liberty bears a striking resemblance to the \\Uk of a cooservalive
philosopher like Michael Oakeshott. It is a resemblance that both Oakeshott and some of his
interpreters also recognise," liMever, although elements of Hayek's thought - such as the
limitations he places 00 the power of reasm and his epistemology - suppm a cooservative
cooceptioo of the good, ~er elements in his thought emmet with cooservatism, in
particular his 00000 of progress and - because fa a cooservative the liberal ader cannot be
shown to be intrinsically better than any OOlerestablished form of political a social order -
his attempted vindicatioo of the 'Great Society' as capable ofjustificatioo.
Hayek defends liberty because it secures 'progress', a term he uses in two senses. In one
sense it denotes the advance in material well being that can be seen in societies enjoying
ecroomic growth: the value of progress lies in the higher living standards and reduced
distributive inequality that it brings.90 In a second sense, however, it refers not to dinx.1ly
materialist instnDnental goals, but to the existence of the emditioos of individual freedom;
cooditioos which allow individuals oppatunities to experiment and learn to use their
knowledge fa their own purposes, 'Progress' in this sense is characterised as a 'process of
formation and modification of hmnan intellect, a process of adaptatioo and learning in
which not only the possibilities known to us but also our values and desires cootinually
change,:91
[W]hat matters is the successful striving fa what at each moment seems attainable. It
is not the fruits of past success but the living in and fa the future in which human
intelligence proves itself: Progress is movement fa movement's sake, fa it is the
process of learning, and in the effects of having learned something new, that man
enjoys the gift of his intelligence.92
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Hayek's view of progress here is peculiar and cootradictory. His psychology and
epistemology laud the value and necessity of traditim in ensuring liberty, and hence
progress, but nothing is more likely to undermlne traditims and render tacit knowledge
valueless than the type ofrestless striving which characterises Hayek's view of progress. It is
a questim of progress for its own salce - and such a cooceptioo of progress is manifestly not
conservative.
The second reasm why Hayek's theay cannot simply be recoociled with conservatism lies
with Hayek's own 'cmstructivist ratiooalism': and in the po;tscript to The Constitution of
Liberty he explicitly explains why he is not a cooservative.93 Hence Oakeshon's peremptory
dismissal of Hayek:
[T]he main significance of Hayek's Road to Serfdom [is) not the cogency of his
doctrine but the fact that it is a doctrine. A plan to resist all planning may be better
than its oppa;jte, but it beloo~ to the same style of politics. And ooly in a society
deeply infected with ratiooalism will the conversion of traditiooal resources of
resistance to the tyranny of Ratiooalism into a self-cooscious ideology be considered a
strengthening of those resoerces, 94
Oakeshott, as a cooservative, rejects Il<X ooly a thea)' of progress such as Hayek's, but also
the very idea that general principles can be used to direct political cooduct. Hayek f(T his
part regards conservatism as 'a useful practical maxim, but me which does not give us any
guiding principles which can influence loog-range developments,.95 F<I' Hayek, the decisive
objectim to any cooservatism is that it is unable to offer an alternative to any direction in
which society is moving;96 so that the fate of cooservatives is to be dragged a100g a path not
of their own choosing. Hayek. as a liberal. wants to guide the directioo along which society
is moving; he wants not just to understand how society functims as a spootaneous order, but
also how the processes of a spootaneous <I'der might be utilised to facilitate human progress.
Hayek's criticisms ofratiooalism and ratiooalists are not criticisms ofratimalism per se, as
in the case of Oakeshott, but are directed at those who do net see limits to the extent to
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which society can be directed by reason,
Hayek. that is to say, is against ratiooalism ooly in so far as it is unlimited. If it can promote
liberty - and hence progress - then 'cmstructivist ratiooalism' is fine. Thus llayek's
'conservative' defence does n<t offer a cmerent explanatioo of the value of Uberty: although
we must hold a prejudice in fiMu of established institutioos and traditioos which have
allowed liberty, in societies where these traditioos are mder threat, (I' do not exist, rules can
and should be made, (I' remade, which will create (I' revitalise society as a spontaneous
order. The problem with this defence, however, is that Hayek is attempting to hnpose an
objective purpose. the defence ofliberty, 00 what in fact is a subjectivist tradition of thought.
At best his 'cooservative' defence of liberty can be used only to justifY existing successful
liberal societies: where people are satisfied with their standard of material well-being and
there is no clamour f(l' change. It could not be used to promote liberty even in a society
governed by a regime as repressive as, say, cootemp<nry China, provided that that regime
continued to retain the tacit suppCI't of the mass of the populatioo and cootinued to offer the
oppCl'tlDlity of material progress to man of its citizens. Although this cannot be what llayek
bad in mind. it is nooetheless the best this type of defence of liberty can otTer.While Hayek
is not a cooservative in the same way as Oakesh<tt (I' Burke. it is only cooservatism which
can fill the chasm between his epistemology, psychology and a valid defence of liberty.
IV - Hayek's putative ){aDu.ism
Two, then, of the three justificatioos which Hayek offers f(l' the defence of liberty fail. 'Ibis
leaves Hayek's final defence of freed<m, his Kantian approach. Two of the most
distinguished coounentatCl'Son Hayek, John Gray and Chandran Kukathas, claim that his
philosophy, in fact, has finnly Kantian fOWldatiOOS.97 Gray argues that '(T]he entirety of
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Hayek's \'Uk - and, above all his \\Uk in epistemology, ethics and the theory of law - is
informed by a distinctively Kantian approach. In its most fundamental aspect, Hayek's
thought is Kantian in its denial of oor capacity to know things as they are, <Ythe \\Uld as it
is. ,98 Furtherm<Ye,
[I]n all of his [Ha)'ek's] writings, ... the distinctively Kantian flavour is evident in his
strategy of \\Uking with postulates in regulative ideas, epistemological and normative.
which are as metaphysically neutral, and as uncommitted to specific conceptions of the
good life, as he can reasooably make them. It is this minimalist or even formalist
strategy of argmnent that most pervasively expresses Hayek's Kantian heritage.99
However, it is n<X apparent that Hayek is as unequivocally Kantian as Gray supposes despite
its being an intellectual debt which Hayek explicitly acknowledges: 'I ... will not enlarge
here on ... the obvious relation of all this to Kant's conceptioo of the categorles that govern
our thinking - which Itook rather f<Ygranted.,IOO And in The Falai Conceit he writes:
[A]lthough I attack the presumption of reason 00 the part of socialists, my argwnent is
in no way directed against reasoo properly used. By 'reason properly used' I mean
reason that recognises its own limitatioos and, itself taught by reason, faces the
implicatioos of the astooishing fact, revealed by ecooOOlics and biology, that order
generated without design can fur outstrip plans men consciously contrive. How, after
all, could I be attacking reason in a bode arguing that socialism is factually and even
logically tmtenable?IOI
The sympathy is clear with Kant's argument that '[Tjhe greatest and perhaps sole use of all
phil~hy of pure reasoo is theref<Ye negative; since it serves as a discipline for the
limitation of pure reasoo.,I02 Hayek also offers a Kantian approach in The Sensory Order,
where he disavows any coocern f<Y'how things really are in the wa-Id', affirming that ' ... a
question like 'what is xr has meaning ooly within a given <rder, and within ... this limit it
must also refer to the relation of roe particular event to other events belonging to the same
order'. F<Y Hayek. as f<YKant, the limits of reason must be established internally, through
reason itself. For bcXh, the limitatioos of reason indicate the limits of possible knowledge.
Hayek indicates that these are logical, not empirical, speaking of 'the permanent limitations
of our filctUal knowledge,.103 He is perhaps at his man Kantian in the Constitution oj Liberty
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when he writes:
The recognitioo that each persoo has his own scale of values which we rught to
respect, even if we do not approve of it is part of the cooceptioo of the value of the
individual persooality ... believing in freedool means that we do not feel entitled to
prevent him [an individual] fiun pursuing ends of which we disapprove so long as he
does not infringe the equally protected sphere of others,
A society which does n~ recognise that each individual has values of his own which he
is entitled to follow can have no respect fa the dignity of the Individual and cannot
~~104really know Ua;uvlU.
But Hayek's Kantian approach neither offers the defence of liberty as the f<nman value in
society that he needs na is as close to Kant as Gray thinks: fm- it rests only on empirical
assumptions so that his padtioo is in the end suijectlve. But since these are subject to
contingen(.)' it is impa;sible fm' Hayek to argue to an objective - properly Kantian -
viewpoint frool which to develop a universal and immutable moral defence fa liberty.
On the one hand what Hayek purports to show with his putative Kantianism is that liberty is
valuable in itself; that is, that the material coosequences which arise from the establishment
of an m-derbased 00 liberty are completely irrelevant to the issue of whether m' n~ liberty is
a good. On the ~er hand, - ifHayek had really adopted a Kantian padtion - he \\WId have
had to argue that there are tmiversal and immutable moral truths on the basis of which to
establish the liberty of the individual. But Hayek argues, rather, that there are certain
specific sets of circumstances that are favwrable to liberty and which should be maintained.
not because they are expressions (W' instantiations of universal immutable rules, but because
they have, as a matter of fact, established liberty in particular sets of circumstances. and
because they have. as a matter of fact, been successful in establishing conditions which
allow the survival in relative canfm of a greater number of people than would ~erwise be
the case. Hayek's subjective case fm' liberty, therefm-e, rests on empirical and matter of fact
claims about the value of liberty in increasing the number of: and improving material
conditions of: human populations. In brief Hayek is attempting to run a deontological and a
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teleological argwnent simultaneously. He is arguing that liberty is both valuable as an end in
itself and fer the coosequences that result from it.
In order to explain fully the failinp of Ha)oek's putative Kantianism let us remind ourselves
of SOOlecentral points within Kant. His belief in the unknowabillty of the rules that govern
the human mind stems frOOlthe dualism between phenOOlenoo and nownenoo, phenomenon
being the appearance of a thing, and noomenoo being the thing in itself. What lies behind
this distinctioo is Kant's cmvictioo that the thing in itself is unknowable, whereas the
phenOOIenoo, er the thing as it appears, is knowable:
... the phenOOlenoo is knowable because Kant believes it derives from the hwnan
mind In other wa'ds, the thing appears as it does because of the unitying activity the
ego undertakes 00 the manifold of experience, fcrming it into an object. The
nownenoo, is 00 the other hand, unknowable since it simply provides the permanent
basis of experience. lOS
The distinctioo ~ the phenOOleDOOand the nownenoo underlies Kant's concept of
man. who has
two points of view fr<m which he can regard himself and ftool which he can know
laws governing the employment of his powers and coosequently governing all his
actioos. He can coosider himself first - so far as he belongs to the sensible woeld - to be
under the laws of nature (heterm<DlY), and under laws which being independent of
nature, are n<t empirical but have their groond in reason alone, 106
For Kant, we have a dualistic nature. We belong to the 'MX'ld of sense er the phenomenal
world, and to the nomnenal wa"ld The two wa"lds give rise to the related 'MX'lds of
everyday life and the \\aId ofmcrality. In everyday life, individuals are pan of the \\Uld of
sense. with a nownenal substratum n<t open to knowledge. However, with respect to the
moral life, individuals are independent of this unknowable substratum. Acarding to Kant,
becatJSe individuals are dealing with values and motives, which fall within thought alone,
our knowledge is not limited. In their moral life, individuals can consider themselves as
nownena becaUSe. when they are dealing with the moral self, if individuals consider
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themselves as part of the intelligible vwa-ld, they cannot mderstand the causality of their
own wills except through the Idea of freedom; because to be independent of determination
by causes in the sensible vwa-ld is to be free. Free will, that is to say, is the product of
understanding ourselves as intelligible beings.l07 The implication of such a position is that.
for Kant himself: mmillty is not the product of traditioo and evolution, but is produced a
priori by reason,
Despite this problem however - f<r I-Ia)'ek, as we have seen, is avowedly anti-ratiooal - Gray
maintains that Hayek is essentially Kantian. Kukathas, to SOOleextent, recognises that there
are difficulties in interpreting Hayek this way, noting the implications of the flaws in
Hayek's Kantianism for his defence of liberty. Kukathas believes that there are three mlijor
claims in Hayek's accoont of justice which suggest that his is a f\mdamentally Kantian moral
philosophy:
1. The most basic and imp<rtant test of justice lies in the principle of
universalisability.
2. Laws are just in so far as they are not arbitrary cmunands imposed by others (but
laws we would give to ourselws).
3. Justice is concerned with the distributioo not of benefits and burdens, but of
freedom.108
While Kukathas does not directly pursue the nature and extent of Hayek's Kantianism,
arguing rather that Hayek's ambitious prQject to combine I-Iumean and Kantian ethical
claims in a cOOerent moral thCCl)' of liberalism ultimately fails, his claims nonetheless offer
a ready means of expl<ring the difficulties to which Ihave alluded.
The first indicatico that Hayek's purportedly Kantian defence of liberty is unsustainable -
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becauSe be vitiates that very Kantianism - arises thxn his prerequisite that laws, to be just,
must fulfil a universalisatioo requirement. Hayek seems to understand this requirement in
two related, rut different ways. He says that '[T]be aprropriate interpretatioo is suggested by
the manner in which Immanuel Kant approached the problem, namely by asking whether
we can 'w.mt' (I' 'will' that such a rule be generally applied.,I09 However, he also says that
'as a test of the apprqriateness of a rule, the possibility of its generalisatioo or
universalisatioo amounts to a test of coosistency (I' canpatibility with the rest of an accepted
system of rules,.110As Kuutbas points out.lII although Hayek doesn't recognise it, he
(Hayek] is coosidering 'universalising' a rule in two different emtexts, each producing its
own distinctive results:
[1]f universalizatioo takes place in the cootext of a system of accepted rules and the
problem is regarded as one of deciding whether or not the rule in questioo can also he
accepted as coosistent and canpatible with existing rules, the test of universalizatioo
does not exclude rules of distributioo if the accepted system is a system of distributive
procedures. All that wwld be required of the new rule is that it not COOle into emtliet
with existing (distributive) arrangements. If: bowever, universalizatioo does not take
place in the cootext of a system of accepted rules rut is a test applied to every rule, and
so is not a test coocerned to recmcile a new rule with an established system but a test
whether the rules of cmduct within any system can be universally willed, then
universalizatioo would (in Ha)'dc's view) render rules of distributioo \Uljust. Certain
rules cannot apply equally to all since sane woold be required to obey laws (of
taxation, f(l' example ...• ) that others were not. This argwnent is \DlSOUI1dsince there is
no reasoo why a cmditiooal principle (I' rule Cif you are rich you must pay more tax')
cannot be universalized. It is clearly this secood \Ulderstanding of universallzatlon that
Hayek has inmind when aiticizing the idea of social justice ... 112
J-IoweVeI'. there is also a simpler point to be made here. What both these two interpretations
have in COOUDoo,and \Wat cooflicts sharply with Hayek's claim that law and justice are the
product of social evolutioo, is that any lKljudicatim of the universalisability of a rule, by
either method. requires the ability to stand back to sane archimedean point to judge either
whether (I' not it is coosistent <X' canpatible with the rest of the accepted system of rules, or
whether (I' not we can 'want' <X' 'will' that such a rule be generally applied. But Hayek has
ruled oot such an approach with both his epistemology and his philosophy of mind. But
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perhaps Hayek might net understand 1lIlM:rsa1ising a rule in quite the same sense as Kant.
Kant intended the idea ofuniversalisabiUty to capture and express the substance of morality:
the tmiversalisatioo test would reveal whether or net a particular maxim or a principle of
actioo was a rule ofmaality.113Kant defines wliversalisatioo thus: '[E}very actioo which by
itself or by its maxim enables the fteedml of each individual's will to co-exist with the
freedom of everyooe else in acardance with a universal law is right.' Kant goes on to argue
that 'if my actioo or my situatioo in general can co-exist with the freedan of everyone else
in accordance with a universal law, anyooe who hinders me in either does me an inju.~tice;
for this hindrance or resistance cannot co-exist with freedoot in accadance with universal
laws,.114 This, as Gray puts it, emomts to the positioo that 'if a rule or a maxim is to be
acceptable as just, its applicatioo must be endmicd by ratiooal agents across all relevantly
similar cases,.115 Hayek's view, given his evolutiooary psychology, is rather different,
however. Whereas the Kantian versioo of the test ofuniversalisability adjures individuals to
deliberate as ratiooal beings and members of the \\\YId of reason, Hayek wants individuals
to do so as members of existing liberal orders, or of potential liberal orders. The criterlon
that Hayek actually offers for the W1iversalisability of a rule, i.e. whether it should be
accepted as just, is in the fimctiooal cootributioo it makes to the generation of spontaneous
ecooomic order. Thus the Hayekian universalisation turns out to be an
[I)m.maDent ... criticism that moves within a given system of rules and judges
particular rules in terms of their cooslstency or COOlpatibility with all <mer recognised
rules in inducing the formatioo of a certain kind of order of actioos. 116
The great body of rules which in this sense is tacitly accepted determines the aim
which the rules being questiooed must also suppm; and this aim .. .is ... the
maintenance or restoratioo of an order of actioos which the rules tend to bring about
successfull 117more <y less y.
In these passages, Hayek is using the test of universalisability in the context of an already
established system of rules. Although the system is not directly specified in his discusslon of
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the Kantian test. the system he has in mind is that of the liberal m1er which has evolved
over time. The practical thrust ofHayek's test is simply to keep m refining. <r in the case of
non-liberal <rders. establishing. the institutimal ftame\\a'k of a liberal order. As I
explained earlier, Hayek's rules of just cmduct are requirements f<r co«dinatioo and
efficient ~m and are moral <r just to the extent to which their observance
cootributes to the generatim and maintenance of a liberal order:
,,0 justice is an attribute of human cmduct vWlich we have learnt to exact because a
certain kind of cooduct is required to secure the fmnatim and maintenance of a
beneficial m:Ier of actims. The attribute of justice may thus be predicated about the
intended results of human actim but not about circumstances which have not been
deliberately lrought about by men. Justice requires that in the 'treatment' of another
person <r persons, i.e. in the intentional actions affecting the well-being of other
persons, certain unifoon rules of cmduct be observed. It clearly has no application to
the manner in vWlich the impersmal process of the market allocates command over
goods and services to particular people: this can be neither just a' Wljust. because the
results are not intended a' f<YeSeen.and depend m a multitude of circumstances not
known in their totality to anybody. The cmduct of the individuals in that process may
well be just a' Wljust; but since their wholly just actioos will have ccnseqoences which
were neither intended n<r fa'CSeell, these effects do not thereby become just or
Oust 118WlJ 0
Crucially, he goes 00:
[T]he tact is simply we cooseot to retain, and agree to enftrce, Wlifam rules f<r a
procedure which has greatly improved the chances of all to have their wants satisfied,
000 Wrth the acceptance of this procedure the recompense of different groups and
individuals becomes exempt mm deliberate cootrol. It is the only procedure yet
discovered in which iTiformation "Widely dispersed among millions of men can be
effectively utilized for the benefit of all - and used by assuring to all an indIvidual
liberty desirable for itself on ethical grounds. It is a procedure vWlich of course has
never been 'designed' but vWlich we have learnt gradually to improve after we had
discovered how it increased the efficiency of men in the groups who had evolved it.119
What Hayek is saying here is that we adopt Wliversalisable rules f<r the liberal and/or
market order because it is a procedure that has 'greatly improved the chances of all to have
their wants satisfied' - and this could hardly be mere different from Kant's posltion. This
dispersed knowledge, \Wich ccostitutes the mechanism by which such want satisfaction is
achieved. can be guaranteed ooly by ensuring that everyooe is guaranteed individualllbcrty,
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and not fel' the coosequential reasm of satisfying wants. It is 'desirable fel' itself 00 ethical
grounds'. Now that appears Kantian; but the appearance is deceptive, f(X'Hayek does not at
all mean by this what a Kantian \\WId - eI' should. His 'ethical grounds' are nd Kantian
givens but rather the outcane of empirical claims abwt want-satisfactioo. F<Ythe point is
that if scmething is to serve as additiooal justificatim it cannd at the same time contredlct
the original justificatioo. Haydc, then, has made two claims here: 00 the me hand he has
claimed that the liberal <rder is the most efficient mJer f<YsatisfYing hwnan wants; 00 the
other he claims that liberty is valuable f<Yits own sake - but this \\WId itself have to rest on
a successful empirical claim ~ding the value of the liberal <Yder in satisfYing human
wants.
V-lbyek'8 iDcoasisteDty
As I argued earlier, Hayek's empirical defences of liberty are incoosistent: his claim. then.
that the liberal el'der is the oo1y procedure yet discovered in which inf<Ymatioo widely
dispersed amoog millioos of men can be effectively utilised f<Ythe benefit of all, cannot be
accepted as an empirical me. His oo1y remaining defence of liberty is what looks like the
Kantian idea that liberty is an end in itself: a point he makes f<YCefully in The Constituuon
of Liberty, where he says that '[liberty] demands that it be accepted as a value in itself, as a
principle that must be respected without our asking whether the coosequences in the
particular instanCe will be beneficial'. But in the next sentence there is an important
qualificatioo: '[W]e shall Dd achieve the results we want if we do not accept it as a creed or
presumptioo so stroog that no cmsideratioos of expediency can be allowed to limit it.'120
Liberty, that is to say, should be 'accepted as a value in itself; but the reasoo why we should
accept it as such are nd at all Kantian. That '\vc shall not achieve the results we want' if we
fail to do so is a transparently instnDnental argument. Hayek is again putting together a
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deontological with a teleological argument. A truly deootological, lY Kantlan, argwncnt
would hold that liberty is valuable whatever the results and n~ just because it gives u.s 'the
results we WclIlt'.At best Hayek seems to be adqning a species of indirect utilitariWlism
rather than Kantianism. Of course, given Hayek's cootentim that the test of Wliversa1isation
amOlUltsto a 'test of coosistency lY COOlpatlbilitywith the rest of an accepted ~)'Stcmof
rules,' his argwnent might be acceptable in cooservative terms. FlY the 'accepted system of
rules' to which Hayek is referring is the 'liberallYder', so that, in effect, he is enlisting Kant
in defence of an existing system of rules. Hayek in the end interprets universalisation in a
political rather than in a metaphysicallY moral sense. And that is precisely what marks an
argwnent flY certain political values as a cooservative - flY example OBkeshouian - one.
Such an interpretatioo, \Walevel' else might be said abrut it is. inimical to liberalism's
espoused meta-political neutrality.
In order to demrostrate more clearly the problem Hayek has, it is \\Uth reminding ourselves
of the distinctim made by Rawls, ammgst others, between deootological and teleological
moral theories. III A deootological thtu)' asserts that what is right does not depend on. but is
independent of, what is good. So, flY example. that we should keep our pronises Is nut
determined by the good coosequences of doing so; right cooduct requires us to keep
promises, and this injunctim is in no way dependent m any good consequences that come
from keeping proorlses. Promise keeping is good because it is right; it is not right because it
is good or because it produces good results. Teleological moral themes, on the other hand.
maintain that what is right depends upm what is good. If promise keeping is right. it can
only be so because it leads to good. The character of deootological moral theories thus
contrasts sharPly with the alleged deootological nature of Hayekian rules of just conduct.
These rules depend m cootingent empirical circwnstances. If they happen to be such that a
principled interventioo (i.e, a change of the rules) is believed to produce superior outcomes,
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that is a better result, in Hayeldan terms, then it is entirely legitimate fill' rules to be
changed. Now, this argument must be invalid unless Ha)'dc's empirical case for liberty Is
proved beyood dotltt - and it is apparent fran previous discussioos in the chapter that it is
not. Hayek is therefore left with no satisfactory defence for the primty of liberty ahead of
other values.
This presents a major problem f<r Hayek's project of defending the liberal order. Ins theory
of human evolutim as the 'natural selectim' ofpractices which enhance the group's survival
prospects leads him to argue that institutioos like justice and property have value because. by
making possible the utilisatim of dispersed knowledge, they facilitate increased
productivity, and so 00.122 This would not be a problem for Hayek ifhe really did present a
coherent normattve case for liberty as the foremost value in society. but he docs not The
difficulty this constitutes becomes clear in his aitique of socialism. Hayek's dispute Is not
with the socialist aims of reducing inequality and abolishing poverty, but with the socialist
method of redistributive interventim.123 Many of his argwnents against socialism attempt to
show that socialist aims and socialist methods are inCOOlpatible:124 '(Slane of the aims of
the welfare state can be realised without detriment to individual liberty, though not
necessarily by the methods which seem most obvious,.m What Hayek manif~1ly tails to
demonstrate is that these contentions are empirically sound. In the same way his reliance on
contestable empirical claims leaves him open to the allegation that, should his empirical
claims for liberty be demonstrated to be dubitable, then his thary only has a very weak
normative basis to fall back 00.
Without a normative basis, and lacking any proof of the empirical validity of his claims.
Hayek's liberalism rests simply m those preferences that individuals agree upon as useful lhl'
their subjective purposes. In a recent article Tilxli' Machan summed up the difficulty faced
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by liberalism without normative fOlDulatims:
[A]ny judgement of morally <r politically good <r bad, as well as right and wrong.
comes to no more than a preference, a positive <r negative feeling of the agent, lacking
any objective moral Import. Is the favourite political principle of classical liberals itself
a mere subjective value? The 3JlSVt'CI' is 'ye:.' despite the fact that the right to individual
liberty 00 first impressim seems to be well suppmed by this radical individualism. But
it is only a matter of convenience, sanething we have adopted rut might jll.\1 as easily
not have; we might have with equal justifiability have adopted smlething else-say the
right to equality or security.
If this is all true, then people who prefer playing golf to defending frecdml when the
latter is in jeopardy do nothing wroog. Also. if someone ignores the plight of the
hapless or the unjustly treated, there is nothing to be criticised ahoot this choice.
Feelings toward me's community or fellow human beings are in no way superior to
feelings toward another visit to Las Vegas or playing tennis. Since there are no
objective goods or objective values, neither the defence of liberty nor any other course
of cmduct is more important than any alternative.126
Machan encapsulates Hayek's dilemma. Unless it can be shown that liberty has a moral
value beyOOd expediency, then it becomes a choice to be rejected <r ignored, either when it
beOOIDes incmvenient that it should be supported, or if another alternative otfers ~1tl.'l"
oppoctunities for progress and material well-being.
If: on the other hand, Hayek's empirical defence of liberty were wholly convincing then the
weakness of the normative dimension to his thought would perhaps not matter too much.
But it is not. Indeed the evidence, where it exists, is elsewhere. Now, whilst it is beyond my
scope to offer a comprehensive empirical evaluatim of Hayek's theay, (me point is
particularly germane. In the contemporary \\Uld economy most progress, in terms of
technological advancement, is not originating in those societies closest to the liberal Ira ...
market model that Hayek advocates. Rather it is - or has been - occurring in the so-called
'tiger economies' of the Pacific Rim: but these societies are hardly liberal: they permit little
individual choice and autOOOOlY, and practice large scale government intervention in the
economy. But that does not mean that Hayek would want Britain and the USA to adopt the
Singaporean model of society and government. His whole system is predicated on the
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assumptioo that the western liberal m1er is Wliquely valuable insofar as it expresses in some
sense the essence ofbwnan nature through liberty and individuality. Hayek's problem is tbat
in all his elaboolte argwnents and his competing defences of liberty, he never actually
finally justifies this point. In effect be gets no closer than Oakeshoo in doing so. Now for
Oakeshott. as a cooservative. this does, at least arguably, not matter. lie can defend his
positioo 00 the basis of just such a set of subjective values: it is ours, we have fOWld much to
value in it, and we are prepared to defend it against too radical and rapid innovation. nut
Hayek cannot have such a defence f<W' two reasoos: first he is advocating a mlivcrsallst
system; and secoad, one of the elements he values most about liberalism is its ability to
promote change and progress.
Both Hayek's critique of socialism, and his attempt to establish an lDlchallengeable basis for
a rule-governed liberal order are based 00 his epistemology and philosophy of mind. As
John Gray bas noted. Hayek's deepest insight has been to develop the political implications
of the limits of human knowledge.127 The coofusioo and cootradictioo in Hayek's thought
begins when he attempts to build upoo that fowuJatioo an edifice which, fa' all times and all
places. proves that the liberal mJer is the sole, Wliversal versioo of the good society to which
all people must aspire. This is supererogation on a massive scale. Hayek's case would
coostitute a valid defence of the liberal order so loog as he could establish three points. First.
that there are cmvincing argmnents that the liberal m1er wa-ks most effectively when
individuals are allowed as much scope as possible to use their own tacit knowledge; second.
beCause we cannot know WI' own minds a' articulate all the knowledge we JXK~'" that any
doctrine which requires perfect knowledge and the ratiooalist recoostructioo of social orders
is (probablY) doomed to failure; and third that sufficient people enjoy the conditions in a
liberal order to want to maintain it.
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Hayek's thought fulfils the first two criteria. But he does not consider that the liberal order
can be defended simply on the basis that people enjoy making choices and seeking their own
wants, and that the liberal order offers them such an opportunity. Ironically, it is precisely
Hayek's restless conception of progress that undermines such a defence. To go back to
Oakeshott's conservative defence of liberty: he notes that 'if the present is arid, offering little
or nothing to be used or enjoyed', 128 then the inclination to preserve existing institutions and
social orders will be absent or very weak. The 'restless striving' for progress which Hayek
sees as an essential part of the liberal order is bound to damage the foundations of liberty
which he has laid so carefully; for such 'restless striving' will undermine the sense of
enjoyment people get from existing society, and will also invariably lead to constant
criticism and re-evaluation of the traditions on which Hayek insists liberty rests. Hayek has.
therefore, failed to provide a satisfactory normative foundation for the liberal order and has
undermined a potentially convincing alternative.
To conclude then Hayek claims that his thought is neutral between competing conceptions of
the good, and offers a universal justification for the liberal order. It can only be so if his
epistemology and psychology can be proved to be empirically true. Hayek does not achieve
this goal. However, his epistemology and psychology do offer a potent critique of
rationalism in all its forms. It is this critique of rationalism which is incipiently
conservative. Where Hayek's thought is unconvincing, is the point where he tries to bridge
an unbridgeable gap between his anti-rationalist epistemology and psychology, and his
rationalist attempt to provide universal justifications for the liberal order.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In the late 1980s and early 199Os, the decline and eventual collapse of communism, or
actually existing socialism, was believed by many to confinn the ultimate triumph of
liberalism. In 1989 Francis Fukuyama wrote:
[W]hat we may be witnessing is not just the end of the cold war, or the passing of a
particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is the end
point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal
democracy as the final form of human government. 1
Fukuyama's belief appeared to be vindicated by the rapid collapse of communist regimes
later the same year. Between June 4th 1989, the date of the first limited multi-party election
in Poland, and the execution of the Ceausescus in Romania on Christmas Day 1989, single-
party communist regimes fell in Poland, Hungary, the former East Germany, the former
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania The one unifying element that could be discerned
in the programmes of the revolutionaries, who ranged across the political spectrum from
trotskyists and reform communists to reactionary Catholics and extreme nationalists, was
that the old system of a planned economy and a one-party state had failed. What was needed
was competition in the political sphere, through the medium of political pluralism, and a
liberal democratic system, underpinned by a competitive economic free market system.
During the 'velvet revolution' in Czechoslovakia, Civic Forum (the leading revolutionary
grouping in the Czech lands) was able to achieve a high degree of consensus on a document
entitled, 'What we Want; The Programme and Principles of Civic Forum'.' This document.
describing hopes for a post-revolutionary Czechoslovakia, listed conditions that are usually
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regarded as liberal staples. With respect to the rule of law it stated that:
[T]he exercise of civil freedoms will be reliably ensured by a developed system of legal
guarantees. The independent judiciary will also include constitutional and
administrative courts.'
The new political system must
. .. remake or renew democratic institutions and mechanisms that make possible the
real participation of all citizens in the administration of public affairs .... All existing
and newly emerging political parties and other social and political associations must
therefore have equal cooditions fa- participation in free elections at all levels of
4government.
Civic Fonun also wished to abandon 'the previous system of economic management' and
'create a market undeformed by bureaucratic interventioo'. However, a commitment to social
justice was retained:
Czechoslovakia must become a socially just society in which the people receive help in
old age, in sickness, and in times of hardship. However, a growing national economy is
the essential pre-requisite fa- such a society.'
Despite the genuflection toward social justice contained in the document, this is clearly the
blueprint fa- a liberal state complete with a market economy, It is far removed from the
1968 vision of 'socialism with a human face' or even the 'third Wcrj between socialism and
capitalism. Timothy Garton Ash commented at the time:
... the truly remarkable thing is not the differences about the programme, but the
degree of almost instant consensus .... This is a Czech phenomenoo. But it is not just a
Czech phenomenon, for in a different way it is repeated all over East Central Europe.
Take a more or less representative sample of politically aware persons. Stir under
pressure for mu days. And what do you get? The same fundamental Western European
model: parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, market economy. And if you made
the same experiment in Warsaw a- Budapest I wager you would get the same basic
result. This is no Third Way. It is not 'socialism with a human face'. It is the idea of
'normality' that seems to be sweeping triumphantly across the world. 6
However, since the apparent triumphs of 1989 and 1990, there has been a shift. Although
the pluralist political systems and market reforms have largely survived, at least in Central
Europe, liberal values have been challenged by both an electoral resurgence of socialist
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parties, if not socialist systems in central Europe; and the slide toward nationalist
dictatorship and clericalism in the eastern and southern areas of post-communist Europe.
Though much of this reversal is no doubt due to the economic difficulties of transition,
nonetheless, if liberalism cannot establish itself successfully throughout post-communist
Europe - where it was not only replacing discredited and repressive regimes, but was also in
close proximity to stable established and successful liberal democratic regimes - then the
prospects for liberal success elsewhere in the world, particularly where anti-liberal
sentiments are entrenched, must be questionable, One source of the current practical
difficulties facing liberalism could, indeed, be its current theoretical problems, one of which
has been examined in this thesis. It is at least possible that the absence of liberallradition.v
in some parts of Central and Eastern Europe has cootributed to the comparative lack of
success in the new democracies. It is also at least possible that this explains the comparative
success of liberal regimes in states like the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland: that is in
those states which, in the case of the Czech Republic and Hungary, had, through the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, at least some exposure to liberal, Enlightenment and proto-liberal
traditions; and in the case of Poland was linked to the post-revolutionary French tradition,
first through the Polish Lancer regiments in Napoleoo's Grande Armee, and later through
the Polish emigre community in France. Where, then, does this leave contemporary
liberalism?
I - Liberalism's neutrality: the evolution of an illusion
Liberalism's theoretical problems have developed because liberal theorists have been unable
satisfactorily to establish moral and political foundations for liberalism without resorting to
the tacit assumptions of liberalism's founders. The tacit moral ideal underlying Hobbes's
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thought was the medieval nexus of honour and duty, ideas which Hobbes retained from his
Aristotelian roots.' Locke, as a Calvinistj' could base his moral ideal on divine law.
Liberalism flourished, that is to say, because it rested on a series of tacit assumptions and
values drawn frool a well-established intellectual tradition in a specific geographical area,"
The liberal quest for universalism, instead of enabling liberalism to transcend its original
geographical and cultural boundaries, has had two quite different consequences. First, it has
led to a developing theoretical inconsistency within liberalism; and second - but related to
the first - it has led to the development of discrete and disparate liberal traditions.
The practical failures of liberalism in dealing with the worst aspects of industrial capitalism
led to the emergence of the social liberals, influenced by Idealism, such as Green and
Hobhouse.10 The liberal drive fa universalism - in societies increasingly characterised by
moral plw-alism - led to the formulation ofliberal theories by thinkers such as Weber, whose
emphasis was m the development of institutions and procedures which could accommodate
incommensurable ethical divisioos. The result has been that liberalism today is not so much
a single mode of thought but three distinct, though intertwined, traditioos. First, a tradition
fundamentally informed by empiricist epistemology and ethics, and thus eschewing any
substantive nedoo of the good, a theory represented today by deontological liberals such as
Rawls and Nozick; second, a multi-faceted set of views whose common theme is the
stressing of liberal political values, regardless of philosophical meta-differences - for
example Bellamy and predecessors such as Weber; and third, social liberalism, originally
formulated by thinkers like Green and Hobhouse, and which has historical and conceptual
links with the contemp<rary communitarian-tinged attitudes of thinkers like Rorty, Walzer
and Taylor, who accept, rather than advocate, liberal politics.
What links these varieties of liberalism is a set of political values rather than philosophical
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positions, This explains how positions as different as. f<Yexample. Mill's and Hobhouse's.
are nonetheless liberal positions; and how it is that many communitarians accept liberal
political - and SOOlemoral - values. despite their philosophical objectioos to the empiricist
epistemology infmning much, if not all, Anglo-American liberalism. I have argued that
these values (whose putative epistemological roots the communitarians are right to criticise
as inadequate) require to be rooted in a notion of the good; and that the only such notion
available is a cooservative me.
Liberalism's orthodox history declares that it emerged as a wholly new creature in 16th and
1""" century Europe. M<re significantly, liberalism was deemed to be a liberating force from
the darkness of traditioo and superstitioo. The point is made trenchantly by Kenneth
Minogue: '[T]he story of liberalism as liberals tell it, is rather like the legend of St George
and the dragon, After many centuries of hopelessness and superstitioo, St George in the
guise of Ratiooality appeared in the world SOOlewhere about the sixteenth century,'!'
Liberalism, emerging in response to new developments in science and ethics, was
formulated principally by the English writers Hobbes and Locke, but also through the ideas
of other writers and movements involved in the debates surrounding the English Civil War:
as John Gray puts it, 'ThOOlaS Hobbes ••. gives voice to an intransigent individualism whose
conswnmate modernity marks a decisive breach with the social philosophy bequeathed by
Plato and Aristotle to medieval Chnstendom.:"
But this orthodox history is misleading. Although individuality first appeared as a relatively
coherent body of ideas in the 1""" century, it developed fran, and was dependent upoo, the
assumptioos inherent in the older intellectual traditions of medieval Christendom such as
honour, hooesty and loyalty to the state <Yruler in SOOlef<YID.13However, the philosophical
devel~ment of individuality is indeed the fOWldatioo of liberalism. According to Parekh, it
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'abstracts the person from all his <r her 'contingent' and 'external' relations with other people
and nature, and defines the pe:rsoo as an essentially self-contained and solitary being
encapsulated in, and tmambiguously marked off1hm the outside wtrld by his <r her body.'14
The 'austere minimalisn'" of this conception of individualism leads each person to define
themselves in terms of their separateness from others: each person is defined not as a
member of a coomn.mity, nor as a participant in political society, nor even in terms of a
profession <r vocation; but as an entity bounded by the naked human body."
Atomism and empiricism in morality and polities, on which this conception was based,
emerged frOOl the success of the scientific method developed in 1""" century Europe. Just as
1'fh century physies saw matter as being made up of small atoms, so Hobbes took an
atomistic view of hmnan society. Society could be explained only by understanding its
component parts, that is individuals. Individuals could, and indeed should, be understood as
being anteri<r to society.11 The nature of politics and morality can be understood only if we
already understand the discrete individual units who comprise society. Such a view makes
problematic both hwnan sociability and shared human values, however. Sociability and
shared human values become things to be justified so that answers must be provided to
questions such as: Why are we sociable? Why do we apparently share many COOlIDonbeliefs
and prejudices?
The answer that the first expooent of individualism presented to account f<r this dilemma
was self-interest. What Hobbes believed he was doing was presenting a mechanistic science
of politics to match Newton's mechanistic account of the universe, To achieve this, Hobbes
had to argue that human beings were like atoms in motion, repelled by certain sensations
and attracted by others. The me common fear that repelled all individuals was fear of
violent death. By focusing 00 what he perceived as this universal element in human nature,
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Hobbes thought he was providing a universally applicable method which would place the
fowuiatioos of government on a scientific footing. However, this is not what Hobbes
achieved The individual selves who contracted together to create Leviathan were clearly
abstractioos fiml 17th century English society. They entered civil society and agreed to obey
a sovereign because they feared that the perils of violent death that lurked in a country riven
by Civil War would spiral further out of control. Within the state, the individual selves who
threatened each other could be controlled, and once the state was created, fear of return to
the state of nature, and with it the risk of violent death, encouraged individuals not to
challenge sovereign authority or break the law.18 However, the question then arises why
individuals should keep their covenants. Why should people not trade on the gullibility of
others by making but then breaking covenants? Hobbes places this objection in the mouth of
a 'fool' who would say that
... there is no such thing as justice; ...that every man's conservation and contentment,
being committed to his own, there could be no reason, why every man might not do
what he thought conduced thereunto: and therefore able to make, or not to make; keep
or not keep covenants was not against reason, when it conduced to one's benefit. 19
For Hobbes, the fool's reasoning is specious. The state exists to secure obedience to
covenants. He points out that no one who breaks covenants can be received into society,
except by error,20 and he holds that no one can COWlton that error being made.
Thrasymachus's question, though. remains; what if some person lr some group of people
could get away with it?
On the face of it, the conclusion that this made the breaking of an agreement justifiable was
a difficult one flr Hobbes to avoid Hobbesian society could exist only by virtue of the
vigilance of the law and the agents of the sovereign: it could not depend on the loyalty or
trustworthiness of its citizens. Why did Hobbes not address this question more explicitly'!
The answer is that Hobbes, despite his protestatioos to the contrary, was not beginning his
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philosophy with a blank sheet of paper after all. In his early years he had been an
Aristotelian (even included within Leviathan there is a view of natural morality and
honour). Moreover, although Hobbes initially links honour with power, '[T]o pray to
another, for aid of any kind, is to HONOUR; because a sign we have an opinion he has power
to help; and the more difficult the aid is, the more is the honour,;21 however, later Hobbes
states when discussing what is or is not honourable that 'Honourable is whatsoever
possession, action, or quality is an argwnent and sign of power.'22 So although Hobbes
attempts to provide a justification for human behaviour based on a social version of the laws
of motion, he includes within it the idea that certain qualities are of themselves honourable.
The problem of finding a stronger foundation for sociability and obedience to a moral code
beyond self-interest was addressed both by the empiricist philosophers, Locke, Berkeley, and
Harne, and later by the utilitarians. Empiricism holds that all knowledge of fact, as distinct
from that of purely logical relations between concepts, has its source in experience,
maintaining that all human knowledge comes from experience and that only experience can
provide it with ideas, including moral ideas. Each mind must have unique experiences. No
two people. not even twins, can possibly have absolutely identical experiences. However, as
with Hobbes, the later figures of the liberal tradition thought that everyone could agree on
the desirability of pleasure and the need to avoid pain. Yet there appears to be a
contradiction between the empiricism present in Locke's Essay Concerning Human
Understanding and the political theory presented in the 1Wo Treatises. In the 1Wo Treatises,
Locke argued that there was a universal moral law accessible to all human beings. As the
property of God, individuals had duties to their maker beyond the pursuit of pleasure and the
avoidance of pain. God had made individuals free and rational so that they could order their
activities in a way which would allow them to discharge their duty to God. Attempts have
been made to find alternative secular, universal, foundations for liberalism in terms of
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enlightened self-interest, psychology or human nature. Empiricist epistemology and ethics
have informed all these attempts and they all face two problems." First, they cannot find
adequate criteria for evaluating the moral worth of the choices individuals make, other than
- in some cases - duty to God; and second, they cannot decide whether individuals are
choosing beings because of capacities they inherently possess, or because of the capacities
they have the potential to possess.
Without the underpinning of divine law, the freedom of choice of the individual degenerates
into moral subjectivism; the belief that what is right or wrong, good or bad, is simply a
matter of personal preference or appetite. But in that case, this subjectivism must apply also
to liberal principles and not least to that of the over-riding value of liberty. The point - and
it is a fimdamental me - is that there is no moral reason why people should choose a liberal
political order before a fimdamentalist Islamic theocracy, for example, with all the likely
repression of liberal values that such a state would entail.24
These historical and conceptual problems are the foundation of the current debates within
liberalism. They are present because liberal theory fails to provide satisfactory answers to the
question of how and why human beings are capable of making, and why they have a natural
right to make, their own moral choices. Charles Taylor sums up the difficulty thus:
[T]o ascribe the natural (not just legal right) right of X to agent A is to affirm that A
commands our respect, such that we are normally bound not to interfere with A' s
doing or enjoying of X. This means that to ascribe the right is far more than simply to
issue the iniunction: don't interfere with A's doing or enjoying X. The injunction can
be issued, to self or others, without grounds should we so choose, But to affirm the
right is to say that a creature such as A lays a moral claim on us not to interfere. It thus
also asserts something about A: A is such that this injunction is somehow
Inescapable."
To affirm a natural right, Taylor notes, is to say both that A lays a moral claim on us not to
be interfered with; and that doing or enjoying X is part of manifesting some essential human
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quality. But what does affirming a natural right entail? If that essential human quality is
rationality, then A must not only have a natural right to X but also to the unimpeded
development of rationality. If the essential human quality is autonomy, then A must have a
right to the necessary cooditions that allow personal autonomy, such as access to material
resources. So even asserting that a natural right exists requires a cooceptual background, in
that it must include sane idea of the worth of certain properties (I' capacities, without which
they \\Wid not make sense:
. .. our position would be incanprehensihle and incoherent if we ascribed rights to
human beings in respect of the specifically human capacities ... while at the same time
denying that these capacities ought to be developed, (I' if we thought it a matter of
indifference whether they were realised (I' stifled in ourselves and others."
The reason why natural rights are ascribed to human beings, and not to other species or
objects, is that human beings can be defined as creatures with, at least, the potential f(l'
ratiooality and autooOOlY,a potential that is sensed so strongly that it cannot be lost. Could
this mean that human beings possess the full capacity ofratiooality and autooomy as a given
capacity, rather than as a potential capacity that has to be developed? Liberal neutrality rests
on the f<rIDer assumption, that human beings possess the full capacity of rationality as a
given.
If individuals are recognised as choosing beings because of the capacities they inherently
possess. then it could be assumed that they will develop into rational beings whatever their
condition and whatever their upbringing. But, this is nonsense. Even fictional characters
like Mowgli (I' Tarzan required a notional society, that of wolves (I' apes which resembled
hierarchical human societies, to allow them to devel~ SOOlerationality. It is difficult to
conceive of the develqxnent of any capacity regarded as human, whether it be language,
rationality (I' sentiment, outside of SOOlekind of society. We can develop language only by
colmmmicating with others; rationality is something that is taught and developed; and
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individuals could hardly develop the full range of human emotions if they were kept isolated
from their fellows.
Rationality is especially significant in this context. It forms the basis of the idea of an
individual as a chooser pursuing self-set aims. In order to show that the liberal individual
requires a social context to develop their rationality let me briefly consider the possibility of
establishing rationality outside human society. Assuming that an individual could be given
physical nourishment without human contact, what could be the choices the individual could
pursue? Whether to sleep, or whether to remain awake; whether to eat the food when
presented, ~ save it f~ later: to take exercise, ~ not to take exercise? These are
tUlquestionably choices, but they are hardly the rational choices that liberal individuals
would need to make in order to develop their individuality. Natural rights to choose can be
ascribed to hmnan beings only by asserting the worth of those hwnan capacities which can
be developed only within society. The normative consequence of this is that these uniquely
human capacities to make rational and moral choices ought to be encouraged and developed
in all individuals. Furthermore, the liberal individual - the individual who recognises him-
~ herself as a rational choosing being - is far from being 'natural', the historical product of
precisely those cultures and traditions where the liberal tradition of thought originated,
Rationally choosing individuals are products of society; liberal individuals are not extra- or
trans-cultural phenomena. The liberal individual is not representative of every human being
but of a particular type of hwnan being. The point is that if the liberal individual is to be
valued, then the society that nurtures that liberal individual ought to be preserved; and so
liberalism, as a matter offact, depends on the preservation of the traditional societies which
gave rise to the individualism which liberalism theorises. But is this not a recognisably
conservative story, little - if at a11- different from that outlined by Oakeshott? A brief return
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to John Stuart Mill demoostrates this point. Mill is the crucial figure in the liberal pantheon,
yet his positioo is fimdamentally ambiguous: his thought demoostrates the tension between
classical atomistic liberalism and emerging social liberalism. The main thrust of Mill's
argument is fimdamentally individualistic, and he makes it clear that the object of On
Liberty is to delineate the area in which individuals cannot be coerced and to argue that the
only justification fa- coercing individuals against their will is the prevention of harm to
others. Nonetheless, Mill recognises that some individuals will undertake foolish or reckless
acts and that other individuals a- groups are entitled to use persuasion or remoostration to
induce them to cease or to avoid such acts but they are not entitled to compel them to
desist:27 '[Tjhe only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in
our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts
to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, <r mental and
spiritual.'28 Yet - and this is all too often either overlooked, or under-emphasized - Mill
introduces a caveat: '[Tjhat the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilised community, against their will is to prevent harm to others. ,29
What Mill turns out to be saying, then, is that it is a certain sort of human being who must
not be interfered with. The implication is that there are communities where liberty can and
should be infringed upon, a point he makes explicit later in the same work when he asserts
that despotism is an appropriate mode ofgovernment for 'barbarians' .30
Mill is here taking an historical view of liberalism: individuals who can benefit from liberty
are the products of certain times and circwnstances; liberty is valuable only when people are
capable of improving themselves. However, while Mill recognises the historical nature of
political liberties, he misses - as we have seen - the historical nature of the liberal individual,
who is the subject of that liberalism. Thus Mill's thought reveals the central paradox in
liberalism and the central theme of my argument: that liberal individuality is an historical
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artefact. and to maintain it acertairl type of society must be eitab1ished.
It is a paradox that is further demmstrated ~ Mill's view 00 state interventioo. Mill does
not want to extend the scope of poIttica1 atIthority wffhoul (Jue cause, preferring to rely
instead 00 voluntary action. Inter\'elltioo is undesirable for· several reasons: it involves the
use of compulsory powers and'so restricts the treedomof ~of individuals affected; It
always involves taxatioo, the impositialof wbic:b offends the fimdamental tenet that each
person is to be rewarded according to his or her own etforts; it increases the power and
influence of government; public pressure may entail the tyranny of the majority; government
offices are often inefficient and their wa-k frequently defective and badly organised as
compared with private agencies; and it inhibits the habit of vohmtary action by groups of
individuals.3) However, in the detailed discussion of these points in the Considerations on
Representative Government, Mill concedes the need for a formidable agenda of public
activity. He accepts the role of government traditionally espoused by classical liberals;
defence and the maintenance of internal order; the establishment of a system of courts; the
enforcement of cootract and the prevention of fraud; the administration of the land as a
vital, limited resoerce; and the cootrol of inheritance and bequest. At the same time,
however, he also gives SOOleaspects of these matters a rather wider scope: he accepts that
the law might regulate cootracts involving unfavourable terms for one of the parties, for
example; and moving even further mm the norms of classical liberalism, he urges that, in
the case of people who cannot effectively care for themselves, the laissez-faire principle
breaks down, and government must assume responsibility,
Mill's departure mm classical liberal norms was taken up by L.T. Hobhouse and T.H
Green, whose version of liberalism saw a shift in attitude toward freedom and the role of the
state. While Mill's theory supports state action in support of individual self-realisation only
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tacitly, such a vision is explicit in the thought of Hobhouse and Green. However, in these
cases the justification of state action remains the ultimate well-being of individuals. Green
was a Hegelian, according to whom, freedom was not confined to the security of life and
property; it included a capacity to fulfil human potential. The liberal right to equal liberty
could be achieved only when every citizen had the opportunity to lead a worthwhile life as a
rational, choosing individual. The task of government was to maintain the conditions
without which free exercise of human faculties was impossible. Like contemporary
communitarians, he recognises that it is the potential to be rational that confers an
entitlement to be treated as a rational being, and with that comes the normative claim that
conditions should be created which will allow individuals to achieve their potential as
rational beings. In this way Green builds on Mill's conception of 'character' and is a
forerunner ofRaz's perfectionism.
Hobhouse was also in favour of more extensive government intervention, Its objective was to
provide a bedrock of material comteet below which none could fall into abject poverty. The
effect, Hobhouse believes, would be to enhance individual liberty, because every citizen
would be able to enjoy autonomy, The aim was to guarantee the self-directing power of
personality. Hobhouse recognises the ambiguity in liberalism, that it was concerned with
autonomy, but that worthwhile autonomy for all could be achieved ooly if certain social
conditirns were established: hence his belief that government action is necessary to promote
individual self-development." However, he too fails to recognise the source of this
ambiguity, namely that the liberal individual is an historical construct. Indeed HobhOll<re'S
and Green's partial disavowal of the classical liberalism represented by Mill may be read as
an earlier version of the communitarian/deoatological Iiberal debate. With their emphasis on
the state's role in removing obstacles to self-improvement, and their idea that individuality
is a quality that must be nurtured rather than something which occurs naturally, 'new'
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liberals like Hobhouse and Green foreshadow contemporary coomnmitarian liberals like
Taylor, Like the communitarians, they also adhere to liberal political and moral values, but
they recognise that particular conditions are necessary fa' the preservatioo of these values.
As Hobhouse argues:
... the life of the individual would be something utterly different if he could be
separated from society. A great deal of him would not exist at all ... his mental and
moral being would, if it existed at all, be something quite different from anything that
we know. By language, by training, by simply living with others. each of us absorbs
into his system the social atmosphere that surrounds us. In particular in the matter of
rights and duties which is cardinal fa' liberal theory, the relation of the individual to
the community is everything. 33
Furthermore, it is the potential of all humans to become rational beings that Hobhouse sees
as the foundation ofliberty:
[I]t [liberty] rests not on the claim of A to be let alone by B, but on the duty of B to
treat A as a rational being. It is not right to let crime alone, or to let error alone, but it
is imperative to treat the criminal or the mistaken or the ignorant as beings capable of
right and truth, and to lead them 00 instead of merely beating them down."
This bears a strong resemblance to the views of Charles Taylor cited earlier in the chapter,"
and it demonstrates the continuity of the debate in liberalism between those who attempt to
found liberalism on the metaphysical idea of the unencumbered self; and those like
Hobhouse and Taylor who argue that individuality was a product of social conditions. What
they both have in COO1IIlon,furthermore, is that they both fail to recognise the implication of
this argument fa' the nature of liberalism. They fail to see that if it is the historical context
that produces the conditions for the development of the ratiooalliberal individual, then what
we have here in terms of the justification of the theory is a fundamentally conservative
position. This point is well illustrated by comparing two similar passages, one from a
commWlitarian, and the other from a conservative, theorist:
[H]ow could successive generations discover what it is to be an autonomous agent, to
have roe's own way of feeling, of acting, of expression, which cannot be simply
derived from authoritative models? This is an identity, a way of understanding
themselves, which men are not born with. They have to acquire it. And they do not in
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every society: nor do they all successfully COOleto terms with it in 0lD'S. But how can
they acquire it unless it is implicit in at least some of their common practices, in the
ways that they recognise and treat each other in their common life ... or in the manner
in which they deliberate a- address each other, or engage in economic exchange, or in
some mode of public recognitioo of individuality and the worth of autooOOly.36
Hwnan individuality is an historical emergence ... In modern Europe this emergence
was gradual, and the specific character of the individual who emerged was determined
by the character of his generatioo ...This experience of individuality provoked a
dispositioo to explore its own intimations, to place the highest value upon it, and to
seek security in its enjoyment. To enjoy it came to be recognised as the main ingredient
of 'happiness'. The experience was magnified into an ethical theory; it was reflected in
manners of governing and being governed, in newly acquired rights and duties and in
a whole pattern ofliving. 37
Both these theorists see individuality as a product of history. Both see it as part of a whole
pattern of life. Most telling of all, neither offers explicit reasons why the idea of a rational
individual making moral choices should be regarded as being inherently ma-e worthy than,
say, the Aristotelian ideal of the person as an integral part of nature and society, or the
Hindu belief that the caste into which a person is born is not an accident, but a result of his
or her actions in a previous life.
Where do these historical and cooceptua1 comparisons lead? Let me briefly recapitulate. My
argwnent is that liberalism mlsunderstands its own history, and thus its own theoretical
foundations. While the philosophical development of individuality was indeed the
foundation of liberalism, this was not a radical departure from the existing tradition of
thought, but a development of it; and moreover, liberalism, despite its claims to the contrary,
cootinued - tacitly at least - to adhere to a cooservative justification of the good. This has to
be the case because the liberal individual, far frOOlbeing natural, is an historical artefact, a
product of time, place, culture and civilisation.
Let me illustrate the point by focussing 00 the use made by liberals and proto-liberals of the
nodoo of an original cootract, an idea devised in the l-rt' century to show how legitimate
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government was based 00 (implicit) consent, and taken up by, among others Rawls. He
claims his principles are neutral inasmuch as he places pre-social individuals behind a 'veil
of ignorance' so that they are unaware of the position they will come to occupy in society."
Once individuals are in this disinterested original position, Rawls asks what coostraints on
pursuing their own wants it would be rational for them to accept. But while this position
may be neutral between individuals who are the 'wanting' beings of liberalism," it cannot
be neutral between those who recognise themselves as individuals, and those who reject the
'austere minimalism' of that liberal concept of the individual, and who hence do indeed
recognise themselves as specific and variously encumbered people - as many critics have
pointed out.40 Rawls's claim to neutrality therefore fails: his conception of individuality -
that very 'austere minimalism' which makes the 'neutrality' of the original position
theoretically available - is not a neutral me, but rather reflects the historical and conceptual
circumstances that gave it birth.
D- A viable liberalism?
If liberalism's attempts to justifY itself have failed, is SOOleother justification possible? Let
us begin from the idea that liberalism is in fact the historical product of the political
traditioos which existed in Britain, parts of Western Europe and North America during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These traditioos, croveniently abridged and entitled
'liberalism', were seen to offer modes of government that were less repressive than existing
modes. and also to offer better opportunities for the security and fulfilment of intellectually
and politically aware classes than in other societies then extant. In societies that adjoined
those of Britain, Western Europe and North America, or were transplanted from them, and
as a result shared at least SOOleof the traditions from which liberalism emerged, states
eventually evolved which could be recognised as operating within the liberal tradition, but
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with national and regional variations.
Now, the liberal states and societies which evolved in this way can indeed be seen as less
repressive, and mm: materially successful, than other forms of political organisation,
especially in those areas that had political, social and religious traditions closely related to
those in the areas where liberalism originated, However, recognising the truth of this
statement is not the same as proving, once and for all, that liberalism is the sole model of
the optimal political and social arrangement for everyone, everywhere. Nor does such
recognition, moreover, lead to the style of liberalism without foundations as advocated by
ROO)' whose anti-essentialist view of the liberal tradition, although invoking some of the
conservative arguments is necessarily fissiparous:" he offers no way of uniting the various
and competing elements within liberalism. What he offers is not one view of what liberalism
is, one that we must accept because it is Our View, but rather several competing statements
of Our Liberal View all of which we must accept (or not) because they are ours. Thus Rorty
invokes Oakeshott's notion of conversatioo to describe political activity, which, like
Oakeshott, he sees as a 'conversatioo not an argument'." However, given the diversity of the
liberal tradition that R{X1y holds to be Our Liberal View (though, as I have said he fails to
recognise it as such), it seems much more likely that it will indeed be an argument, or even
just a noise, rather than a conversatioo. Recognitioo that the liberal states and societies that
emerged in, or were transplanted from, Britain, Western Europe and North America are less
repressive and mm: materially successful than other forms of political organisation, allows a
defence of liberal values on the basis of their being part of a holistic tradition of political
activity which has developed at specific times and in specific parts of the world. In areas
where it has been firmly established, it has been a generally successful traditioo in terms of
both political stability and material prosperity for most of the populatioo, most of the time.
Moreover, people who live in societies governed by the liberal tradition of politics have
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found much to enjoy in liberal ways of life. They therefore deem that it is worth retaining,
defending where necessary, and indeed, where possible, improving. Nonetheless, members
of such societies realise that these arrangements are not perfect, but that they need both to be
maintained and to evolve. This raises an important question about the name of political and
social change within liberal societies. As citizens who enjoy the way of life provided by
liberal societies, and who recognise that they might lose much by radical change, they tend
to favour continuity, but at the same time they understand that as circumstances change so
political arrangements must adapt. Therefore, there needs to be SOOleunderstanding of how
change can occur whilst minimising loss and the risk of loss, The ooly reliable guide in
these circmnstances is not the political theory of liberalism, which as we have seen is not
antecedent to practice, but practice itself - practice, which is, of course, the product of
existing traditioos of behaviour within liberal states. But such a way of understanding the
activity of politics, at least with respect to liberalism, must be restricted to the times and
places which have an extant liberal tradition that has been legitimated both by
circwnstallces of comparative prosperity, and the enjoyment of the ways of life facilitated by
the establishment ofliberal values. Such a defence is stronger than Rorty's 'minimalism': not
only does it recognise that liberalism is valuable because it eschews cruelty, but because it
offers ways of life which people find congenial and, more importantly, it offers prudential
reasons for rejecting policies, practices and ways of life which threaten the well-being of the
liberal tradition.
The justification I have briefly admnbrated for the maintenance and retention of liberal
values is not, however, itself a liberal justification. It cannot be so, because it is based on
two factors foendationalist liberals of any type would unequivocally reject: first, the
subjective preference that liberal societies are ours and that we value them for that reason
alone; and second, because they are ours and we have found much to enjoy in them, we will
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defend them against perceived and actual challenges from within and without. In fact this is
exactly what the defence of liberalism mounted by communitarian liberals amounts to,"
even though they are not prepared to describe it in this Wdy. Nor of course is that surprising.
As liberals committed to liberal justification, no less than political liberalism, they could
hardly do so. Fer to reject liberal justificatioo - in the absence of any other justificatory
strategies - is to adopt precisely that sat of justification which a conservative thinker such
as Oakeshott espouses:
[T]he political theory of individualism should ... be understood as the elucidation of a
view of the office of government appropriate to certain circumstances. And the chief
feature of these circumstances is the appearance of subjects who desire to make choices
for themselves, who find happiness in doing so and who are frustrated in having
choices imposed upon them. In order to begin to think about the manner of governing
appropriate in these circumstances we do not need to demonstrate that a disposition of
this sat has eternal validity, that it represents the fundamental structure of human
nature, a that no other dispositioo is conceivable; all we need do is to recognise the
appearance of such subjects - namely, subjects intent on the enjoyment of individuality
- in sufficient numbers to make it appropriate to consider the corresponding office of
government. What has to be elucidated is not an eternally valid notion of government,
but a nOOoo of government appropriate to subjects of this sort."
For Oakeshott, the problem with many liberal theorists is that they have attempted to do too
much. The best liberal writers are those who 'have not lost sight of the fact that what they
were doing is no mere than exploring a theory of government appropriate to certain
hlstorical cireumstances'" (even though such recogniti~ ought to preclude their remaining
liberals at least as hitherto understood). Complex normative foundatioos fa liberal
government are unnecessary. All that is required as a normative justification of liberal
values, if not of liberalism as a complete philosophy - a metaphysical philosophy as well as
a political philosophy, so to speak - is the recognition of the existence of individuals who
recognise themselves as such:
.,. we require fa our starting-place nothing more than the recognition of the existence
of subjects of this sat [individuals]. We know well enough that this is an acquired
disposition, we know that there have been communities of men from which it has been
absent a in which it was relatively insignificant; and we know that such communities
may re-emerge. But all this offers no hindrance to the elucidation of the political theory
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of individualism. All that could make such a political thea)' unintelligible would be
the demoostration that subjects of this disposition have never existed; and all that could
make such a political thea)' of merely historic interest would be the demonstration that
subjects of this sort do not now exist. And neither of these propositions is capable of
being convincing or even plausible."
Such a justificatioo of liberal values seems both sensible and coherent. The problem is,
however, that no liberal, apart frOOl someone like Rorty who entirely rejects any attempt to
offer foundatioos, could accept such a limited defence of the liberal order as a starting point.
First, it is based 00 prejudice in favour of existing institutioos and rejects the search for
universalist foundatioos. Second, it also openly recognises that the illiberal groups within
liberal states can be tolerated only insofar as they do not transgress the norms laid down by
liberal values." But liberal theorists have never been able to present coherent universal
moral foundations for liberal values; and we have seen why the (liberal) quest for liberal
foundations must prove futile. Liberalism cannot be sustained on its own basis. Rather,
liberalism must be founded 00 the pre- and proto-liberal traditions which gave birth to its
founding texts (such as Locke's TIro Treatises, Paine's Rights of Man, the Constitution of the
United States and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen) rather than on the
texts themselves: for these were in fact abstractions from extant political behaviour and
arrangements, and not, their authors' views to the contrary notwithstanding, universal truths
accessible to entirely disinterested reason.
Liberalism is the product of certain times and certain places. It is not a universally
applicable system of thought based on eternally valid precepts discovered by reason. It is not
neutral between competing conceptioos of the good; it is at best neutral only between the
competing wants of individuals. It is simply something abstracted from the political
traditions of the lands that gave it birth. Does this fatally weaken liberalism? I venture to
suggest not. Political activity, whether it is in terms of practice or theory, seldom if ever
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begins from a blank piece of paper. It is almost always. as Oakeshott puts it a matter of
'attending to the arrangements' of already existing societies." This is surely what liberal
theorists do, however rarely they admit it. But coosider, finally, Oakeshott's definition of
politics:
[P]olitics is the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a collection of
people who, in respect of their common recognition of a manner of attending to its
arrangements, compose a single community, To suppose a collection of people without
recognized traditions of behaviour, or one which enjoyed arrangements which
intimated no direction f<r change and needed no attention, is to suppose a people
incapable of politics. This activity, then springs neither from instant desires, nor from
general principles, but frcm the existing traditions of behaviour themselves. And the
form it takes, because it can take no other, is the amendment of existing arrangements
by exploring and pursuing what is intimated in them."
Now, if we think back to the concerns examined throughout this thesis we discover that
pursuing the intimations of the liberal tradition is exactly what they have been doing. Mill,
for example, is coocerned to establish the maximwn level of freedom so that individuals can
pursue a fine character; Hayek attempts to justifY liberalism in terms of individualism and
material well-being; and Raz seeks to ensure that individuals can make the most of the
autOOOOlY enhancing culture in which they live. These attempts are intimated by
preoccupations within the liberal traditioo. This is the basis of the relationship between
liberalism and cooservatism. It is ooly through reversion to cooservative ideas of the priority
of practice over thea)' and the defence of existing orders that liberalism can defend its core
values. It is only by utilising these argwnents, which were developed by cooservatives to
defend the remnants of the older traditim on which liberalism was founded, that liberal
values can ultimately be defended.
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